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[Excerpt] This report offers an approach and ideas for reflection, inviting readers to consider how we can 
ensure that the actions that we know are required to strengthen resilience are actually taken. It is primarily 
aimed at investors in the public sphere, namely governments and their development partners. The report 
intentionally applies a loose definition of investment and investors, looking well beyond financial outlays 
on physical infrastructure. It covers the investment of a wide range of resources—including political 
commitment, human resources utilization, knowledge, know-how, and personal time and dedication—in an 
extensive array of structural and nonstructural instruments and mechanisms to identify and assess risk, 
reduce risk, and manage remaining risk. It includes investments in, for instance, institutions, legislative 
and regulatory frameworks, financing mechanisms, incentives for change, and systems of accountability. 
It encourages investors to integrate investments in resilience into their own areas and modes of work and 
to promote, incentivize, and coordinate on the part of the private sector and households. 
The report is not a manual or handbook and deliberately does not present prescribed courses of action. 
Instead, it establishes a vision of a resilient future and equips investors with a framework and ideas to 
identify practical actions that will result in the realization of that vision. The vision shows how resilience 
can be accomplished through the coordinated action of governments and their development partners in 
the private sector, civil society, and the international community. It stresses the interconnectedness and 
complementarity of possible actions to achieve resilience across a wide range of development policies, 
plans, legislation, sectors, and themes. The vision encourages “investors” to identify and prioritize 
bundles of actions that collectively can realize that vision of resilience, breaking away from the current 
tendency to pursue disparate and fragmented disaster risk management measures that frequently trip 
and fall at unforeseen hurdles. 
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Ensuring a Disaster-Resistant Future
Investing in Resilience: Ensuring a Disaster-Resistant Future focuses on the steps required 
to ensure that investment in disaster resilience happens and that it occurs as an integral, 
systematic part of development. At-risk communities in Asia and the Pacific can apply a wide 
range of policy, capacity, and investment instruments and mechanisms to ensure that disaster 
risk is properly assessed, disaster risk is reduced, and residual risk is well managed. Yet, real 
progress in strengthening resilience has been slow to date and natural hazards continue to 
cause significant loss of life, damage, and disruption in the region, undermining inclusive, 
sustainable development.
Investing in Resilience offers an approach and ideas for reflection on how to achieve 
disaster resilience. It does not prescribe specific courses of action but rather establishes 
a vision of a resilient future. It stresses the interconnectedness and complementarity of 
possible actions to achieve disaster resilience across a wide range of development policies, 
plans, legislation, sectors, and themes. The vision shows how resilience can be accomplished 
through the coordinated action of governments and their development partners in the private 
sector, civil society, and the international community. The vision encourages “investors” to 
identify and prioritize bundles of actions that collectively can realize that vision of resilience, 
breaking away from the current tendency to pursue disparate and fragmented disaster 
risk management measures that frequently trip and fall at unforeseen hurdles. Investing 
in Resilience aims to move the disaster risk reduction debate beyond rhetoric and to help 
channel commitments into investment, incentives, funding, and practical action.
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The cover design depicts a section of a geodesic sphere, a resilient 
structure made up of networks of geodesics (*) on the surface of the 
sphere. The geodesics intersect to form triangle elements that gain 
strength from the connections and distribute the stress across the 
structure. In the context of this report, it is these connections, between 
a wide range of instruments and mechanisms and core needs spanning 
the entire disaster risk management spectrum, that create the building 
blocks for strengthening resilience. The design conveys the notion of 
backward and forward linkages created by the interconnectedness of the 
different elements in the structure, thus recognizing the availability of 
many shared entry points and numerous opportunities to lead and direct 
change to strengthen resilience, or even to spur it from behind.
* A geodesic line is the shortest distance between any two points on a sphere.
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Foreword
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has provided considerable resources to assist its developing member 
countries in reducing disaster risk and responding to disaster events over the past 25 years. Between August 
1987 and December 2012, it has approved $17.60 billion, for a total 560 disaster risk management projects. Of 
this, 10.5% ($1.85 billion) has been for emergency assistance, 27.9% ($4.91 billion) for post-disaster rehabili-
tation and reconstruction, and 61.6% ($10.84 billion) for disaster risk reduction activities. 
Developing member country requests for disaster risk reduction assistance are growing as awareness and 
understanding of the threat posed by natural hazards to inclusive sustainable development strengthens. Two-
thirds of ADB’s total investments in disaster risk reduction over the past 25 years have occurred in the past 8 
years alone. Disaster risk reduction initiatives currently underway include actions to enhance urban resilience 
by developing risk-sensitive land-use planning tools; strengthen school seismic safety in Nepal; and integrate 
climate and disaster risk information into urban development and infrastructure planning in the Pacific. 
ADB is increasing efforts to integrate disaster risk management and climate change adaptation into its wider 
operational plans, country partnership strategies, and development investments. This is important in a region 
dominated by climate-related hazard impacts, and ADB’s integrated disaster risk management framework 
and the draft Environmental Operational Plan bring together these key elements within an overarching 
context of resilience. Resilience is developed in many of ADB’s approaches, and are captured in programs 
under the Water Operational Plan, the Urban Operational Plan, and the Financial Sector Operational Plan. 
However, disaster losses continue to increase in Asia and the Pacific. Populations and economies have 
expanded, increasing the number of people and assets exposed to natural hazards. Much development has 
occurred with little regard to natural hazards, unintentionally exacerbating existing disaster risk and creating 
new forms of disaster risk. In anticipation of yet greater need for post-disaster emergency, early recovery, and 
reconstruction assistance in future years, ADB approved a new pilot disaster response facility in October 2012 
for countries eligible for concessional Asian Development Fund Financing, to enable a more flexible, predict-
able, and systematic approach to disaster response. It has also embarked on several initiatives to support the 
development of city-level financing mechanisms for disaster response.
The continuing trend of rising disaster losses points to one clear message: much greater investment in 
resilience is needed. This investment must assess risk, reduce risk and ensure that residual risk is managed as 
efficiently as possible, spurring rapid, hazard-resilient recovery and reconstruction. It requires commitments 
of finance, know-how, and human resources on the part of governments, the private sector, civil society, and 
the international community in a wide array of, legislative, regulatory, policy, planning, institutional, finan-
cial, and capacity-building instruments and mechanisms.
This publication seeks to stimulate, secure and sustain this investment in resilience. It recognizes that 
there is an extensive array of disaster risk management tools and mechanisms available in Asia and the Pacific 
but that they are not being applied as often, or as effectively, as they could be. It encourages governments and 
their development partners to embark on a coordinated approach to resilience. It emphasizes the mutual 
connectedness between potential initiatives to strengthen resilience and encourages stakeholders to identify 
individual actions which collectively would complement and reinforce one another, together working towards 
a common vision of a disaster-resilient future.
We hope this publication will inspire governments, in collaboration with their development partners, 
to paint their individual visions of a resilient future in keeping with their particular disaster risk and other 
development challenges. It urges governments to place their visions, and related actions, within the context of 
broader poverty reduction and development policies and programs, seeking to ensure that each dollar spent 
on development is spent just once, not repeatedly as development gains are undone by disaster.
Bindu N. Lohani
Vice-President
Knowledge Management and Sustainable Development
Asian Development Bank
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Executive Summary
Natural hazards continue to cause significant 
loss of life in Asia and the Pacific, and existing 
trends suggest that growth in direct physical 
losses is outpacing regional expansion in gross 
domestic product. Behind each human and 
physical loss, there are additional indirect 
impacts and secondary consequences. These 
impacts can take many forms, including 
reduced output, disruptions to supply chains, 
lost schooling, and widening income and 
gender inequalities.
These losses are far from inevitable. There 
is a wide range of tools and mechanisms 
available to assess, reduce, and manage risk, 
covering a vast array of legislative, regulatory, 
policy, planning, institutional, financial, and 
capacity-building instruments. Moreover, 
there is increasing public awareness of 
the need to strengthen disaster resilience 
(hereafter shortened to resilience) at all 
levels of society as a critical component of 
efforts to achieve sustainable socioeconomic 
development and poverty reduction. However, 
as long as countries and their development 
partners continue to regard investment in 
resilience and investment in development 
as two separate issues, disaster risk will 
continue to accumulate and losses to expand, 
threatening long-term inclusive, sustainable 
growth in the region.
Purpose of the Report
This report offers an approach and ideas 
for reflection, inviting readers to consider 
how we can ensure that the actions that we 
know are required to strengthen resilience 
are actually taken. It is primarily aimed 
at investors in the public sphere, namely 
governments and their development partners. 
The report intentionally applies a loose 
definition of investment and investors, looking 
well beyond financial outlays on physical 
infrastructure. It covers the investment of a 
wide range of resources—including political 
commitment, human resources utilization, 
knowledge, know-how, and personal time 
and dedication—in an extensive array of 
structural and nonstructural instruments and 
mechanisms to identify and assess risk, reduce 
risk, and manage remaining risk. It includes 
investments in, for instance, institutions, 
legislative and regulatory frameworks, 
financing mechanisms, incentives for change, 
and systems of accountability. It encourages 
investors to integrate investments in resilience 
into their own areas and modes of work and 
to promote, incentivize, and coordinate on the 
part of the private sector and households.
The report is not a manual or handbook 
and deliberately does not present prescribed 
courses of action. Instead, it establishes 
a vision of a resilient future and equips 
investors with a framework and ideas to 
identify practical actions that will result in the 
realization of that vision. The vision shows 
how resilience can be accomplished through 
the coordinated action of governments and 
their development partners in the private 
sector, civil society, and the international 
community. It stresses the interconnectedness 
and complementarity of possible actions 
to achieve resilience across a wide range 
of development policies, plans, legislation, 
sectors, and themes. The vision encourages 
“investors” to identify and prioritize bundles 
of actions that collectively can realize that 
vision of resilience, breaking away from 
the current tendency to pursue disparate 
and fragmented disaster risk management 
measures that frequently trip and fall at 
unforeseen hurdles. 
Ensuing investments should enhance the 
ability of countries, communities, businesses, 
and individual households to resist, absorb, 
recover from, and reorganize both in anticipa-
tion of and in response to natural hazard events 
without jeopardizing their sustained socioeco-
nomic advancement and development. These 
investments should be undertaken within the 
context of a broader development framework, 
regarding strengthened resilience as an integral 
part of development goals, approaches, and 
individual initiatives.
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Scope
The report begins in Part I by reviewing recent 
disaster losses in the region, both overall 
and for a range of key development themes 
and sectors, and their consequences for 
poverty reduction and sustainable economic 
development. It paints a potentially bleak 
future, characterized by a reversal of recent 
progress in poverty reduction and rising 
average losses. The report identifies some of 
the key gaps and obstacles to investment in 
resilience, examining the processes shaping 
and informing development decisions and 
directions. These gaps and obstacles hinder 
efforts to meet the three basic core needs in 
strengthening resilience: risk assessment, risk 
reduction, and the management of residual 
risk. The report then identifies opportunities, 
investors, entry points, incentives, and actions 
to overcome these gaps and obstacles. The 
tools of intervention are categorized into 
three groups: policy instruments, relating 
to the legislative, regulatory, practice, and 
process parameters for managing risk; 
capacity instruments, enabling households, 
communities, businesses, and governments 
with appropriate skills, knowledge, and 
know-how to meet those parameters; and 
investment instruments, providing adequate 
financing and human resources to implement 
policy and apply capacity. These instruments 
and mechanisms are well established and 
embody principles of integrated disaster risk 
management, entailing a systematic set of 
activities that collectively seek to avoid, lessen, 
or transfer the potential adverse effects of 
all hazards. Collectively, these instruments 
and mechanisms could satisfy—but as yet 
have not satisfied—the three core needs 
(risk assessment, risk reduction, and 
residual risk management), leading to a set 
of circumstances whereby investments in 
resilience are appropriately stimulated, the 
necessary investments are acted upon or 
secured, and investments continue into the 
future on a sustained basis.
Part II is less orthodox. It creates 
hypothetical stories of successful investment 
in resilience from the perspective of a range 
of levels of administration and development 
themes and sectors, using a backcasting 
approach. Visions of a desirable resilient 
future are established and then translated into 
possible steps and measures that can be taken 
to achieve them. Part II begins with a series of 
stories focusing on strengthened national, city, 
and household resilience. It then considers five 
key themes and sectors of particular relevance 
in strengthening resilience: 
•	 livelihoods, where investment in resil-
ience of the poor and near-poor can lead 
directly to poverty reduction;
•	 land use planning, where the integration 
of disaster risk considerations into 
the existing process represents a 
fundamental first step in strengthening 
resilience;
•	 transport, as the siting and satisfactory 
functioning of such infrastructure plays 
a central role in determining the location 
and continuing productivity of many 
other development investments;
•	 education, where investment in resil-
ience translates into a direct transgen-
erational investment in the future of a 
country; and
•	 housing, a centerpiece of social fabric 
and human security.
The backcasting approach, combined 
with the related analysis of existing gaps and 
obstacles, reveals a wide variety of potentially 
useful tools and mechanisms to strengthen 
resilience. These range from more obvious 
steps, such as risk assessment, assignment of 
accountabilities, training, capacity building, 
and insurance, to less immediately obvious 
ones, such as extension of mobile phone 
networks, enhanced access to microcredit, the 
regularization of land tenure, and the creation 
of regional university insurance pools. 
By adopting a backcasting approach, the 
analysis goes a step further and stimulates 
more unified thinking and action. Individual 
instruments and mechanisms are often 
designed to address a particular gap or 
challenge but may encounter other unfore-
seen—but not unexpected—gaps and chal-
lenges during implementation. These gaps 
and challenges often require additional action, 
well beyond the scope, area of expertise, and 
funding of those individual measures whose 
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progress they are hindering. Backcasting helps 
planners and policy makers explore the bigger 
picture, examining the potential interplay 
among different instruments and mechanisms 
across a range of development themes and 
sectors. It facilitates the critically-required 
coordinated development of bundles of mutu-
ally supportive tools that together overcome 
key gaps and obstacles and create synergies 
that enhance the sum of parts. As such, it 
helps embed the more theoretical discussion 
and ideas in Part I into on-the-ground realities 
in implementation and supports the design 
of sound wider resilience strategies as well as 
individual tools and relevant mechanisms. 
Part III considers a sixth theme of par-
ticular relevance in strengthening resilience 
in Asia and the Pacific: disaster risk financing. 
It explores the future role that ex ante (antici-
patory) disaster risk financing instruments 
can play in supporting timely and adequate 
post-disaster relief, early recovery, and 
reconstruction operations. It begins, again, 
with a vision of the future in which disaster 
risk financing is an accepted, institutionalized, 
and routinely employed part of the disaster 
risk management policy and practice, working 
back via backcasting to identify key steps to 
the vision’s achievement. These steps include 
considerable strengthening of risk assessment 
capacity; the innovative application of existing 
disaster risk financing instruments, developed 
and supported by new financing vehicles;  
and concerted efforts to ensure that local  
and national governments can access disaster 
risk financing.
Concluding comments are provided in 
Part IV, returning to the importance of invest-
ing in resilience to help ensure a sustainable, 
inclusive, and prosperous future. A series of 
critical steps that can help jump-start greater 
investments of finance, know-how, and human 
resources in resilience, together with key 
indicators to monitor progress and outcomes, 
are discussed.
Critical Next Steps
The report identifies eight critical next steps 
toward strengthened resilience, building on 
the gaps and challenges identified in the  
report and the findings of the backcasting 
exercises: 
Policy Change
•	 Governments can review and, where 
appropriate, revise disaster risk manage-
ment legislative and regulatory frame-
works to clarify and explicitly articulate 
the precise roles and responsibilities of 
individual households, communities, 
the private sector, governments, and the 
international community in strengthen-
ing resilience. 
Risk Assessment
•	 Governments can ensure that some form 
of disaster risk assessment is under-
taken for all new investments in their 
countries, whether financed directly 
by a government, via support from the 
international community, or privately. 
Financing
•	 National and subnational governments 
can develop and implement comprehen-
sive disaster risk financing strategies to 
reduce risk and to provide adequate and 
timely post-disaster support to strength-
en financial resilience. 
•	 Governments, in cooperation with the 
international community, can encour-
age the growth and development of the 
insurance and reinsurance sectors in their 
countries and generally provide for a range 
of disaster risk financing instruments.
•	 Governments, in cooperation with the 
international community, can establish 
public programs of financial support for 
community and local investment in risk 
assessment, risk reduction, and residual 
risk management.
Private Sector Engagement
•	 Governments, working in cooperation 
with the international community, can 
develop programs of work to strengthen 
private sector understanding and appre-
ciation of the commercial opportunities 
in strengthening resilience. 
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Knowledge Management
•	 Governments and regional associations, 
working in cooperation with the inter-
national community and private sector 
partners, can establish an open-source, 
regional, online information platform to 
facilitate the development, exchange, and 
dissemination of hazard and risk data, 
including climate change modeling. 
•	 Governments and regional associations, 
working in cooperation with the 
international community, can establish a 
regional knowledge-development  
and capacity-building program to 
strengthen understanding across 
government and the wider society of the 
potential returns on investments in risk 
assessment, risk reduction, and residual 
risk management.
Part I
Disasters and Development:  
Instruments and Mechanisms 
for Strengthened Resilience
2 Investing in Resilience
Part I establishes the case for greater 
investment in disaster resilience, current gaps, 
and obstacles to investment in this area and 
potential opportunities to move forward. 
It begins by defining the report’s two key 
terms—investment and resilience—stressing 
the inclusive interpretation of the former 
to include a wide range of financial and 
nonfinancial resources. 
Recent loss of life and direct physical losses 
as a consequence of natural hazards in Asia 
and the Pacific and globally are reviewed, and 
the indirect impacts and secondary effects of 
natural hazards in five particularly vulnerable 
development themes and sectors are considered 
as well. The third chapter takes the discussion 
a step further, exploring the potential conse-
quences for poverty reduction and economic 
growth if disaster risk is not tackled. It presents 
a potentially bleak future, characterized by a 
reversal of recent progress in poverty reduc-
tion; rising average losses in excess of average 
growth in gross domestic product; and a sharp 
rise in losses associated with low-frequency, 
high-impact hazard events in urban areas. The 
following chapter identifies current gaps and 
obstacles to investment in greater resilience.
 The final chapter in Part I examines 
potential opportunities for stimulating, 
securing, and sustaining public and private 
investment in disaster resilience. It begins by 
exploring the scope for stimulating investment 
via policy change, focusing on national and 
subnational development planning, legislation, 
and regulative frameworks and national and 
subnational budgetary processes. It consid-
ers opportunities for securing investment in 
individual initiatives to strengthen resilience 
via project planning procedures, mechanisms 
to foster community and private sector 
participation, and public and private funding 
instruments, covering financing for both risk 
reduction and post-disaster relief, early recov-
ery, and reconstruction. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the knowledge, informa-
tion, capacity, and capabilities required to 
sustain investment in resilience many years 
into the future.
Rapid urban expansion can lead to densely built-up urban landscape in hazard-prone areas, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam
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The dawn of the 21st century holds many 
challenges for Asia and the Pacific. To reach 
their development potential, countries in 
the region must manage risk in many forms, 
including risk emanating from natural hazards 
and the disasters they spawn. Climate hazards 
have drawn the most visible recent political 
attention, linked to concerns about potential 
consequences of global warming, due to their 
frequency and intensity. However, geologic 
hazards are also prevalent, wreaking far 
greater loss of life in recent years.
Natural hazards pose a significant 
threat to the attainment of both national and 
regional development goals. As recent experi-
ence has clearly demonstrated, natural hazards 
threaten the most-developed economies in 
the region just as they threaten middle- and 
lower-income countries. However, significant 
disaster losses and related setbacks in poverty 
reduction and development are not inevitable. 
Investments in disaster resilience (hereafter 
shortened to resilience) can reduce direct 
and indirect disaster losses dramatically, 
contributing to sustained economic growth, 
the achievement of poverty reduction and 
other Millennium Development Goals, and 
enhanced natural resources management. 
Indeed, as the Group of Twenty recently 
acknowledged, “Action must be taken to help 
vulnerable populations manage risks and the 
impact of external shocks, such as economic 
crises and natural disasters” (Group of Twenty 
2012, 11).
Investments in resilience will have the 
most far-reaching effect if they are undertaken 
in the context of wider development and are 
carefully integrated into the development 
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Box 1 The Foundations of Resilient Development
All development actions carry certain inherent risk. Some forms of risk are explicitly identified, assessed, and managed. 
However, potential disaster risk often goes unnoticed, is ignored, or, at best, is misunderstood, leading to avoidable loss of life 
and assets at some future date. A new approach to development is urgently required, firmly rooted in two key facts:
1. Many development actions potentially carry disaster risk.
2. Many development actions can become instruments for investing in resilience.
process. Huge investment needs must be 
satisfied in Asia and the Pacific over the next 
few decades to sustain recent high rates of 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth, which 
averaged 7.4% per year in real terms during the 
first decade of the 21st century. Investments in 
resilience must be integrated into this process to 
help ensure that the broader investments lead 
to sustained socioeconomic development—that 
is, to use the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction’s (UNISDR) 
definition of sustainable development, to ensure 
that development “meets the needs of the pres-
ent without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (UNISDR 
2009, 29; see also Mileti 1999).
Disaster risk must be taken into account 
in determining the design and positioning 
of basic infrastructure, offices, factories, and 
homes; the direction and orientation of busi-
nesses and livelihood choices; and the broad 
thrust of economic and social development 
strategies. The effect of natural hazard events 
cannot be entirely eliminated, but it can be 
reduced, and new or amplified risk can be 
avoided (Box 1). Investment in resilience also 
helps ensure that the same investment is not 
paid for multiple times. Ultimately, the case 
and opportunity for investing in resilience 
should be considered with each and every 
development action.
Actions to strengthen resilience also 
need to be implemented within an integrated 
disaster risk management (DRM) framework, 
combining climate change adaptation (CCA), 
disaster risk reduction (DRR), disaster pre-
paredness, post-disaster relief, early recovery, 
reconstruction, and disaster risk financing 
(DRF) goals under a single framework and 
pursuing them through joint initiatives.
Defining Resilience
Resilience is a relatively new term in the 
DRM lexicon. It originated in an ecological 
context. Recently, it has been adopted by a 
range of other disciplines, including sociology, 
psychology, structural and engineering 
science, corporate strategy, and CCA, in 
addition to DRM (Bahadur, Ibrahim, and 
Tanner 2010). The term acknowledges 
“the existence of interconnected and 
interdependent sets of social, economic, 
natural and manmade systems that support 
communities” (National Academy of Science 
2012, 179). Moreover, it recognizes that the 
achievement of resilience involves actions and 
contributions from a wide range of disciplines 
and actors at various levels, working together 
with a shared responsibility and wide mix of 
tools and methods to balance their various 
needs and resources, including environmental 
and social as well as economic resources. It 
has become particularly popular in describing 
the intersection between DRM, CCA, poverty, 
and development (Bahadur, Ibrahim, and 
Tanner 2010). 
Precise concepts of resilience vary among 
disciplines but typically encompass a number 
of common characteristics. These include 
several or more of the following: high diversity 
in the range of functional groups within a 
system; effective institutions and institutional 
structures; the ability to accept uncertainty 
and change and work effectively in such 
environments; community involvement and 
inclusion of local knowledge; preparedness, 
planning, and readiness; equity; social values 
and structures as a basis for building resilient 
systems; nonequilibrium system dynamics, 
moving to new steady states after a disturbance; 
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learning from experience; and adoption of a 
cross-scalar perspective (Bahadur, Ibrahim, and 
Tanner 2010). Achieving resilience is challeng-
ing, not least because of its multidisciplinary, 
multi-scalar nature. An elaboration of a vision 
of a disaster resilient community and potential 
paths to its achievement may define precise 
shared and individual responsibilities, spurring 
progress toward its achievement.
Based on an amalgam of existing 
definitions, the term resilience is defined 
in this report as the ability of countries, 
communities, businesses, and individual 
households to resist, absorb, recover from, 
and reorganize in response to natural 
hazard events, without jeopardizing their 
sustained socioeconomic advancement and 
development (Table 1). Successful investment 
in resilience embodies principles of integrated 
DRM, entailing a systematic set of activities 
that collectively aims to avoid, lessen, or 
transfer the potential adverse effects of all 
hazards, specifically through the integration 
of CCA, DRF, and DRR measures. The term is 
used in this report to refer not only to physical 
resilience of the built environment but also 
to human resilience, social resilience, and 
physical resilience of the natural environment. 
Moreover, the selected definition recognizes 
the highly dynamic, continually shifting 
nature of the state of resilience as populations 
grow and move, capital investments 
expand, and the frequency and intensity 
of meteorological, hydrological, and 
climatological events change as a consequence 
of global warming. 
Defining Investment
In the context of this report, the term 
investment is used loosely, looking well 
beyond financial outlays on physical 
infrastructure. It covers the investment 
of a wide range of resources—including 
political commitment, human resources, 
knowledge, know-how, and personal time 
and dedication—in an extensive array of 
structural and nonstructural instruments 
and mechanisms to identify and assess risk, 
reduce risk, and manage remaining residual 
risk. It includes investments in, for instance, 
institutions, legislative and regulatory 
frameworks, financing mechanisms, incentives 
for change, and systems of accountability.
Table 1 Definitions of Resilience
Source Definition of Resilience
Department for 
International 
Development of the 
United Kingdom  
“The ability of countries, communities, and households to manage change, by maintaining or 
transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses—such as earthquakes, drought, 
or violent conflict—without compromising their long-term prospects” (DFID 2011, 6). 
Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate 
Change
“The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while 
retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-
organization, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change” (IPPC 2007, 86).
United Nations 
International Strategy 
for Disaster Reduction
“The ability of a system, community, or society exposed to hazards to resist, 
absorb, accommodate to, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely 
and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration 
of its essential basic structures and functions” (UNISDR 2009, 24).
World Bank “The ability to withstand, recover from, and reorganize in response to crises so that all 
members of society may develop or maintain the ability to thrive” (Benson et al. 2012, 10). 
6 Investing in Resilience
Potential investors come from both the 
public sphere and the wider society. They 
comprise anyone who can potentially create 
risk as well as anyone who can potentially 
enhance resilience, whether at a household, 
individual commercial, community, district, 
regional, sectoral or national level and whether 
directly or indirectly. 
The Call for Investing  
in Resilience
As long as countries and their development 
partners continue to consider investing in 
resilience and investing in development to 
be two entirely separate issues, disaster risk 
will continue to accumulate. To address 
the trend toward increased vulnerability to 
natural hazards and to counter additional 
factors potentially contributing to rising 
losses—in the form of increasing exposure 
as physical infrastructure and assets expand, 
and increasing frequency and intensity of 
meteorological, hydrological, and climatological 
hazards as a consequence of climate change—
development policies, programs, and individual 
actions urgently need adjustment to take 
account of disaster risk.
The call for investment in resilience 
and the call to lead this effort by addressing 
disaster risk as an integral part of development 
are by no means new or innovative. Instead, 
such thinking dates back at least 30 years 
in the academic literature, and less than a 
decade later the concept appeared in practical 
handbooks on the topic. This body of work 
explicitly recognizes the potential implica-
tions of development for vulnerability and of 
disasters for development. Furthermore, it 
recognizes development itself as the central 
key to enhanced resilience (see, e.g., Cuny 
1983; OAS 1990, 1991).
International recognition of the links 
between disasters and development—and 
international commitment to address-
ing disasters through development—also 
dates back almost 2 decades. The United 
Nations (UN) launched the International 
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR) in 1990 to reduce loss of life, 
damage to property, and social and economic 
disruption as a consequence of natural 
hazards. Initiatives undertaken during the 
decade were somewhat dominated by the 
scientific community and the technical 
aspects of risk management. Nevertheless, 
a notable breakthrough was achieved at the 
Mid-Decade World Conference on Natural 
Disaster Reduction in Yokohama in May 1994, 
when the strategy and plan of action drawn up 
for the remainder of the IDNDR endorsed a 
shift in emphasis toward broader risk man-
agement strategies and capacity building as 
integral components of development planning 
(IDNDR 1994).
In 2000, the UN system was designated 
to carry on the work begun under the IDNDR 
by implementing the International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction. This strategy continued 
to emphasize the integration of ongoing risk 
prevention strategies into sustainable develop-
ment plans (UNISDR 2000). The integration 
of disaster risk considerations into sustainable 
development policies, planning, and program-
ming at all levels also formed the first of the 
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Vulnerable buildings contribute to increased disaster risk in urban areas. 
Dhaka, Bangladesh
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three strategic goals of the Hyogo Framework 
for Action (2005–2015). The Hyogo Frame-
work for Action was adopted by the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction in January 
2005, with 168 nation and multilateral institu-
tion signatories, and it was later endorsed by 
the UN General Assembly.
Within Asia and the Pacific, the same goal 
has been reiterated in various regional and 
subregional declarations and action plans since 
that time, including in the 2005 Pacific Island 
Countries Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster 
Management Framework for Action (2005–
2015); the 2006 Pacific Islands Framework for 
Action on Climate Change (2006–2015); the 
2006 South Asian  Association for Regional 
Cooperation Comprehensive Framework 
on Disaster Management in South Asia; the 
November 2007 Delhi Declaration on Disaster 
Risk Reduction, adopted at the Second Asian 
Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion; the 2009 Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on  Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response; and 
the October 2012 Yogyakarta Declaration on 
Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia and the Pacific, 
adopted at the Fifth Asian Ministerial Confer-
ence on Disaster Risk Reduction. The 2009 
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response was also the first 
legally binding agreement in the world to cover 
disaster risk reduction.
Extensive international dialogue is cur-
rently under way on the post-2015 framework 
for DRR and the precise thrust of future 
directions is still being determined. However, 
it will almost certainly continue to emphasize 
strengthened resilience via appropriate devel-
opment decisions. The year 2015 marks the 
deadline both for the achievement of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals and the comple-
tion of the Hyogo Framework for Action, and 
efforts are under way to align their respective 
successor frameworks and goals.
However, despite the plethora of mounting 
commitments and pledges to strengthen resil-
ience through development actions, substantive 
practical progress toward this end has yet to be 
achieved in Asia and the Pacific. As in other 
regions, efforts to date have focused particularly 
on raising awareness, together with further 
strengthening of technical disaster response 
capabilities. Raising awareness clearly is an 
essential fundamental first step, and substantial 
progress has been made in this regard, aided by 
advances in hazard modeling. Knowledge and 
know-how on specific actions to strengthen 
resilience, including DRF instruments to man-
age residual risk as well as tools and techniques 
to reduce risk, have expanded enormously. 
Moreover, there is a growing body of experi-
ence with and understanding of the gaps and 
obstacles to their application and replication on 
the part of governments, businesses, communi-
ties, and individual households. Nonetheless, 
this awareness; the mounting development 
of tools, instruments, and guidelines; and the 
accumulating piecemeal success stories have yet 
to translate into concerted practical action that 
actually achieves strengthened resilience on a 
substantial scale.
Objective and Scope  
of the Report
This report is primarily aimed at investors in 
the public sphere, namely governments and 
their development partners. These investors 
include policy makers, legislators, national 
and subnational government officials, private 
businesses working in partnership with 
government, civil society organizations, and 
the international community. The report is 
also of wider relevance to all public and private 
investors in development, stretching from the 
highest reaches of government to individual 
communities, businesses, and citizens.
The report seeks to encourage its target 
audience to integrate investments in resil-
ience into its areas of work and to promote, 
incentivize, and support parallel actions on 
the part of the private sector and households. 
It focuses on the steps required to ensure both 
that investment in resilience happens and that 
it occurs as an integral part of development. 
The report offers a structure, an approach, and 
ideas for reflection, inviting readers to con-
sider how we can ensure that the actions that 
we know are required to strengthen resilience 
are actually taken. It is not a manual or hand-
book and does not present all the answers. 
Instead, it encourages readers to envisage a 
resilient future and equips them with a frame-
work and ideas to identify practical actions 
that will result in the realization of that vision. 
It seeks to effect change, identifying ways of 
overcoming key gaps and obstacles in order 
Despite the 
plethora of 
mounting 
commitments 
and pledges 
to strengthen 
resilience through 
development 
actions, 
substantive 
practical progress 
toward this end 
has yet to be 
achieved in Asia 
and the Pacific
8 Investing in Resilience
to turn existing rhetoric and commitments on 
strengthened resilience into responsibilities, 
accountability, and funded, targeted actions 
that can be undertaken within the context of a 
broader development framework. 
The remainder of Part I outlines the 
case for investing in resilience and examines 
key gaps and obstacles to such investment. It 
identifies possible opportunities, instruments, 
entry points, and investors to overcome 
these gaps and obstacles. Part II presents 
the five development themes and sectors of 
particular focus in this report, identifying 
potential policy, capacity, and investment 
instruments that could be applied to address 
risk assessment, risk reduction, and residual 
risk management needs. Part III considers 
the scope for increasing investment in ex ante 
financing instruments for post-disaster relief, 
early recovery, and reconstruction, an area 
offering considerable potential for investment 
in Asia and the Pacific over the next few 
decades. Part IV returns to the importance 
of investing in resilience to help ensure a 
sustainable, prosperous future and identifies a 
series of critical steps that can help jump-start 
greater investments of finance, know-how, and 
human resources in this area.
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Disaster Losses in Asia  
and the Pacific2
Residents commute along a flooded stretch of road as waist-high water inundated the town. Calumpit, north of Manila, Philippines
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Many development policy makers and 
practitioners in the public and the private 
sectors have been witness to the role of 
development in the creation of risk from 
natural hazards, whether they have recognized 
it or not. Greenhouse gas emissions; water, 
forest, and mineral extraction; and land use and 
livelihood choices made by governments and 
the wider society have continued to contribute 
to growing risk. Risk has been created  
and accentuated—–be it inadvertently— 
by economic growth policies, rural–urban 
migration, infrastructure investments, and 
consumption of natural resources.
In consequence, natural hazards continue 
to cause significant loss of life in Asia and the 
Pacific. From 1970 to 2010, 1.7 million hazard-
related deaths were recorded in the region. This 
accounted for 51% of total global deaths as a 
consequence of natural hazards, slightly lower 
than the region’s average 57% share of total 
global population over the same period. Rela-
tive to total land area, however, loss of life has 
been much greater. Average annual deaths per 
1,000 square kilometers averaged 0.5 globally 
from 1971 to 2010 but was double that, averag-
ing 1.1 deaths per 1,000 square kilometers, in 
Asia and the Pacific (Figure 1). Some progress 
has been made in reducing loss of life from 
cyclones/typhoons through the implementation 
of highly effective early warning systems. How-
ever, there has been little apparent progress in 
reducing overall levels of mortality in Asia and 
the Pacific, and periodic disasters—including 
several earthquakes and tsunamis over the past 
decade—continue to cause major loss of life.
Direct physical losses have followed 
a gradual upward trend as the region has 
grown economically and infrastructure and 
assets have expanded. Total losses were a 
Choices made  
by governments  
and the wider 
society have 
continued  
to contribute to 
growing risk
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Figure 1 Loss of Life as a Consequence of Natural Hazards, 1971–2010 
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Source: Based on data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (n.d.).
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marginal 2% lower in real terms in 2000–
2009 than during the 1990s. However, data 
for the earlier period were inflated by record 
losses in 1995 as a consequence of the Kobe 
earthquake, an extreme event. A new high 
was set in 2011, both regionally and globally, 
as the region suffered unprecedented damage 
from a series of major disasters in Japan, New 
Zealand, and Thailand (Figure 2).
Direct physical losses have followed a 
similar upward trend in the region’s develop-
ing countries alone (Figure 3). Particularly 
high losses were experienced in 2008 due to 
the earthquake in Sichuan Province, People’s 
Republic of China.
Asia and the Pacific accounted for 40% 
of total reported disaster losses globally from 
1970 to 2010 in real terms, and accounted 
for 44% of losses over the longer period 
1970–2011 (Figure 4). In comparison, it 
accounted for 29% of global GDP in 2009 (UN 
ESCAP 2011) and for notably less during the 
Figure 2 Direct Physical Losses as a Consequence of Natural Hazards in 
Asia and the Pacific, 1970–2011
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Figure 3 Direct Physical Losses as a Consequence of Natural Hazards  
in Developing Countries in Asia and the Pacific, 1970–2011
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Figure 4 Direct Physical Losses as a Consequence of Natural Hazards, 
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Figure 5 Loss of Life in Asia  
and the Pacific by Natural Hazard, 
1970–2010 
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Figure 6 Direct Physical Losses  
in Asia and the Pacific by Natural 
Hazard, 1970–2010
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1970s and 1980s, highlighting the fact that the 
region bears a disproportionately large share 
of total reported losses relative to its wealth. 
Moreover, GDP includes economic activi-
ties linked to recovery and reconstruction, 
implying that the ratio of losses to resources 
channeled for development progress is even 
greater in this region than it is globally. 
Average annual per capita losses have been 
generally lower in Asia and the Pacific than 
elsewhere, but average annual losses relative to 
land mass have been higher.
Earthquakes and storms have been the 
leading cause of hazard-related death in 
Asia and the Pacific, together accounting for 
85% of total loss of life from 1970 to 2010 
(Figure 5). Developing countries accounted 
for more than 97% of total hazard-related 
deaths in the region. Floods and earthquakes 
have caused the largest direct physical losses, 
with floods accounting for 35% of total losses 
and earthquakes accounting for 32% of total 
losses in Asia and the Pacific (Figure 6). In the 
region’s developing countries alone, however, 
floods have accounted for 49% of total losses 
and earthquakes have accounted for 22% of 
total losses.
Subregionally, among developing coun-
tries alone, Southeast Asia fared the worst on 
average in terms of loss of life and damage, 
both per capita and relative to land mass. 
Annual damage averaged a colossal  
$4.3 million per 1,000 square kilometers, 
or $4,285 per square kilometer (Figure 7). 
Central and West Asia suffered the fewest 
losses expressed in these terms.
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Figure 7 Loss of Life and Damage in Developing Countries of Subregions 
of Asia and the Pacific, 1970–2010
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Different Perspectives on 
the Toll of Disasters
Dry statistical data of this sort abound, 
whether they pertain to global, regional, 
or national losses, or even to losses from 
individual events. Reports of one kind or 
another follow disaster events in Asia and 
the Pacific, as elsewhere on the globe. These 
reports come from varying sources and focus 
on effects at a range of levels. However, they 
typically paint a static, snapshot picture, in 
many cases taken in the immediate aftermath 
of an event. The reports highlight loss of lives 
and assets, numbers affected, and related 
humanitarian relief efforts, but they often say 
little more.
In reality, there is far more to the story 
than quantitative estimates and monetary 
sums. The true extent of effects often extends 
well beyond loss of life and direct physical 
losses and, over time, well beyond the imme-
diate aftermath of an event. Moreover, behind 
each disaster, there is a story about the causal 
factors underlying the losses, the factors 
determining changes in risk over time, and, by 
implication, the measures that could be taken 
to avoid a repeat event.
The real toll of a disaster includes a wide 
range of indirect impacts and secondary 
effects as a consequence of the direct human 
and physical (stock) losses. Indirect impacts 
take the form of disruption of flows of goods 
and services stemming from the direct losses. 
For instance, such effects can include reduced 
output; higher production costs; disruptions 
to domestic, regional, or even global supply 
chains; job losses; and reduced years of 
schooling. They can also include certain 
positive effects—in the form of increased 
demand in unaffected parts of a country, 
for instance. Secondary effects capture the 
wider economic and social consequences of 
a disaster, including the effects on economic 
fundamentals such as fiscal balance, external 
reserves, and GDP growth rates; on income 
and gender inequalities; on poverty levels; and 
on the nutritional, health, and educational 
status of a country’s population.
Looking at the toll of disasters on 
specific development themes and sectors can 
help broaden our understanding of the full 
potential consequences of a natural hazard 
event, the need for investment in resilience, 
and specific opportunities to overcome any 
gaps and obstacles to that investment. This 
report places particular emphasis on five 
development themes and sectors of particular 
relevance in strengthening resilience: liveli-
hoods, land use, transport, education, and 
housing. Transport and education have been 
selected in part because they are representative 
of, respectively, infrastructure and services 
more generally. Much of the discussion 
relating to these two sectors applies to other 
infrastructure and service sectors as well. 
The toll on public finance is also considered, 
leading into an examination of opportunities 
to strengthen DRF capacity, both to support 
governments in managing contingent liability 
and to reduce public contingent liability via 
greater private use of market-based disaster 
risk transfer mechanisms. 
The Toll on Population: 
Livelihoods
Livelihoods are an appropriate place to 
start the discussion, because the degree of 
livelihood resilience lies at the heart of a 
natural hazard’s effect on a country and thus 
investment in resilience can lead to a direct 
reduction in poverty.
Hazard events can exact a toll on all forms 
of livelihood assets—human, social, natural, 
physical, and financial—with potentially par-
ticularly severe consequences for the poor and 
Extensive damage caused by the volcanic eruption of Mt. Merapi. Indonesia 
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near-poor. For instance, hazards are more likely 
to result in the loss of places of work (including 
homes), tools, livestock, and inventories of the 
poor and near-poor, and these lower-income 
groups are less likely to have savings,  insurance, 
or access to formal credit to restore their 
physical assets. These effects are compounded 
by the loss of access to predominantly public 
services—health, education, water and sanita-
tion, transport, energy, and telecommunica-
tions—which, together with housing, constitute 
the spaces and services upon which livelihoods 
function. Reflecting their smaller asset base, the 
poor and near-poor are also more likely to face 
prolonged periods of recovery, during which 
time they are even more vulnerable to further 
hazard events.
The Toll on Environment:  
Land Use
Integration of disaster risk considerations into 
land use planning represents a fundamental 
first step in strengthening resilience. The use 
of land can determine the extent of a natural 
hazard’s damage to the built environment—
the megacities, urban areas, towns, and 
farms that development has brought—and 
the consequences for the people that live and 
work in those areas. Disasters can also have 
implications for future land use. They have 
aggravated environmental degradation in 
many countries, destroying trees, vegetation, 
and coral reefs and contributing to coastal 
erosion, thereby rendering these countries 
more vulnerable to future natural hazards.  
In some countries, disasters have generated 
large amounts of debris from damaged 
structures (and ash and pyroclastic flow 
deposits, in the case of volcanic eruptions), 
pollution, and even nuclear contamination, 
leaving parcels of land unusable for many 
years. Disasters also have exacerbated pressure 
on urban land by forcing additional migrants 
into towns and cities in search of work and 
the influx of even more people into informal 
settlements in hazard-prone areas.
The Toll on Transport
The siting and satisfactory functioning of 
transport networks and other infrastructure 
play a central role in the economic functioning 
of all countries and determine the location 
and continuing productivity of many other 
development investments. However, the 
transport sector also often suffers some of 
the highest direct physical losses, with far-
reaching indirect consequences. The direct 
losses often receive particular attention in 
damage, loss, and needs assessments, but the 
implied toll on the population is less frequently 
reported. These indirect impacts can take 
the form of disruptions to the movement 
of goods and services, reduced access to 
schools and health-care facilities, prolonged 
travel times, increased transportation costs, 
or reduced competitiveness, all of which can 
result in particular hardship for lower-income 
households. This toll is often exacerbated 
by substantial delays in securing funding 
for reconstruction and by the reallocation 
of transport maintenance and investment 
resources to early recovery and reconstruction, 
thereby reducing the quality of unaffected 
sections of the transport network and delaying 
planned extensions.
The Toll on Education
The effect of natural hazards on the education 
sector, similar to the effect on health facilities 
and other public places of assembly, is routinely 
manifested in loss of life and buildings and 
translates directly into a reduced investment in 
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Victims of Cyclone Nargis repair their temporary bamboo shelter at a village on 
the outskirts of Yangon. Myanmar
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the future of a country. Mortality levels can be 
especially tragic if sudden-onset hazard events 
occur during school hours. Less information 
is normally available on the indirect and 
secondary consequences of loss of life and 
damage to schools, colleges, and universities, 
particularly in the case of more-frequent, 
lower-intensity hazard events. In practice, these 
indirect and secondary losses can be far-
reaching. Reconstruction of local educational 
school facilities often takes some time. 
Meanwhile, schools in a number of countries 
in Asia and the Pacific already operate on a 
double-shift system. In some countries, even 
triple-shift schools are quite common. This 
implies that there is little spare capacity to 
absorb additional children into the surviving 
facilities in the event of a disaster, even 
assuming that such facilities are located within 
a reasonable distance of the affected students’ 
homes. The traumatic loss of life of teachers 
and fellow students as well as family members 
can have a severe long-term psychological 
impact as well, causing additional disruptions 
and affecting academic performance. In sum, 
lives and livelihoods are interrupted or changed 
as disasters disrupt education and training,  
and some students simply never return  
to education.
The Toll on Families: Housing
Damage to housing—a centerpiece of social 
fabric and human security—often accounts 
for one of the largest shares in total reported 
damage following a disaster. The collapse of a 
home poses an immediate and obvious threat 
to human life, particularly when disasters 
occur during the night and families are asleep 
at home. Indirect losses are very poorly 
documented but include effects on livelihoods 
for those who work from home, such as in 
a tailoring or bicycle repair business; on 
community structures; and on psychological 
health. Indirect losses are commonly amplified 
further by temporary loss of basic services 
such as water and sanitation, electricity, 
health care, and education. For the displaced, 
housing costs can soar as existing housing 
shortages are exacerbated. Life in temporary 
housing settlements also leads to further 
issues, not least the increased risk of violence, 
particularly against women.
The Toll on Public Finance
Disasters can place enormous pressure on 
public finance, resulting in both loss of 
revenue and higher spending demands. 
Revenues can decline as economic 
productivity drops and, more temporarily, 
as revenue collection systems are disrupted. 
Demands on the public purse increase as both 
explicit and implicit contingent government 
liabilities are brought to bear. These potentially 
take the form of the repair and reconstruction 
of public assets; the fulfillment of public 
guarantees (for instance, in the form of 
financial backing of insurance schemes or of 
lending institutions that subsequently struggle 
because of disaster-induced defaults); and 
moral, economic, and politically motivated 
actions to provide relief, early recovery, and 
reconstruction support to affected households 
and businesses.
The capacity of government to deal 
with these pressures depends on a range of 
factors, including its overall fiscal position, its 
level of access to international assistance and 
external capital markets, and its use of ex ante 
(anticipatory) risk transfer and risk financ-
ing instruments. This capacity, in turn, has 
consequences for the overall pace of recovery 
and reconstruction, both for the country as a 
whole and for individual households and busi-
nesses, and thus for the final indirect toll of a 
disaster. The availability of funding will affect 
how long it takes, for instance, to reinstate 
fully functioning transport and education 
systems and to rebuild homes and livelihoods.
The availability 
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Farmers walk against the back drop of Mt. Merapi volcano. Srumbung village, Indonesia
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Hazardscape is a term used to describe 
the exposure and vulnerability of a 
particular place, its people, and its assets 
to the full range of types of hazard that it 
faces, including natural, environmental, 
health, and technological hazards. It is 
useful because it links the dimensions of 
earthbound atmospheric, hydrologic, and 
geologic processes and human interventions 
with the spatial dimension of land use, the 
built environment, and ecosystems. Most 
importantly, it focuses on the risk, not the 
outcome of the risk, and on the unfolding of a 
hazardous event. This orientation is essential 
because a natural hazard event does not 
necessarily become a disaster.
Implicit in the definition of hazardscape is 
the context of development. All development 
actions carry some potential risks, and many 
have the potential to spread existing levels 
of risk, including disaster risk, more widely, 
whether for better or for worse. In the case 
of natural hazards, that risk is manifest in the 
changing relationship of natural events to 
populations, their built environments,  
and their related strengths and weaknesses. 
For instance, development often drives 
changes in land use, altering existing  
exposure and, potentially, vulnerability.  
Thus, all development actions can be con-
sidered in light of their potential to serve as 
instruments to alter risk, and, if the will exists, 
to enhance resilience.
In practice, development decisions have 
brought about a considerable rise in disaster 
risk in Asia and the Pacific, rather than 
strengthened resilience. Many development 
decisions by governments, the private sector, 
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the international community, and society 
at large have been made with little regard to 
their consequences for the vulnerability of 
either populations or infrastructure. Some 
create risk internal to the development itself, 
such as through failure to consider seismic 
risk in building design or site selection. 
Some  decisions result in the modification or 
destruction of naturally occurring hazard 
defenses supplied by ecosystem structures 
and functions, as when forests, floodways, 
deltas, mangroves, wetlands, dunes, or reefs 
are  occupied for development projects. Some 
encourage populations to move into hazard-
sensitive areas by creating public infrastruc-
ture and jobs in these locations.
If this pattern continues, the resulting 
vicious cycle of risk-insensitive develop-
ment followed by disasters and subsequent 
risk-insensitive development could pose a 
considerable impediment to socioeconomic 
advancement. Mounting disaster risk directly 
threatens development’s two key goals: poverty 
reduction and inclusive sustainable economic 
growth. It could even force fast-growing 
economies into a middle-income trap and 
impede any sustained progress by slower-
growing, low-income economies. 
An Impediment to 
Poverty Reduction
Hazard events can have devastating 
consequences for the poor and near-poor, 
reflecting their social, economic, and political 
circumstances. More-marginalized groups 
such as women, children, the elderly, the 
disabled, and minority groups often are 
particularly vulnerable, mirroring wider 
socioeconomic and cultural inequalities. 
As highlighted in Part II in some detail, for 
instance, the poor are far more likely to have 
unsafe housing, vulnerable livelihoods, and 
insufficient disaster-coping mechanisms. 
Their post-disaster recovery can extend long 
past the process of physical reconstruction. 
Disasters can force them into additional debt, 
into the sale of productive assets, or into 
the decision to pull children out of school. 
Such actions have implications for factors 
such as earning capacity, health, and levels of 
educational attainment.
The threat of hazard can also influence 
long-term behavior, in some cases reinforcing 
poverty via deliberate risk-averting 
livelihood choices. For example, there is 
some tendency among marginal rice farmers 
in the Philippines to cultivate traditional, 
lower-yielding rice varieties because such 
varieties are relatively more hazard-tolerant, 
thereby limiting potential earnings but also 
reducing the risk of total crop failure (World 
Bank 2007). Studies of drought-prone areas in 
Burkina Faso and India indicate that farmers 
may sacrifice 12%–15% of average income to 
reduce risk (Hazell and Hess 2010).
Asia and the Pacific has made consider-
able gains in poverty reduction and progress 
toward the achievement of a number of the 
Millennium Development Goals, including 
reducing the number of people living on less 
than $1.25 (purchasing power parity) per day. 
However, these gains may not be sustained in 
hazard-prone areas unless resilience to natural 
hazard events is considerably strengthened for 
the poor and near-poor.
A Threat to Sustainable  
Economic Growth
Asia and the Pacific has achieved considerable 
growth over the past 4 decades, expanding 
by an average of 6.3% per year in real terms 
in the 1970s, 7.3% in the 1980s, 6.7% in the 
1990s, and 7.4% in the first decade of the 
21st century. In contrast, reported losses 
from disasters have fluctuated enormously 
among years, rendering examination 
of annual average growth rates or their 
direct comparison with GDP performance 
meaningless over a period of just a few years 
or even a few decades.
Nevertheless, if disaster losses over the 
period 1970–2010 are smoothed over time 
(that is, regressed against time—in this case, 
achieving the best fit by using an exponential 
function), the resulting fitted line suggests that 
direct physical disaster losses in Asia and the 
Pacific not only are following a steady upward 
path (as already indicated in Figure 2), but 
are also rising more rapidly than regional 
GDP (Figure 8). This suggests that the rise in 
losses is not entirely due to a rise in exposure, 
assuming the volume of infrastructure and 
assets increases broadly in line with GDP, but 
also possibly due to a rise in vulnerability. 
If the year 2011—a year of all-time record 
losses for the region—is included in the 
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Figure 8 Comparative Real Growth in Gross Domestic Product and Direct 
Physical Losses as a Consequence of Natural Hazards in Asia and the 
Pacific, 1970–2010
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analysis, the emerging gap between disaster 
loss growth rates and GDP is even wider. It 
is important to stress that a run of very low 
losses over the next 5 years, along the levels 
experienced in 2006, would result in a much 
lower fitted trend line, more or less matching 
reported growth in GDP. Regardless, the 
current evidence points to a potentially 
alarming trend: the long-term rate of growth 
in disaster losses in Asia and the Pacific is 
apparently outpacing growth in GDP, making 
the need for strengthened resilience ever  
more urgent.
Loss figures are potentially skewed by 
the timing of occurrence of major geologic 
events with very low return periods, such as 
the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake, and the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake. Indeed, available data suggest 
that growth in GDP has outpaced growth 
in direct physical losses occurring just as a 
consequence of non-geologic hazards over the 
past 40 years (Figure 9). This apparent finding 
provides no reason for complacency, however, 
for two reasons. First, the incidence and fre-
quency of climatological hazards are expected 
to increase with climate change. Second, 
losses incurred as a consequence of localized, 
more frequent hazard events often are not 
reported in national and international disaster 
statistics, although efforts are under way to 
address this issue. These localized hazards, 
almost entirely in the form of weather-related 
hazards, can have a substantial aggregate 
impact. Data for 21 countries across the 
globe over a 40-year period suggest that these 
weather-related events increase the number of 
houses destroyed as a consequence of natural 
hazards by 22% and increase the number of 
houses damaged by natural hazards by 100% 
(UNISDR 2011). The “invisibility of such a 
high proportion of disaster loss is one reason 
why so many countries find it politically and 
economically difficult to prioritize invest-
ments in DRM” (UNISDR 2011, 36). 
Looking beyond direct physical losses 
alone, it is widely observed that major 
disasters cause significant short-term 
economic disruption at a country level. 
For instance, the economy of Thailand 
contracted by around 9% in the last 3 months 
of 2011,  following severe flooding and 
related disruptions to the agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors (Government of 
Thailand 2012). Japan’s GDP fell by 2.1% 
year-on-year in the second quarter of 2011 
as a consequence of the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in March 2011(World Bank 
2012b). The early September 2010 earthquake 
in New Zealand had an immediate adverse 
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impact, reducing economic activity in the 
Canterbury region alone by 0.8% for the full 
third quarter of the year and knocking 0.2% 
off the country’s GDP, thereby resulting in an 
overall economic contraction of 0.2% for that 
quarter (Government of New Zealand 2011).
Unraveling the longer-term effects of 
disasters, and thus discovering whether they 
have influenced longer-term economic growth 
patterns in the region, either positively or 
negatively, is more complex. A range of factors 
determines their ultimate consequences. Most 
obviously, the nature and extent of direct 
physical losses play a role, and this in turn is 
influenced by prior investment in resilience. 
Partly linked to this, the type of hazard 
experienced also matters. For example, major 
floods and droughts typically have negative 
long-term economic effects, particularly in 
lower-income countries with large agriculture 
sectors. However, the widespread devastation 
caused by severe earthquakes may sometimes 
be partly offset by positive long-term macro-
economic consequences if large portions of 
capital stock are rebuilt to higher standards 
of resilience and technology and a disaster-
induced construction boom occurs.
The unit of analysis is also relevant, both 
in exploring the economic consequences of 
a disaster and in designing related financing 
instruments and reconstruction strategies, 
because consequences for the immediately 
affected area and wider region or even nation 
may be very different. Despite the potential 
prospects of economic gain at a national level, 
major disasters can have a long-term abiding 
effect in the immediately affected area, even in 
high-income countries that are able to access 
considerable resources for reconstruction. 
Twelve years after the devastating 1995 earth-
quake, for instance, per capita GDP in the Kobe 
region of Japan was estimated to be 13% lower 
than it would have been had the earthquake not 
occurred (DuPont and Noy 2012). Thus, what 
may be good for the country as a whole is not 
necessarily good for the immediately affected 
area. Unaffected regions may benefit from a rise 
in demand for capital goods, consumables, and 
even labor from the disaster zone. Producers 
in unaffected areas may also gain additional 
market share, assuming a preexisting slack in 
their capacity. However, impacts in affected 
areas can extend for many years, shifting the 
balance of prior regional disparities.
Prevailing economic circumstances matter 
as well. There is evidence that disaster-related 
GDP losses are higher when disasters occur 
during periods of expansion and all resources 
are already fully utilized (Hallegatte and Ghil 
2007). Conversely, countries often fare better 
Figure 9 Comparative Real Growth in Gross Domestic Product and Direct 
Physical Losses as a Consequence of Non-Geologic Hazards in Asia and 
the Pacific, 1970–2010
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if macroeconomic fundamentals such as fiscal 
balance, level of external reserves, and balance 
of payments are strong at the outset of a disaster 
and they are thus better able to finance recovery 
and reconstruction efforts. Prior redundancies 
in productive and infrastructure capacity—for 
instance, in power supply or transportation 
networks—can also help alleviate the conse-
quences of direct physical losses.
Leading on from this, the ultimate conse-
quences of a disaster are heavily influenced by 
the availability and timeliness of post-disaster 
financing, which dictates the pace of recon-
struction and thus the extent and longevity 
of myriad indirect impacts stemming from 
the direct losses. The scale and timeliness of 
early recovery and reconstruction financing 
depends, in turn, both on prevailing economic 
circumstances and the prior establishment of 
DRF mechanisms. Higher-income countries 
typically have higher levels of insurance 
penetration, better access to international 
financial and reinsurance markets, and larger 
budgetary resources in the hands of both 
national and subnational governments, even 
in times of recession. As such, they are better 
placed to support rapid recovery and recon-
struction, thereby reducing the indirect and 
secondary effects of the event and helping to 
ensure that there is sufficient financing avail-
able to upgrade capital stock. Lower-income 
countries can also put in place comprehensive 
DRF strategies, should they choose, but at 
potentially much higher opportunity cost as 
scarce resources are used to build up contin-
gency reserves, pay insurance premiums, and 
so forth, rather than invested in new infra-
structure and other development initiatives. 
Post-disaster borrowing is often more costly 
as well, and post-disaster budget reallocations 
can carry high opportunity costs in terms of 
foregone development opportunities.
On balance, however, major disasters in 
most cases represent adverse economic shocks. 
They knock economies off course and often 
force a long-term realignment of investment 
plans in immediately affected areas, not least 
because of inadequate financing arrangements 
for early recovery and reconstruction.
Governments, communities, the private 
sector, and individual households across 
Asia and the Pacific must invest far more 
in risk assessment, risk reduction, and the 
management of residual risk to lessen both  
the direct and indirect effects of disasters  
and to help achieve inclusive sustainable  
long-term growth.
A preliminary sense of the potential 
extent of macroeconomic threat posed by 
natural hazards and the degree of attention 
national governments should pay to them can 
be gauged by examining average expected 
losses and probable maximum losses arising 
from natural hazards, relative to GDP and 
total government expenditure. For instance, 
according to recent analysis, Vanuatu should 
expect to experience losses equivalent to up 
to 39.1% of its GDP and 159.3% of its annual 
government expenditure once every 50 years, 
as a consequence of a tropical cyclone, earth-
quake, or tsunami. In contrast, Timor-Leste 
should expect to experience losses equivalent 
to up to 7.9% of its GDP and 9.1% of its 
annual government expenditure over the same 
return period (Table 2).
Similar analysis has been undertaken for 
ASEAN member states. Within this region, 
relatively frequent, lower-impact 20-year 
natural hazard events would place the greatest 
burden on Cambodia, causing losses equivalent 
to up to 3.6% of its GDP and 18.3% of its 
annual government expenditure once every 
20 years (Table 3). In contrast, somewhat 
lower-frequency, higher-impact 100-year 
events would place the highest burden on the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, causing 
losses equivalent to up to 11.7% of its GDP and 
Flood water almost reaching the maximum level. Bangkok, Thailand
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Table 2 Average Annual and Probable Maximum Tropical Cyclone, Earthquake, and Tsunami 
Losses in the Pacific
Annual average direct 
economic losses
Losses from  
50-year events
Losses from  
100-year events
$ 
million
% 
GDP
% annual 
government 
expenditure
$ 
million
% 
GDP
% annual 
government 
expenditure
$ 
million % GDP
% annual 
government 
expenditure
Cook Islands 4.9 2.0 6.3 56.8 23.3 72.9 103.0 42.2 132.2
Fiji 79.1 2.6 10.8 620.1 20.6 84.1 844.8 28.1 115.0
Federated States  
of Micronesia
8.3 2.9 5.3 75.3 26.2 47.8 150.7 52.4 95.6
Kiribati 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 4.0 2.6 3.7
Marshall Islands 3.1 2.0 3.0 34.1 21.9 32.8 67.4 43.3 64.7
Niue 0.9 5.8 5.5 9.4 59.7 57.7 22.7 143.4 139.3
Palau 2.7 1.6 3.8 16.8 9.9 23.6 46.7 27.5 65.7
Papua New Guinea 85.0 0.9 3.0 582.9 6.1 20.7 794.9 8.4 28.2
Samoa 9.9 1.7 4.4 109.8 19.4 48.9 152.9 27.0 68.1
Solomon Islands 20.5 3.0 7.2 189.6 27.9 67.0 280.6 41.4 99.1
Timor-Leste 5.9 0.8 1.0 55.7 7.9 9.1 143.7 20.5 23.4
Tonga 15.5 4.3 15.6 140.2 39.2 141.3 225.3 63.0 227.1
Tuvalu 0.2 0.8 0.5 2.8 8.9 6.5 4.8 15.1 11.2
Vanuatu 47.9 6.6 26.8 284.9 39.1 159.3 370.1 50.8 207.0
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: World Bank (2011).
49.4% of its annual government expenditure 
over the same return period. In determining 
indirect and secondary consequences and the 
related need to strengthen resilience, however, 
each potential hazard event, both in ASEAN 
countries and more broadly, must be placed 
in the context of the affected communities, 
sectors, and macroeconomy, requiring  
more detailed analysis on an individual  
country basis.
Prospects for continued strong economic 
progress in Asia and the Pacific are in jeopardy 
if resilience is not strengthened and, instead, 
the growth in disaster losses continues to 
outpace economic expansion. This threat holds 
for countries both individually and collectively. 
Increasing regional connectivity has 
contributed to Asia’s growth, and governments, 
together with their international partners, 
are actively pursuing further integration via 
investment in infrastructure and enhanced 
regional cooperation (ADB and ADBI 2009). 
However, the 2011 floods in Thailand were a 
stark reminder of potential disaster risks linked 
to increasing regional integration and just-in-
time supply chain management. Without due 
attention to strengthened resilience, hazard-
related disruptions of production, transport 
of raw materials and elaborated components, 
and delivery of finished goods could become 
an increasing problem in the region, extending 
the impact of disaster events well beyond the 
directly affected populations and countries.
The Urban Imperative
Asia and the Pacific are undergoing rapid 
urban growth. One-third of the region’s 
population was located in urban areas in 
1990, rising to 38% in 2000 and 43% in 2010 
(UN ESCAP 2011). By 2050, Asia’s urban 
population alone is projected to increase 
by a further 1.4 billion people, almost 
doubling in size (Kohli, Sharma, and Sood 
2010). In many countries, this expansion 
is occurring in hazard-prone areas, in part 
reflecting the very facets of geography that 
attracted settlement and investment in the 
first place—namely, proximity to rivers and 
coasts and (low-lying) flat land. A number of 
other rapidly expanding cities in the region 
are located, by chance, on major seismic fault 
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Table 3 Average Annual and Probable Maximum Losses for Natural Hazards in Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations Member Statesa
Annual average direct 
economic losses
Losses from  
20-year events
Losses from  
100-year events
$ 
million
% 
GDP
% annual 
government 
expenditure
$ 
million
% 
GDP
% annual 
government 
expenditure
$ 
million
% 
GDP
% annual 
government 
expenditure
Brunei Darussalamb 0.4 0.0 0.0 – – – – – –
Cambodia 74.2 0.7 3.3 405.5 3.6 18.3 825.0 7.3 37.2
Indonesia 1303.5 0.2 1.0 4,722.7 0.7 3.7 9,865.9 1.4 7.6
Lao PDR 52.3 0.7 3.0 342.6 4.6 19.3 875.3 11.7 49.4
Malaysia 174.6 0.1 0.2 953.8 0.4 1.3 2,332.7 1.0 3.2
Myanmarc 184.8 0.9 8.2 – – – 9,078.7 45.2 405.1
Philippines 1,602.9 0.8 4.8 4,570.9 2.3 13.6 9,407.4 4.7 27.9
Singapore 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0
Thailand 255.6 0.1 0.3 1,000.0 0.3 1.3 2,222.6 0.7 3.0
Viet Nam 786.4 0.8 2.4 2,448.5 2.4 7.4 3,718.2 3.6 11.3
GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
a Geophysical, meteorological, hydrological, and climatological hazards.
b Probable maximum losses for Brunei Darussalam were not reported because neither complete historical data nor simulated catastrophic loss data were available.
c Due to limited historical economic loss time series data and limited availability of simulated losses from catastrophic probabilistic modes, probable maximum losses 
were not reported for Myanmar.
Source: World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2012a).
lines. The growth of substantial informal 
settlements in more hazard-prone urban 
areas is of particular concern. In hazard-
prone megacities such as Jakarta, Manila, 
and Mumbai, at least one-quarter of the 
population lives in informal settlements. 
These settlements are becoming more 
densely populated as the number of new 
informal settlements grows at a slower pace.
Cities create opportunities for jobs and 
livelihoods. They are focal points for eco-
nomic activity; centers of higher education, 
innovation, and technological development; 
and engines of economic growth, offering 
better infrastructure, larger markets, and 
opportunities for economies of scale and for 
productivity gains. However, a balance of 
economic development and resilient urban 
expansion has been elusive in many cases. 
The drivers of development have brought to 
urban growth not unanticipated but certainly 
undesirable disaster risks in the name of 
development. These risks carry the possibility 
that economic and social advancement could 
be rapidly knocked back should a hazard 
event occur. 
As cities grow and prosper, overall levels 
of protection could reasonably be expected to 
improve—a result of, for instance, ever more 
stringent and enforceable building codes and 
land use zoning and rising investment in flood 
and storm protection—and losses associated 
with higher-frequency, lower-intensity hazard 
events to decline. However, disasters in excess 
of hazard-protection design standards will still 
occur, periodically resulting in excessive losses 
and implying that average disaster losses 
could still increase, despite improvements in 
protection (Hallegatte 2011). Less-frequent 
experience of losses could also create a false 
sense of security, resulting in a progressive 
downplaying of disaster risk by households, 
businesses, and the public sector and thus 
resulting in underinvestment in resilience, 
unless imaginative and deliberate education 
and awareness programs are initiated. 
Moreover, unless deliberate action is taken, 
disparities in relative disaster risk faced by the 
poor and nonpoor could potentially widen as 
the middle and upper classes are increasingly 
protected against natural hazards while 
informal settlements and informal livelihoods 
continue to expand in the most hazard-prone, 
marginal areas of a city. This would create 
additional challenges in securing inclusive 
socioeconomic growth.
A balance 
of economic 
development and 
resilient urban 
expansion has 
been elusive in 
many cases
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Gaps and Obstacles to  
a Resilient Future4
Densely populated informal settlements in hazard-prone urban areas. Dhaka, Bangladesh
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Despite the clear case for greater investment in 
resilience, a wide range of gaps and obstacles 
hinders progress. These challenges are linked 
to the processes shaping and informing 
development. They can relate to gaps and 
obstacles linked both to broad public sector 
plans, legislation, and budgets and also to 
the more detailed micro processes, contexts, 
and circumstances that influence individual 
public and private decisions and actions at an 
operational, usually local, level. Individually, 
the micro gaps and obstacles have no 
discernible effect on national development. 
Collectively, however, their effect is potentially 
huge, undermining possible progress toward 
enhanced resilience. 
National Socioeconomic 
Development Plans
Inadequate risk information. Disaster risk 
data are unreliable, insufficient, and difficult 
to obtain in many countries in Asia and the 
Pacific. Admittedly, there have been notable 
improvements in the past decade or so as risk 
modeling capabilities have been improved 
and related tools have been applied across 
many countries in the region. In consequence, 
countries are no longer solely reliant on 
historical loss data for recent decades or the 
related inaccuracies and biases pertaining to the 
actual incidence of disasters over those decades. 
Disaster risk data 
are unreliable, 
insufficient,  
and difficult to 
obtain in many 
countries in Asia 
and the Pacific
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Modeling generates probable maximum losses 
and average expected losses for both individual 
assets and wider sectors or geographic areas. 
However, modeling capabilities are still far from 
perfect, particularly in the case of flood risk, 
which is both complex and, as a consequence 
of human activity, highly dynamic. Climate 
change poses a further challenge, particularly 
with regard to challenges in downscaling 
broad climate change projections to develop 
likely scenarios for specific sectors and spatial 
locations over clearly defined periods of time.
There are also huge gaps in risk 
information locally, where it can be essential 
in guiding community planning and where 
most risk reduction measures are actually 
conceived and acted upon. For instance, fewer 
than 20% of cities in Asia and the Pacific have 
carried out climate risk assessments (Carmin, 
Nadkami, and Rhie 2012). The number of 
municipal geologic hazard risk assessments 
is even smaller. Yet, the integration of that 
knowledge comes about, first and foremost, in 
community planning. 
Poor conceptual understanding of 
disaster risk management. The conceptual 
understanding of resilience in many countries 
remains relatively poor, manifesting itself in 
a tunnel-vision approach to the issue. Many 
governments now have comprehensive DRM 
strategies in place, covering risk reduction as 
well as disaster preparedness and response. 
However, the national disaster management 
offices (NDMOs) leading their implementation 
typically are staffed by emergency-response 
management personnel with limited 
understanding of development concepts 
or processes, or with limited knowledge 
about the intricacies of DRR, and hence are 
not well placed to promote strengthened 
resilience. This has resulted in the curtailed 
treatment of disaster risk concerns in national 
socioeconomic development plans and a 
focus on a very narrow range of structural 
investment, environmental regeneration, early 
warning capabilities, and reactive assistance 
to vulnerable groups, rather than the broader 
integration of resilience objectives into the 
overall approach to development.
Lack of leadership for disaster risk 
management planning. DRM interests often 
have weak political and budgetary standing 
and remain peripheral to the planning 
and budget process, leading to missed 
opportunities to influence change toward 
a holistic, integrated approach centered on 
widely supported development action. Even 
worse, inclusion of a few discrete DRM 
measures in national plans, budgets, and 
operational items may be viewed as a job well 
done. However, even when these measures 
are implemented, there may be no established 
assignment of responsibility, accountability, 
monitoring, or evaluation of disaster losses.
Legislative and Regulatory 
Frameworks
Limited political support for legislative 
reform. In many countries, there is growing 
appreciation of the need to revise disaster 
legislation to reflect the broad shift from an 
essentially ex post (reactive) approach to DRM 
to a more comprehensive approach, with much 
greater emphasis on ex ante (anticipatory) 
risk reduction in the context of development. 
Similarly, there is growing awareness of the 
need to link DRM and CCA legislation. 
Related revisions have been implemented in 
some countries. More commonly, however, 
the passage of disaster legislation reforms has 
stalled because there is little sense of urgency 
or interest on the part of legislators, their 
constituents, and NDMO staff. Thus, although 
many countries have drawn up comprehensive 
national DRM strategies and action plans, 
progress in implementation has often been 
limited because there is insufficient legislative 
and regulatory underpinning
Fragmented disaster risk management 
legislation. In many countries, aspects of 
DRM are addressed through a wide range of 
laws dealing with issues such as emergency 
preparedness and response, land use planning, 
building codes, environmental protection, 
water resource management, financial 
regulation, and, most recently, climate change. 
Overarching coordinating frameworks 
that draw existing legislation together are 
not common, however, thus potentially 
undermining the collective effect and 
coherence of individual laws. This also implies 
that laws that block enhanced resilience may  
go unnoticed.
The passage 
of disaster 
legislation 
reforms has 
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Weak enforcement of key disaster risk 
management regulations. Building codes 
and land use zoning have been strengthened 
in many countries over the past few decades. 
Extremely stringent building codes are widely 
acknowledged, for example, as having saved 
thousands of lives during the 9.0-magnitude 
Great East Japan Earthquake in March 
2011. However, enforcement has lagged in 
many developing countries due to varying 
combinations of financial, institutional, 
technical, and human resource limitations; 
weak political support; corruption; and 
insecure land tenure.
Subnational Policy and 
Planning Processes
Highly limited disaster risk management 
capacity. Many local governments have 
extremely limited, if any, DRM expertise. 
Any existing capability most likely pertains 
to emergency-response management, and 
even that may be limited to emergency 
management pertaining to the most frequent 
types of hazard experienced in a particular 
area. Local governments also often have very 
little planning capacity. Together, this implies 
that few local governments are adequately 
equipped to integrate disaster risk concerns 
into local physical, social, and economic 
policies and plans. These challenges are 
exacerbated by extreme budget constraints, 
shortsighted political focus, and in many 
cases, very limited assessment of disaster 
risk on the part of the communities served. 
Knowledge of risk can be particularly weak 
in areas of high inward migration to rapidly 
expanding economic growth areas.
Poor vertical integration. Disconnects 
between national and local government 
development objectives and their physical 
and financial investment plans are common 
because the respective plans often are 
formulated independently of one another. 
Typically, there are several layers of 
government between national and local 
governments, building up from local and 
down from national government priorities 
and goals. Local government plans should 
be built on participatory assessments and 
consultations with local communities and 
therefore (at least in theory) should be 
more in tune with grassroots disaster risk 
concerns than national plans and strategies. 
At the same time, local plans often lack 
input from DRM specialists and broader, 
long-term vision. The national government 
provides these in the form of national policy, 
and technical knowledge and know-how. 
At some point, however, the upward and 
downward transmission of national and local 
levels grinds to a halt, resulting in a vertical 
disconnect. Moreover, local government 
interests can be easily swayed by lobbying 
pressures, leading to changes in direction that 
undo previously agreed-upon policies and 
plans (SMEC and IID 2006).
Poor horizontal integration. There are 
parallel horizontal disconnects between 
various government plans and policies—for 
instance, between physical and investment 
plans at both national and subnational levels. 
A similar gap is emerging between local 
DRM and local development and investment 
plans as more and more community, district, 
provincial, and city DRM plans are developed, 
often with the support of nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs). There are yet further 
gaps between the plans and actions of adjacent 
local governments and contiguous nation-
states facing specific shared natural hazards. 
Horizontal disconnects can undermine both 
the individual and the collective achievements 
of government policies and plans even where 
they do individually take account of resilience 
concerns. Coordination is critical given the 
crosscutting nature of investment in resilience.
National and Subnational 
Budgetary Processes
Insufficient funding. Budgetary resources for 
DRR are frequently inadequate at all levels of 
government, particularly in low-income states 
and locally, where much of the responsibility 
for implementation lies. In the face of 
limited budgetary resources, policy makers 
favor investments that generate immediate, 
tangible outcomes rather than risk reduction 
endeavors that may not reap benefits for 
many years and, even then, may generate 
little political gain. For instance, they prefer 
to build additional kilometers of roads and 
Budgetary 
resources for 
disaster risk 
reduction are 
frequently 
inadequate 
at all levels of 
government
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more schools and health clinics today than to 
construct fewer, more resilient roads, schools, 
and health clinics that will survive potential 
hazards tomorrow. This line of thinking fails 
to acknowledge that DRR actually supports 
and secures the achievement of those tangible 
outcomes by reducing vulnerability to hazards.
It is similarly difficult to persuade govern-
ments to put adequate financing arrangements 
in place for post-disaster relief, early recovery, 
and reconstruction ahead of the occurrence 
of a disaster. The design of such arrangements 
is complicated by substantial interannual 
fluctuations in the scale of disaster losses and 
by considerable latitude on the part of govern-
ments to determine the forms and levels of 
post-disaster support (Benson and Mahul, 
forthcoming). Subsequent funding delays 
in the aftermath of a disaster can result in 
considerable setbacks in relief, early recovery, 
and reconstruction efforts, exacerbating the 
indirect social and economic impact of an 
event at all levels of society and hampering 
efforts to rebuild with an eye toward strength-
ening resilience to future hazard events.
Misplaced reliance on the international 
community. Contrary to popular belief, 
international grant assistance accounts for a 
very small proportion of post-disaster expen-
diture globally, and much of it focuses on 
major events (Benson and Mahul, forthcom-
ing). For instance, the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(2012) reports international aid flows in 
response to just 60 events in 2010, less than 
a sixth of the total 373 natural hazard events 
recorded globally for the same year. More-
over, post-disaster external assistance is not 
necessarily additional. Rather, it often entails 
some adjustment of existing aid programs 
and potentially displaces short- to medium-
term flows of new development support.
Expenditure tracking systems. Very few 
countries have any form of tracking system 
in place to monitor spending on either 
DRR or disaster response and are therefore 
unable to indicate what percentage of the 
national budget is spent in these areas. Poor 
tracking capacity partly reflects certain innate 
challenges in monitoring disaster-related 
spending. DRR initiatives may be scattered 
across a number of sector budgets and in some 
cases may form just one component (such 
as seismically strengthened design) or even 
an indirect benefit of a wider development 
project (e.g., irrigation of land reduces the 
effects of drought) rather than an explicit 
goal (Benson, Arnold, and Christoplos 2009). 
Meanwhile, post-disaster operations may 
involve many national and international 
actors, the reallocation of government and 
aid resources, and both off-budget and 
on-budget contributions, creating its own set 
of challenges in tracking expenditure.
Maintenance budgets. Many governments 
allocate insufficient funding for maintenance. 
Ironically, this situation is exacerbated by 
the diversion—or reservation—of budgeted 
routine maintenance funds to meet smaller-
scale natural hazard event–related repairs, 
thereby leaving other infrastructure more 
exposed to future hazard events.
Prevailing Political 
Economy
Power disparities. The interests and power 
relations of different stakeholders in a 
Growth of informal settlements contributing to increasing vulnerability is a typical 
feature of many Asian cities. Sandakan City, Malaysia
A
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particular country play a key role in shaping 
forms and levels of investment in resilience, 
often acting as a negative rather than positive 
force. In many countries, disaster risk is 
concentrated disproportionately on poorer 
households—that is, on the segment of 
society with typically very limited political 
voice. In contrast, the most powerful groups 
in society are often responsible for creating a 
significant share of disaster risk. 
Misaligned incentives. There are various 
misaligned incentives that, in combination 
with weak systems of accountability, 
encourage insufficient public focus on 
DRR and an overemphasis on highly 
visible disaster relief, early recovery, and 
reconstruction. Political incentives for 
action are curtailed by limited general 
public knowledge of disaster risk, of the 
likely net benefits of many DRR actions, and 
of the extent to which such actions have, 
indeed, reduced losses in the event of a 
disaster. Evidence suggests that, regardless 
of the extent of prior investments in DRR, 
citizens are likely to blame public policy 
failure for disaster losses anyway, except 
in the event of a major disaster (Keefer 
2009). Poor knowledge of the benefits of 
DRR actions also implies that priority 
is awarded to physical investments in 
infrastructure, such as flood defenses, which 
can at least be seen, and targeted on favored 
constituencies.
Political costs. Certain DRM actions may 
damage the popularity of a local or national 
government, imposing a political cost on 
incumbent leaders (Williams 2011). For 
instance, they may require the resettlement 
of communities and businesses away from 
hazard-prone areas; the denial of planning 
permission; or curtailment of certain 
economic activities, such as logging or 
saltwater shrimp farming. Political costs 
can be particularly high if vested interests 
of powerful individuals are involved. 
Conversely, politicians may deliberately  
seek favor through the nonenforcement  
of certain laws and regulations or  
through special concessions for politically 
powerful groups and business interests 
(Williams 2011).
Investment Identification, 
Design, and 
Implementation
Little mandated consideration of disaster 
risk in investment design. Existing 
government guidelines and procedures 
on the identification and appraisal of 
new investments typically require little 
consideration of disaster risk. To some extent, 
these guidelines direct the design of both 
private and public investments.
Weak voice of resilience proponents. 
Government agencies working directly in  
areas that support strengthened resilience— 
for instance, in flood control departments or 
hydrometeorological agencies—often have 
relatively weak political standing. Moreover, 
they do not have the necessary skills to prepare 
convincing economic arguments for investment 
in their field or to communicate effectively with 
ministries of planning and finance.
Perception of low net return on investment 
in resilience. The incremental cost incurred 
in strengthening physical infrastructure 
against natural hazards is often perceived to 
be far higher than it actually is. Moreover, 
there is a preference for immediate returns on 
investment, implying that the benefits of DRR 
investment, potentially appearing many years 
down the line, are highly discounted.
Resilience benefits in the form of reduced 
losses rather than a short-term positive 
income stream. Unlike most other forms of 
investment, investments in resilience often 
reduce potential future losses rather than 
generate a direct and more nearly immediate 
stream of positive income. This limits public 
and private sector willingness to bring 
financing or expertise to bear in strengthening 
resilience, because it requires setting a  
present value on a future reduction in 
losses and then monetizing that to create a 
commercial transaction.
Weak hazard and disaster risk information. 
In many countries, there is insufficient 
high-resolution hazard and risk data available 
to support investment in individual resilient 
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development actions. Moreover, in the absence 
of a strong demand for risk assessment 
information by owners and operators of 
economic and social infrastructure in the 
public and private sectors, there is little reason 
to believe that such information will be seen 
as a public good worthy of provision or, 
therefore, that it will be developed and made 
available free of charge.
Household, Community, 
and Private Sector 
Participation
Narrow perception of the private sector’s 
role in resilience. Often, the public and 
private sectors see the private sector’s role 
in resilience in terms of corporate social 
responsibility. However, there is a limited 
understanding or appreciation of potential 
commercial opportunities in the field of 
resilience, or even of the importance of 
protecting a business’ own assets and supply 
chains against natural hazards.
Perverse incentives. Government actions can 
distort levels of private sector and household 
investment in DRR. Many governments offer 
certain post-disaster tax breaks and allow 
businesses and households to deduct from 
their tax bills the cost of disaster-related 
damage, but far fewer offer fiscal incentives for 
risk reduction. Indeed, household property 
insurance premiums are even subject to tax 
in at least one country. In combination, these 
factors imply that households and businesses 
may take little direct action on their own to 
reduce their disaster risk, and may even make 
decisions that increase their risk. Similarly, 
expectations of post-disaster public assistance 
can limit household incentives to purchase 
insurance, invest in risk reduction, or build 
up precautionary savings, and governments 
can find it morally difficult to penalize such 
behavior after a disaster, a situation referred to 
as the Samaritan’s dilemma.
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Stimulating, Securing, and Sustaining 
Investment in a More Resilient Future5
Farmers can achieve higher yields from fertile volcanic soils. East Java Province, Indonesia
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There are three basic core needs that must be 
satisfied to strengthen resilience and provide 
a solid underpinning for inclusive, sustainable 
development. These needs, which span the 
entire DRM spectrum and are repeatedly 
identified in the literature, entail risk 
assessment, risk reduction, and residual  
risk management:
•	 Risk assessment: Understanding who 
and what is at risk from what hazard(s), 
as well as where, when, why, how, and to 
what extent.
•	 Risk reduction: Acting to reduce the 
impact of specific natural hazards on 
specific targets in specific places to a 
point that the outcome of those events  
is acceptable.
•	 Residual risk management: Acting to 
minimize further indirect and second-
ary consequences subsequent to a hazard 
event via the implementation of adequate 
and timely disaster relief, early recovery, 
and reconstruction efforts and building 
back to a safer condition.
A wide range of instruments and 
mechanisms have been developed to 
help satisfy these core needs. They can be 
categorized as policy, capacity, and  
investment tools:
•	 Policy: Setting the legislative, regulatory, 
practice, and process parameters for 
managing risk, including definitions of  
acceptable risk.
•	 Capacity: Enabling individuals, 
communities, civil society, businesses, 
governments, and the international 
community to act to meet those 
parameters with appropriate skills, 
knowledge, and know-how.
There are three 
basic core needs 
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•	 Investment: Ensuring adequate 
financing, human resources, and 
commitment to implement policy  
and to apply capacity.
Strengthened resilience begins to take 
shape when particular instruments or 
mechanisms and particular core needs are 
paired to effect change. For instance, risk 
assessment is required at many different 
levels, focusing on national policy through 
to individual development and private 
sector initiatives, and across the full range of 
development themes, sectors, and social and 
economic activities. A wide variety of policy, 
capacity, and investment instruments may 
be required to meet all of these many and 
varied risk assessment needs. The suitability 
of individual instruments depends on the 
specific risk assessment need at hand. The 
most appropriate risk assessment framework 
and methodology will also depend on the 
need under consideration. When repeated 
again and again, this pairing of specific 
instruments and specific needs results in a 
series of measures that collectively stimulate, 
secure, and sustain investment in resilience. 
Using the Geodesic 
Sphere to Characterize  
the Resilience Process
The process of pairing instruments and core 
needs to strengthen wider socioeconomic 
resilience can be visualized in terms of the 
steps required to construct a geodesic sphere 
(Figure 10). The initial pairing of instruments 
and core needs creates clusters of triangles. 
The instruments and mechanisms form 
the sides or line segments of the triangles. 
The satisfied core needs are represented by 
connections positioned at the corners or 
vertices of the triangles. The line segments fix 
into these connections. 
As more and more instruments and 
needs are paired, drawing on a wide range 
of instruments and mechanisms and core 
needs spanning the entire DRM spectrum, 
the clusters of triangles join and fold together 
and a three-dimensional shape emerges. The 
final resulting structure is made up of the 
networks of lines or rods connecting circles 
on the sphere. The individual triangular 
faces, which can be thought of as develop-
ment themes and sectors, gain strength from 
the connections—that is, from the satisfied 
needs in the form of risk assessment, risk 
reduction, and residual risk management.
The geodesic sphere also conveys the 
notion of backward and forward linkages 
 created by the interconnectedness of the 
different elements in the structure. The 
linkages stress the power of a coordinated 
approach whereby planners and policy 
makers examine the potential interplay 
between different instruments and 
mechanisms, both to overcome gaps 
and obstacles and to build on success. 
Moreover, the linkages highlight numerous 
opportunities both to lead and direct change 
and to spur it from behind. As such, the 
geodesic sphere delivers the message that 
there are no fixed rules on the sequencing 
of application of different instruments 
and mechanisms to strengthen resilience. 
Instead, there are many backward and 
forward linkages between the different tools 
and outcomes, and, also, many shared entry 
points and drivers of change.
These instruments and mechanisms 
are explored in further detail below. A range 
of both established and innovative tools 
to strengthen resilience are examined and 
potential entry points and associated actors 
identified. No particular instrument or 
mechanism is necessarily better than another. 
Their relevance and potential will reflect the 
context and needs of individual countries 
and communities and the way in which they 
are bundled with other instruments and 
mechanisms. These issues are pursued in 
further detail in Part II. However, collectively, 
there are sufficient tools available to ensure 
that investments in resilience are adequately 
stimulated, that the necessary investments are 
acted upon or secured, and that investments 
in resilience are sustained going forward into 
the future.
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Resilience can be stimulated through initial 
investments focusing on the incorporation 
of resilience objectives and incentives 
into a country’s national and subnational 
development goals, objectives, and 
overarching planning processes; into its 
regulatory and legislative frameworks; and 
into its national and subnational budgetary 
processes and instruments.
National Development 
Plans
The goals and objectives laid out in a national 
development plan drive the focus of public 
interventions over the life of the plan. The 
inclusion of disaster risk concerns in these 
and in longer-term development visions is 
therefore a critical first step in strengthening 
investment in resilience.
The preparation of the plan itself creates a 
natural opportunity, together with resources, 
to explore disaster risk from a socioeconomic 
perspective, examining the role of disaster 
risk in determining development progress. 
If exploited, this can lead to a development 
vision and related program of work, incor-
porating principles of strengthened resilience 
and stimulating future practical progress 
in risk assessment, risk reduction, and the 
management of residual risk (Figure 11). 
Conversely, if disaster risk is not taken into 
account, or if plans are not regularly revised 
to reflect changing risk, national plans can 
inadvertently exacerbate risks and make future 
corrections more costly and difficult.
Exploring disaster risk in preparatory 
scoping work. Analysis of the effects of 
disasters on recent social and economic 
performance as part of the initial plan 
preparation process provides a starting point 
in integrating strengthened resilience goals 
into development planning. Such analysis leads 
directly into an examination of the underlying 
factors determining vulnerability, possible 
future trends in disaster risk, and the potential 
benefits of risk reduction, including gains in 
poverty reduction. It also helps identify points 
of entry for initiating specific resilience projects 
and/or resource allocations. If undertaken at an 
early stage in plan preparation, this analysis can 
play an important role in determining broad 
development directions, objectives, and sector 
initiatives, seeking both to strengthen resilience 
and to ensure that the plan does not create 
new forms of risk. A holistic approach works 
best, acknowledging the complex, multifaceted 
nature of vulnerability to natural hazards 
and supporting analysis and solutions from 
environmental, social, economic, institutional, 
and technical perspectives.
Setting resilience goals. Building on the 
analysis of disaster risk, goals and objectives 
for strengthening resilience can be established. 
Reflecting the potentially wide, multisector 
range of factors contributing to vulnerability, 
these goals and objectives can be integrated 
across the full development plan, rather than 
being dealt with in a more compartmentalized 
manner. In more hazard-prone countries, 
resilience can warrant treatment as one of the 
plan’s key crosscutting issues.
Diversion channels being constructed to reduce risk from floods and mudslides. 
Gansu Province, People’s Republic of China
A
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5.1  Stimulating inveStment: Policy change  
and innovation
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Encouraging private sector participation 
in resilience. The private sector can play 
a pivotal role in strengthening resilience. 
National development plans can include a 
wide array of measures aimed at encouraging 
and guiding private sector participation. 
Possible actions include the formation of more 
appropriate legislative and policy frameworks; 
the introduction of risk reduction technology 
research and development grants; the 
establishment of public–private partnerships, 
incentives, and other financial mechanisms to 
encourage private sector provision of products 
that enhance resilience; the establishment of 
resilience goals for public service provision 
in which the private sector may play a role, 
such as the development and operation of 
roads, ports, airports, power grids, water 
and sanitation systems, telecommunications, 
health facilities, and schools; and awareness-
raising activities to promote corporate 
social responsibility engagement. The most 
promising options can be determined in 
collaboration with the private sector, learning 
from and building on solutions to existing 
obstacles and constraints.
Joining forces with climate change adaptation 
proponents. Government units working on 
the overlapping issue of CCA are also working 
to integrate resilience to natural hazards into 
development planning. Although typically 
located in ministries of the environment, which 
often are not particularly powerful, these units 
have secured far greater political standing 
and support than NDMOs over the past few 
years. Collaboration between the two units—
pooling resources, capabilities, know-how, and 
contacts; working on joint initiatives in areas 
such as infrastructure and agriculture; and 
collaborating on the development of a culture 
of safety and resilience—can accelerate mutual 
progress toward shared goals for improved 
management of extreme climate events. 
Within this longer-term framework, DRR 
interventions take the form of “no-regrets” 
minimum levels of adaptation to climate risk, 
seeking to address immediate risks and thereby, 
to some degree, alleviating future ones (Box 2).
Figure 11 Stimulating Resilience 
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Box 2 No-Regrets Strategies and Actions
No-regrets resilience strategies and actions are strategies and actions that are justified based on current economic, social, 
and/or environmental costs, benefits, and hazard probabilities, and that help enhance resilience against future climate 
extremes without requiring any certainty of knowledge about their precise frequency or intensity. Thus, “adding climate 
change scenarios to ‘no-regrets’ adaptation is simply a way to make an already solid investment more robust in face of 
increasing uncertainty” (Bettencourt et al. 2006, 9). No-regrets strategies and actions can be undertaken at any level and by 
any player, from individual households and businesses, local communities, and nongovernment organizations to subnational 
and national government agencies and the international community. They can be encouraged through the introduction of 
various legislative and regulatory changes and incentives. 
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Tracking progress in strengthening 
resilience. The national development 
plan framework and related results-based 
management systems provide an important 
opportunity to track progress in strengthening 
resilience within a broader development 
context and to foster accountability for 
potential disaster losses among a wide range 
of stakeholders. Ideally, indicators focusing 
on outcomes will be established, relating to 
reductions in a particular form or level of 
disaster loss rather than focusing on inputs. 
For instance, the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China (2012) has set itself the goal 
of reducing disaster-related economic losses to 
less than 1.5% of annual GDP over the course 
of implementation of its Comprehensive 
Disaster Prevention and Reduction Plan 
(2011–2015), compared to a reported average 
of 2.4% over the previous 20 years.
Regulatory and Legislative 
Frameworks
Regulatory and legislative frameworks 
play a vital role in stimulating investment 
in resilience (Figure 12). Comprehensive 
DRM legislation, covering issues of ex ante 
risk reduction as well as ex post response, 
and reflecting the latest multi-hazard risk 
assessments, empower national and local 
governments to implement resilience 
strategies. In addition to their more obvious 
roles in establishing the necessary institutional 
arrangements and resources to implement 
these strategies, such frameworks also 
offer important opportunities to establish 
accountability for different forms and levels 
of disaster loss across all sectors of society. 
In addition, they not only require but also 
incentivize the wider society to take certain 
measures and actions to protect their 
individual lives, homes, productive assets, and 
livelihoods against hazard events.
Establishing overarching legislative 
frameworks. Overarching DRM legislative 
frameworks can be developed, coordinating 
all relevant laws under a single, cohesive 
structure. Such frameworks may cover a 
wide array of laws dealing with issues such 
as emergency preparedness and response, 
land use planning, building standards, 
environmental protection, water resource 
management, financial sector regulation,  
and climate change.
Undertaking legislative reform. Some reform 
of existing legislation may be required to 
remove potential obstacles and proactively 
promote strengthened resilience. Existing legal 
and regulatory systems covering insurance 
markets provide an obvious example. Reforms 
may be required to strengthen trust in risk 
transfer products, to improve solvency, to 
remove obstacles to access to reinsurance 
markets, and to provide greater incentives for 
investment in DRR.
Establishing accountability for unacceptable 
losses. Legislative and regulative frameworks 
can be used to require regular assessments 
of risk; to establish acceptable levels of risk; 
to define clear roles and responsibilities for 
Figure 12 Stimulating Resilience through Regulatory 
and Legislative Frameworks
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reducing risk, preparing for hazard events, 
providing emergency relief, and undertaking 
early recovery and reconstruction efforts 
(shared as appropriate across different levels 
and sectors of government, the private sector, 
and individual households); and to establish 
unambiguous accountability for any losses in 
excess of acceptable limits.
The assignment of responsibilities and 
accountabilities should reflect both roles in 
the creation of risk and DRM service delivery 
capabilities. For instance, NDMOs often have 
little capacity for direct implementation of 
DRR projects and limited funding under their 
direct control for such actions, regardless of 
their official DRR mandate. As such, they 
cannot be held singly responsible for per-
formance in strengthening resilience. Other 
government agencies can also face difficulties 
in meeting their resilience-strengthening and 
other responsibilities, particularly in countries 
with significant decentralization, where 
accountability for service delivery may not be 
supported with adequate operational capacity. 
Such arrangements can hamper the progress 
of programs to promote more resilient crop 
management techniques among farmers, 
for instance, unless obstacles are clearly 
recognized and appropriate steps are taken to 
overcome them.
Under certain circumstances, additional 
legislative changes are required to ensure 
that designated roles and responsibilities are 
accepted. For instance, individual households 
may require title to their land and property 
before they are willing to invest in structural 
risk reduction. Similarly, rent controls may 
need to be lifted to allow landlords to recoup 
retrofitting costs before they are willing to 
comply with building codes (World Bank and 
UN 2010). Alternatively, tenants may need to 
be given the legal authority to make changes 
to their buildings’ structure.
Establishing legally binding incentives 
for enhancing resilience. Legislative and 
regulatory frameworks can be used to 
establish mandatory incentives that promote 
strengthened resilience. For instance, 
national and local government agencies and 
individual businesses and households can 
be required to meet certain DRM standards, 
such as compliance with building codes and 
insurance of assets, before being permitted 
access to post-disaster relief, early recovery, 
or reconstruction funding. Land use and 
zoning requirements can be shaped to 
reward property developers, for instance 
offering easements on height restrictions and 
floor area ratios to property developers that 
adopt strong resilience features. Financial 
lending institutions can be obliged to 
require compliance with building codes 
and disaster insurance before approving 
mortgage and business loan applications. 
Related technical assistance can be allocated 
for capacity development to ensure that 
financial regulators are appropriately trained 
and have the requisite technical resources to 
enforce compliance requirements. Insurance 
companies can be required to file premium 
rate and deduction differentials for properties 
on which DRR measures have been employed; 
this has been the case, for instance,  
for residential property insurance in  
Florida in the United States since 1994  
(Ward et al. 2008).
Developing regional frameworks for 
transboundary hazards. Regional 
frameworks can play a key role in managing 
transboundary hazards. Several relevant 
nonbinding agreements are already in 
place, including the 1995 Agreement on the 
Cooperation for the Sustainable Development 
of the Mekong River Basin, to which 
Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Thailand, and Viet Nam are 
signatories, and the international Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005–2015. In 2010, 
the first binding agreement on the regional 
management of disasters in Asia and the 
Pacific came into effect in the form of the 
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response. This agreement 
seeks to strengthen cooperation among the 
10 ASEAN member states in disaster risk 
identification, monitoring, technological and 
scientific research, reduction, preparedness, 
relief, early recovery, and reconstruction. 
Exploiting surges in political interest to 
secure legislative reform for resilience and to 
strengthen implementation and compliance. 
Political interest in resilience in a particular 
country periodically increases, for instance 
following a major disaster or a wider rise in 
international focus. Such moments can be 
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seized upon to secure the passage of legislative 
reform, where required, and to strengthen 
regulations and other implementation and 
compliance instruments, particularly in 
countries where previous efforts have stalled. 
In the Philippines, for instance, work on a 
long sequence of DRM bills over more than 
a decade finally came to fruition in 2010, 
following two severe typhoons that struck the 
country’s capital. In Indonesia, the devastating 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami underlined the 
urgent need for legislative reform, spurring 
on a process begun several years earlier and 
resulting in new DRM legislation in 2007 
(Government of Indonesia and UNDP 
2009). The current international dialogue 
on the successor frameworks to the Hyogo 
Framework for Action and the Millennium 
Development Goals after 2015 may also create 
political space for legislative reform and 
strengthened implementation and compliance 
in some countries.
Subnational Policy and 
Planning Processes
Local governments operate on the front lines 
of disaster, dealing with localized hazards 
as well as less-frequent large-scale events. 
They also bear significant responsibility 
for implementing DRM policy and central 
government–initiated legislation, both  
directly through their own actions and 
by guiding, encouraging, and enforcing 
appropriate actions on the part of businesses 
and households.
In some respects, local governments are 
well placed to play these roles because they 
have firsthand knowledge of and experi-
ence with disaster risk in the communities 
they serve. Drawing on this, with national 
government support, they can stimulate 
long-term gains in strengthened resilience 
both for themselves and for their neighbors 
and hence for the overall national good. 
However, local governments in hazard-prone 
areas may have resource and capacity limita-
tions, are sometimes uncertain how much 
funding they will ultimately receive from the 
central government, and are less equipped 
to undertake detailed risk assessments or 
develop local DRM strategies. In these cases, 
in consultation with local communities and 
national experts, local governments can still 
identify a few key initiatives that are consistent 
with national policies and targets and local 
needs and that integrate disaster risk concerns 
into spatial and development planning. 
Meanwhile, regional, provincial, citywide, and 
other administrative units that sit between 
national government and the lowest level of 
local government have an essential intermedi-
ary role in linking and coordinating national 
development goals and objectives with locally 
identified priorities, including those related to 
DRM (Figure 13). They also provide  
steady guidance of both public and private 
(property) development toward greater 
resilience, influencing ongoing investment in 
local development.
Drawing on local knowledge and expertise. 
Local governments have direct access to a 
Figure 13 Stimulating Resilience 
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rich pool of knowledge (including indigenous 
knowledge), experience, capabilities, and 
perspectives on disaster risk within their 
local communities. This pool provides a 
firm foundation for the development of 
local resilience initiatives. It can be drawn 
upon through a series of multi-stakeholder 
and multisector consultations, including 
discussions with marginalized groups and 
businesses. Consultations can be important 
not only as a learning process for local 
government but also for establishing common 
understanding, mutual assistance, and shared 
commitment to moving resilience initiatives 
forward (UNISDR n.d.). Subnational 
institutional arrangements for DRM provide 
access to a wide base of knowledge in many 
countries as well as to DRM committees 
typically comprising representatives from all 
departments of local government, providing a 
multidisciplinary body with broad collective 
expertise and experience. 
Securing national government capacity and 
information support. National government 
agencies can support subnational authorities 
in translating government objectives into 
initiatives to strengthen resilience by 
providing hazard information; by providing 
training and technical expertise in areas such 
as hazard mapping and risk assessment; by 
encouraging the development of local disaster 
databases; and by establishing financial 
incentives for subnational government 
progress in this area. For instance, under 
its Comprehensive Disaster Prevention and 
Reduction Plan (2011–2015), the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China intends to 
establish a disaster information clerk in every 
rural and urban community and to strengthen 
disaster reporting and verification systems and 
the dissemination of disaster information.
Collaborating with neighboring units 
of subnational government. Horizontal 
consultation and collaboration among 
adjacent units of subnational government can 
play a vital role in the management of shared, 
cross-boundary hazards and vulnerabilities. 
Such initiatives can help ensure that individual 
units of government do not simply transfer 
disaster risk to their neighbors—by evicting 
squatters from hazard-prone areas, for 
instance, which can result in their relocation 
to hazard-prone locations in neighboring 
jurisdictions, or by investing in upstream 
structural flood controls that increase the 
risk of flooding for downstream jurisdictions. 
Instead, they can pool resources, know-how, 
and expertise to address disaster risk for their 
mutual benefit. They can also help identify 
cross-boundary issues that may require 
support from a higher level of government.
Encouraging twinning arrangements. 
Twinning options—linking hazard-prone 
cities, municipalities, or provinces with 
other localities that have relevant resilience 
expertise, technical solutions, or resources—
whether locally or internationally, can help 
stimulate investment in resilience. For 
instance, twinning arrangements have already 
been successfully established to support post-
disaster reconstruction efforts in the People’s 
Republic of China, following the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake. In that case, financial resources, 
personnel, and moral support were provided 
by other parts of the country (International 
Recovery Platform 2010). International 
twinning arrangements in a post-disaster 
context have been promoted more generally 
by Sister Cities International, under its 
Humanitarian Assistance Program. Twinning 
arrangements supporting innovation in ex 
ante risk reduction and the replication of 
successful risk reduction policies, instruments, 
and actions should also be encouraged.
Creating resilience legacies. The formulation 
of long-term development visions, coupled with 
aspirations to leave an enduring political legacy, 
can play a fundamental role in stimulating 
investment in resilience. The analysis of 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats underlying the development of a long-
term vision provides an obvious opportunity 
to examine disaster risk concerns and develop 
a subnational government’s broad approach 
to the issue, in tandem with economic and 
social development considerations. In disaster-
prone communities, successful initiatives 
to strengthen resilience can also constitute 
a substantial political legacy, benefitting 
a community for many years to come by, 
say, reducing loss of life; protecting homes, 
livelihoods, and community assets; and limiting 
indirect losses and the secondary effects of 
disasters. Nationally, such legacies might take 
the form of land use zoning, revised building 
codes, or resilient lifeline infrastructure.
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National and Subnational 
Budgetary Processes
Funding is “the ultimate litmus test of 
government commitment to disaster risk 
management” (UNDP 2005, 6). The precise 
level of commitment (subject to expenditure 
tracking issues) can be further gauged by 
the degree to which it adheres to three key 
principles (Benson 2009; Benson and Mahul, 
forthcoming):
•	 Levels of public expenditure on risk 
reduction are sufficient, relative to 
the level and nature of risk faced, the 
expected social and economic returns 
to risk reduction, and the reasonable 
responsibilities and obligations of 
government.
•	 There are adequate financing 
arrangements in place to manage the 
residual risk, manifested in the form of 
post-disaster relief, early recovery, and 
reconstruction costs, thereby limiting the 
indirect impacts to the maximum extent 
possible.
•	 Fiscal instruments are used effectively to 
encourage private sector and household 
investment in DRR and disaster risk 
transfer, reducing the contingent liability 
borne by the government.
Successful performance relative to 
these three key measures can be secured by 
developing a comprehensive DRF strategy 
that incorporates financing instruments to 
reduce risk and to provide adequate and 
timely post-disaster support to strengthen 
the management of residual risk. This, in 
turn, requires an assessment of the potential 
hazard-related fiscal risks faced by a govern-
ment, leading to the development of financing 
instruments both to limit that risk through ex 
ante risk reduction measures and to manage 
the residual risk, thereby limiting the direct 
and indirect losses and secondary effects 
incurred as a consequence of natural hazard 
events (Figure 14).
Assessing fiscal risk emanating from 
natural hazards. The development of a 
comprehensive DRF strategy begins with 
a quantitative assessment of disaster risk, 
ideally based on probabilistic disaster risk 
models rather than historical data alone. 
Models generate estimates of average 
expected loss and probable maximum losses 
over defined return periods. National and 
subnational government contingent liabilities 
(incorporating “build back safer” principles) 
can then be set in law, providing clarity on 
the share, scale, and nature of potential losses 
borne by government and on the precise 
UNDP: Funding 
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Figure 14 Stimulating Resilience through National and 
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division of responsibilities for disaster risk 
between national government and local 
government, on one side, and individual 
businesses and households (differentiated 
by income group) on the other. From this, 
governments can design suitable bundles  
of financing instruments to support  
different layers of disaster relief, early  
recovery and reconstruction efforts, and risk 
reduction programs.
Exploring disaster scenarios as part of 
the budget preparation process. The 
assessment of fiscal risks emanating from 
natural hazards and related management 
strategies can be further refined by building 
disaster scenarios into regular government 
forecasting exercises. This enables 
governments to explore in further depth 
the potential consequences of disasters 
for macroeconomic performance and 
budgetary envelopes and to identify potential 
opportunities to manage disaster risks more 
effectively via capital investment decisions 
and DRF arrangements.
Such analysis is rare in Asia and the 
Pacific but has, for instance, been undertaken 
by the World Bank for Ethiopia. The World 
Bank’s (2006) macroeconomic forecasting 
model for the country replaced smoothed 
average rainfall data with data on interannual 
variations in rainfall, based on historical 
records. This adjustment resulted in a 
doubling of the predicted growth and poverty 
reduction return on investment in irrigation.
Establishing funding lines for disaster 
risk reduction. The establishment of 
dedicated budget lines for DRR initiatives, 
linked to performance-based incentives 
where possible, can play a central role 
in kick-starting investments in this area. 
At first glance, their creation appears to 
fly in the face of efforts to integrate risk 
reduction concerns into development. 
However, progress in risk reduction has 
been very poor to date in many developing 
countries, and short-term incentives leading 
to the demonstration of the benefits of 
risk reduction (including retrofitting) can 
help lead to the ultimate absorption of 
incremental DRR costs into regular line 
agency development budgets (Benson, 
Arnold, and Christoplos 2009).
There are a range of potentially relevant 
instruments, dependent in part on the extent 
of devolution of responsibility for DRR activi-
ties in a particular country:
•	 Dedicated multisector disaster risk 
reduction budget lines for use by 
national agencies. This funding can be 
used to provide additional resources 
to strengthen the hazard resilience 
of approved investment projects. 
Subsequent demonstration of the net 
returns to this incremental expenditure, 
should a disaster occur over the life of the 
investment, could potentially eliminate 
the need for such budget lines as sector 
agencies could become willing to meet 
such costs directly.
•	 Centrally held disaster risk reduction 
budget lines for use by local govern-
ment. Access can be limited to local 
governments that have established sound 
DRM initiatives and that are willing to 
provide matching funding to demon-
strate their commitment to risk reduc-
tion. Straightforward application proce-
dures and clear guidelines on eligible uses 
are required to maximize effectiveness.
•	 Additional discretionary resource al-
locations to more hazard-prone areas 
as part of the annual budget transfer 
from central to local governments. 
Again, this incremental transfer can 
be linked to performance, requiring 
evidence of DRM initiatives or strength-
ened resilience to qualify for support.
In many cases, the creation of dedicated 
budget lines for local resilience activities 
is unrealistic, in view of very limited local 
government resources. However, the use of 
local contingency funds for DRR purposes 
is permitted in a few countries. This practice 
carries the danger that it may leave insufficient 
funding for disaster relief, early recovery, and 
reconstruction as and when it is needed, but 
it could ultimately result in significant savings 
in post-disaster expenditure in the long term. 
The Philippines has bypassed this potential 
problem by establishing a law whereby 
annual local government disaster relief, early 
recovery, and reconstruction appropriations 
can only be used for DRR purposes following 
the completion of the fiscal year. Unutilized 
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resources are placed in special trust funds for 
this purpose, rather than reverting to general 
government coffers.
Setting national and subnational disaster 
risk reduction public spending targets. 
The establishment of spending targets can 
be a useful tool to promote investment 
in risk reduction. Delegates at the 2009 
session of the Global Platform for Disaster 
Risk Reduction called for at least 1% of 
both national development funding and 
international development assistance to be 
allocated for risk reduction (UN 2009), and 
the Fourth Asian Ministerial Conference on 
Disaster Risk Reduction (2010) called for 
2% of development assistance to be assigned 
for DRR by 2015. Many participants at both 
meetings also supported the allocation of 10% 
of humanitarian relief funds for DRR (UN 
2009). Whether these goals are reached is in 
part a question of labeling. DRR spending 
requirements also vary between countries, 
implying that different targets may be 
appropriate in different contexts. Nevertheless, 
the establishment of global and regional targets 
can provide extremely useful mechanisms for 
drawing attention to the often considerable 
underspending on DRR and for rallying 
support for increased expenditure. Similar 
mechanisms can also be explored by  
local governments.
Establishing a cost-effective set of financing 
tools for post-disaster relief, early recovery, 
and reconstruction. Both national and 
subnational governments can establish a 
range of financing instruments to cover public 
liabilities associated with the residual risks 
arising from low-impact/high-frequency, 
medium-impact/medium-frequency, or 
high-impact/low-frequency events. These 
instruments may include an array of tools, 
linking each layer of risk to the most cost-
effective bundle of instruments and combining 
both ex ante and ex post instruments.
Ex ante instruments entail some form 
of forward planning and related budgetary 
allocation in anticipation of a disaster. They 
include various risk transfer mechanisms, 
including indemnity and parametric insur-
ance and catastrophe bonds, together with 
contingent loans and disaster reserves. Ex post 
instruments involve financing arrangements 
that are put in place only after a disaster has 
occurred. Examples include post-disaster 
budget reallocations, tax increases, deficit 
financing, or international assistance. Each 
instrument (with the exception of interna-
tional grant assistance) comes at some cost, in 
the form of direct premium or loan repayment 
costs and/or opportunity costs. The most 
appropriate bundle of instruments for each 
layer of loss depends on
•	 the scale of resources to which each 
instrument can facilitate access;
•	 the marginal cost of each instrument;
•	 the speed with which each instrument 
can be activated; and
•	 individual country circumstances, 
including prevailing macroeconomic 
circumstances; government economic, 
fiscal, and monetary goals and objectives; 
access to international finance markets; 
and the market-based cost of borrowing.
A more timely response limits the indi-
rect and secondary consequences of disasters. 
It has even been suggested that governments 
that adopt a countercyclical response, increas-
ing total public expenditure to support more 
rapid post-disaster recovery, may limit the 
long-term indirect and secondary impacts of 
an event (Melecky and Raddatz 2011).
National governments can explore 
ways of shifting some of the financial 
burden of post-disaster spending to their 
local counterparts, the private sector, and 
individual households via greater use of 
loans, enabling governments to fulfill 
moral and economic obligations to provide 
post-disaster support while limiting the 
ultimate public cost. For instance, extensive 
reconstruction loans were provided under 
the Government of Japan’s Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Program following the March 2011 
Great East Japan Earthquake.
Building disaster risk reduction incentives 
into disaster relief, recovery, and 
reconstruction financing mechanisms. 
Principles of DRR can be embedded in 
post-disaster financing instruments to reduce 
future contingent liability. For instance, 
sovereign contingent credit facilities offered 
by the World Bank (or the Inter-American 
Development Bank, in the case of Latin 
America and the Caribbean) incorporate this 
principle, with access to financing conditioned 
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on the establishment and implementation of 
adequate DRM programs. Similarly, central 
governments can limit post-disaster support 
to line agencies or local governments that have 
made insufficient progress in risk reduction 
or that do not carry insurance. In Mexico, for 
instance, only insured public assets are eligible 
for indefinite repeat reconstruction funding 
from the Fund for Natural Disasters (World 
Bank 2012a).
Disclosing disaster-related fiscal risks in 
budgetary statements. Over the past 2  
decades, there has been increasing emphasis 
on efforts to improve the management of all 
forms of fiscal risk, through identification and 
disclosure in public budgeting and accounting 
and the development of related international 
standards, codes, and sound practices. 
Natural hazards pose two basic forms of 
fiscal risk. First, they have the potential to 
cause unanticipated changes in the expected 
performance of key variables upon which 
public revenue forecasts and spending 
plans are based. Second, they can trigger 
contingent liabilities. These can take the form 
of government obligations with regard to 
the realization of related public guarantees 
(most obviously, of insurance programs), 
reconstruction of public assets, provision of 
humanitarian assistance, and facilitation of 
economic stability and recovery.
In practice, full quantification of fiscal 
risks from natural hazards is a huge task, 
and the results are probabilistic in nature. 
Thus, for instance, although the Government 
of New Zealand is a world leader in 
accrual budgeting and accounting and 
the disclosure of fiscal risks— recognizing 
revenues and expenditure when they are 
due and consumed rather than when they 
are received and paid—it only discloses 
its natural hazard–related obligations to 
meet any financial shortfalls faced by the 
Earthquake Commission and specific 
contingent liabilities relating to disasters 
that have already occurred. However, even 
qualitative disclosure combined with a clear 
articulation of accepted forms and levels 
of contingent liability represents a big step 
forward, clarifying the potential cost to the 
state of natural hazards and giving greater 
attention to related risks as they are accrued 
rather than simply when they come to bear 
(Benson and Mahul, forthcoming).
5.2  Securing inveStment: imPlementing reSilience
Investment in resilience can be secured by 
incorporating resilience-strengthening criteria 
and analysis into the identification, design, and 
implementation of individual development 
investments; by fostering household, 
community, and private sector participation 
in strengthening resilience; and by harnessing 
private financing to help fund investments in 
DRR and to share post-disaster relief, recovery, 
and reconstruction costs.
Investment Identification, 
Design, and 
Implementation
At the heart of efforts to strengthen resilience 
are investments in individual dedicated 
initiatives to reduce risk—for instance, 
in structural flood defenses or in school 
retrofitting programs. Other development 
investments can also take disaster risk into 
account in their design and implementation, 
to ensure that assets are adequately protected 
against natural hazards and that the 
investments themselves do not create new 
forms of risk.
The project cycle includes a number of 
entry points to explore and act on potential 
opportunities to strengthen resilience, 
particularly relating to the initial screening of 
investment proposals, the detailed feasibility 
and design phases, and subsequent monitor-
ing and evaluation (Figure 15).
Exploring resilience benefits in preliminary 
project selection. Most governments screen 
preliminary public investment project 
proposals according to a standard set of 
criteria relating to factors such as cost and 
employment generation before moving onto 
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fuller feasibility studies for selected initiatives. 
This process offers an early opportunity to 
determine which projects contribute to or 
detract from resilience, if relevant questions 
are included in the screening criteria. The 
potential benefits of considering resilience at 
an early stage of project preparation can be 
further enhanced by strengthening knowledge 
and understanding of the risks posed by 
natural hazards to actual performance against 
other screening indicators, such as poverty 
reduction and gender equality.
Taking disaster risk into account in project 
preparation. Both disaster risk and potential 
for enhanced resilience can be explored in 
further depth as part of the detailed feasibility 
studies for selected projects—for instance, 
while undertaking an economic appraisal, 
environmental assessment, social impact 
assessment, or broader risk analysis (which also 
covers financial, political, and other risks). The 
following are some potential options:
•	 Stand-alone disaster risk screening and 
assessment. Stand-alone disaster risk 
screening and assessment tools can be 
established to evaluate risk and to iden-
tify any related project design require-
ments (Box 3). The private sector can 
also be required to apply such tools.
•	 Environmental assessment.  
The environmental assessment process 
can include an examination of the effect 
of proposed investments on vulnerability 
to natural hazards in the project 
vicinity (e.g., the effect on drainage of 
the construction of a road) and of the 
potential effect of hazard events on 
proposed investments.
•	 Economic appraisal. Disaster risk 
concerns can be integrated into standard 
economic appraisal procedures, and 
related training and technical support 
can be provided, covering analysis of 
dedicated DRR initiatives and the risk 
reduction features of other development 
projects. Guidance is particularly useful 
on challenges relating to the fact that 
the estimated flow of benefits will 
be probabilistic, with actual benefits 
dependent on the number and scale of 
hazard events occurring over the life of the 
investment; that many of the benefits will 
Figure 15 Incorporating Resilience 
in Individual Development 
Investments
■ Consider resilience 
benefits in preliminary 
project screening
■ Take disaster risk into 
account in project 
preparation procedures
■ Adjust structural designs 
to reflect disaster risk
■ Include monitoring and 
evaluation indicators on 
resilience
Resilient
development 
investments
Diameter of the reinforcing bar, bending method and joint detailing are all crucial 
for seismic resistant construction. Dhaka, Bangladesh
A
D
PC
 Stimulating, Securing, and Sustaining Investment in a More Resilient Future 47
relate to direct physical and indirect losses 
that will not ensue should the related 
hazard occur, rather than to expected 
streams of positive benefits; and that 
comprehensive risk assessments may not 
be available for the project locality (Benson 
and Twigg 2007).
There is an additional challenge relating to 
the limited appraisal requirements and proce-
dures for many subnational projects, particu-
larly at the lowest level of government and even 
for smaller-scale national projects, implying far 
fewer entry points to encourage consideration 
of resilience concerns. This issue can be tackled 
to some extent by raising local awareness of the 
importance of ensuring that investments are 
both adequately protected against disasters and 
do not exacerbate existing risk.
Adjusting engineering designs and 
standards to reflect disaster risk. 
Community structures such as schools, 
hospitals, roads, and publicly supported 
low-cost housing often are built according to 
standard, one-size-fits-all nationwide design 
templates. These templates can be adjusted to 
reflect site-specific considerations, including 
the local hazard environment.
Including monitoring and evaluation 
indicators on resilience. Project monitoring 
and evaluation indicators can be established 
to gauge progress on the implementation 
of resilience measures and their degree of 
success. In an ideal world, particular emphasis 
would be placed on the degree of success, 
measuring the outcome of investments in 
terms of tangible evidence of reduced loss 
of life, direct physical losses, indirect losses, 
and adverse secondary effects. However, the 
design hazard event (for instance, a 100-year 
flood) may not occur during the life of a 
project. Therefore, process indicators capturing 
enhanced though unproven resilience in the 
form of project outputs and activities may take 
on more significance. These could measure, for 
instance, the number of schools constructed or 
retrofitted to withstand winds or earthquakes of 
a certain magnitude, or the rates of growth and 
survival of trees in a mangrove planting scheme 
intended to provide protection against sea 
surges (Benson and Twigg 2007). Use of proxies 
and alternative indicators also may assist in 
measurement. For instance, the progress of a 
project aimed at strengthening the drought 
resilience of poor households may be easier to 
gauge by monitoring fluctuations in livestock 
sales or school enrollment than movements in 
household income.
Fostering Household, 
Community, and Private 
Sector Participation
Households, communities, and businesses 
can play a significant role in strengthening 
resilience by taking disaster risk into 
account in their investment behavior and 
by supporting the public sector in financing 
investments in resilience (Figure 16). Indeed, 
they play a role in the creation of risk and 
therefore bear direct, partial responsibility for 
its management. They can be encouraged to 
Box 3 Incorporating Resilience into Project Appraisal in India
In 2009, the Government of India amended the formats for the detailed project report (DPR) and the Expenditure Finance 
Commission (EFC) memorandum, both key elements of the public investment project approval process in India, to 
incorporate resilience concerns. DPRs are prepared after proposed projects have secured in-principle approval from the 
Planning Commission. Accompanying EFC memorandums are also prepared for all public investment projects costing in 
excess of Rs1 billion ($18 million) and which therefore require EFC appraisal (Government of India 2010).
Following the 2009 amendment, DPRs are now required to include a natural disaster impact assessment (Government 
of India 2009). EFC memorandums must include an assessment of disaster risk management concerns, should the proposed 
project involve the creation or modification of structural and engineering assets or a change in land use plans, and must 
include any related risk reduction costs in the total project cost. All EFC memorandums should also indicate whether the 
project design is “secured” against natural hazards such as floods, cyclones, earthquakes, and tsunamis (Government of  
India 2012).
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become more proactive by strengthening their 
knowledge and understanding of the business 
continuity resulting from strengthened 
resilience and the potential commercial gains 
from the development and marketing of goods 
and services that strengthen wider resilience. 
Tax breaks and incentives can provide further 
motivation, and financiers can also promote 
resilience via lending conditions, introduced 
either by choice or by legislative requirement.
Developing the business continuity case 
for strengthened resilience. There are 
a number of opportunities to protect a 
company’s workforce, assets, and supply 
chains (including power and water supplies) 
adequately against natural hazards. Individual 
businesses, ranging from multinational 
corporations to small enterprises, can take 
various steps to strengthen resilience, for 
instance, by ensuring that their physical assets 
are suitably protected, by maintaining larger 
input inventories, by installing alternative 
power supplies (e.g., solar options), and by 
securing disaster risk insurance. Collaborative 
public–private forums can be established to 
map out the potential effect of disasters on 
business operations and trade in general; to 
identify key public actions and investments 
that could be taken to minimize post-disaster 
disruption to the business sector; and to 
encourage take-up. Efforts to protect a 
company’s profit margins against disaster can 
also have wider fringe benefits.
Identifying commercial opportunities in 
strengthened resilience. The private sector 
can play a critical role in securing investment 
in resilience, not only bringing in funding 
but also an understanding of the market, 
operating efficiencies, and products and 
services that will sustain the latest technology 
and innovative, flexible capacity (Intellecap 
2010). There are a wide range of potential 
commercial opportunities, including 
infrastructure development, service provision, 
financial services, and information and 
communication technology (Box 4).
Governments and the international 
community can support the private sector in 
identifying potential commercial opportuni-
ties. For instance, they may jointly research 
and map out the types of companies and 
sectors in which strengthened resilience is 
most likely to emerge as a business oppor-
tunity. They can also undertake measures 
to encourage private sector engagement in 
lower-income segments of the market and 
in geographically more remote areas, where 
profit margins may be much smaller and 
risks much higher but where the need for 
strengthened resilience may also be much 
greater. Analysis of likely future growth in 
these markets as incomes grow may be helpful 
in attracting commercial interest. In Mongolia, 
insurance companies continue to participate 
in the World Bank–supported Index-Based 
Livestock Insurance program, despite net 
overall losses to date, because their engage-
ment has resulted in strong brand recognition 
in rural areas and because the companies have 
identified considerable growth potential in 
these markets (Benson 2011a).
Public and community support can also 
play a useful role in identifying opportuni-
ties to link investment in resilience with the 
immediate generation of household income. 
Figure 16 Fostering Household, Community, and 
Private Sector Engagement in Strengthening Resilience
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For instance, investing in ducks rather than 
chickens may increase the resilience of income 
streams in the case of floods. Likewise, 
switching to more hazard-tolerant crops or 
seed varieties can increase resilience. Comple-
mentary private sector initiatives, such as the 
establishment of related credit facilities and 
marketing infrastructure, may be needed to 
encourage changes in household behavior.
Providing tax breaks and other incentives. 
Governments can encourage private and 
household efforts to enhance resilience 
by establishing an attractive investment 
climate, including suitable legislative and 
regulatory frameworks and fiscal incentives. 
Governments can provide financial grants, 
subsidized loans, or tax breaks to stimulate 
the development, marketing, and adoption of 
risk reduction measures in selected sectors. 
For instance, they can assist households 
in securing land tenure by providing 
land purchase loans or supporting lease 
negotiation or, as in Pune, India, they might 
provide property tax incentives to encourage 
households to recycle wastewater and store 
rainwater runoff to reduce the risk  
of severe flooding (UNISDR 2012b). 
Conversely, penalties and sanctions can be 
applied to households and businesses that, 
for example, increase risk by contributing to 
environmental degradation.
Governments can also provide public 
goods, such as hazard data and risk models, to 
reduce start-up costs in developing insurance 
and other products; to reduce first-mover mar-
ket research costs; and to boost solvency, for 
instance, by improving risk assessment. Public 
sector financial backing of some early products 
may also be required to demonstrate profit-
ability, and, in the case of insurance products, 
to ensure financial viability  during their early 
years. For instance, public backing in the form 
of reserves, contingent loans, or credit guaran-
tees may be required to encourage the develop-
ment of insurance products. Public incentives 
to encourage the development of the insurance 
industry can trigger further incentives for both 
homeowner and commercial investment in 
resilience, because insurance often offers one of 
the most transparent and speedy paybacks on 
such investment. For instance, moving inven-
tory to an upper floor can be rewarded with an 
immediate reduction in premiums.
Packages of incentives that seek to 
encourage small, local businesses as well as 
large corporations to engage in strengthening 
resilience can be important. Large corpora-
tions are better able to absorb first-mover and 
start-up costs and often have greater technical 
expertise. However, local businesses have a 
strong understanding of the context-specific 
nature of disaster risk faced by the individual 
communities in which they live and work; a 
long-term commitment to those communi-
ties, including potentially greater willingness 
to support community-based DRM efforts, 
such as clearing drains and waterways, which 
Box 4 Business Opportunities in Strengthening Resilience
In the context of urban climate change resilience, but also of relevance to disaster risk management, a study by Intellecap 
(2010) identified particular business opportunities in the following areas:
•	 Microinsurance, including products providing life, asset, and crop coverage
•	 Waste and sanitation, with particular opportunities in integrated waste management operations, which in part 
would reduce risk of flooding by unclogging urban drainage systems
•	 Water management, including provision of water conservation technology such as recycling, rainwater harvesting, 
and drip irrigation, to provide better protection against drought
•	 Affordable, hazard-strengthened housing
•	 Off-grid backup energy solutions, providing individual homes and businesses with alternative energy supplies to 
overcome disaster-related power grid failures
•	 Microfinance, helping to build resilience and overcome disaster shocks
•	 Information and communication technology, facilitating the collection and dissemination of data for use in 
strengthening disaster resilience and shorter-term preparedness pertaining to, for example, short- and long-term 
weather forecasts, river levels, and crop, market, price, and job information
•	 Livelihood promotion, providing services such as vocational education and training and job market information to 
support vulnerable groups in building skills, thus increasing earnings
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will benefit both themselves and the wider 
community; and a willingness to persevere in 
fine-tuning products and marketing arrange-
ments if initial efforts reap too little financial 
return (Benson 2011b).
Supporting financial institutions in promot-
ing resilience. Investors and financial institu-
tions can potentially play a significant role in 
promoting DRR and can be encouraged and 
supported in this capacity. The following are 
some examples:
•	 Lending institutions can be obliged 
to require compliance with land use 
zoning, design, and building codes, and 
with disaster insurance requirements 
before approving mortgage and business 
loan applications. Homeowners may be 
unwilling to incur the high up-front cost 
relative to the small premium discount 
associated with these  
DRR investments, but this issue  
can be overcome by bundling  
long-term insurance  policies and home 
improvement loans with mortgages, if 
the  reduction in insurance premiums 
exceeds the annual home improvement 
loan repayment (Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan 2010).
•	 Governments can guarantee loans to 
low-income households to, for instance, 
strengthen homes or livelihoods against 
natural hazards.
•	 Insurance companies can be required to 
apply differentiated risk-based premiums 
and deductibles and to cap coverage be-
low 100% of the value of insured assets.
•	 Investors can require disclosure of 
disaster risk by the companies in which 
they invest, compelling such companies 
to identify and address risks, minimize 
them, and ensure  
appropriate arrangements are in place to 
manage residual risk (Box 5).
Harnessing Private 
Financing
Rapid economic and demographic growth  
has placed enormous pressure on infrastructure 
in Asia in recent years, potentially limiting 
future growth and threatening competitiveness, 
stability, and poverty reduction if the effects 
of growth are not addressed (ADB and ADBI 
2009). A recent paper focusing on 32 ADB 
developing member countries indicated that 
these countries alone are expected to need 
almost $8.22 trillion (in 2008 dollars) for 
national infrastructure investment in areas 
such as energy, transport, telecommunications, 
water, and sanitation between 2010 and 2020, 
and that an additional $320 billion is required 
for investment in regional transport, energy, 
and telecommunications infrastructure 
(Bhattacharyay 2010). These financing needs 
are huge and pose an enormous challenge 
for many developing countries, not least 
in translating such needs into “bankable,” 
commercially viable, profitable projects that will 
attract private sector financing. Investments 
in resilience are no different. Governments 
must harness considerable private financing 
to help meet the funding gap for DRR and 
to share post-disaster relief, recovery, and 
reconstruction costs.
A number of opportunities to harness 
funding for resilience are highlighted below, 
focusing on public–private partnerships, 
Box 5 Incorporating Disaster Risk into Corporate Credit Risk Analysis and Disclosure
In 2006, a group of leading institutional investors from around the world released the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclo-
sure, outlining the climate risk information that investors require companies to disclose in order to analyze their business risk; 
the commercial opportunities in the form of new products and markets presented to them by climate change; and their efforts  
to address those risks and opportunities (Climate Risk Disclosure Initiative Steering Committee 2006). The framework contains 
an assessment of the physical risks posed by climate change, including changes in the frequency and intensity of natural 
hazards, and related opportunities for adaptation.
Certain initiatives also have been undertaken at a national level. In Bangladesh, for instance, a public–private initiative has 
been launched to develop environmental risk management guidelines to support financing institutions in assessing environ-
mental risk as part of their credit risk analysis (Asian Tiger Capital Partners 2010).
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instruments for accessing financial capital 
markets and diaspora incomes and savings, 
and the development of private insurance 
markets (Figure 17).
Promoting public–private partnership 
opportunities in the field of resilience. 
Significant financing for investment in 
resilience can be raised through public–private 
partnerships. Indeed, Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation ministers and senior government 
officials, meeting in Hawaii in November 
2011, specifically pledged to increase private 
sector engagement in their resilience agenda 
through the development of public–private 
partnerships (APEC 2011).
With a little lateral thinking and 
consideration of indirect rather than direct 
opportunities to increase resilience, there 
is considerable potential for public–private 
partnerships to generate income in areas 
supporting strengthened resilience. 
Opportunities to generate direct revenue 
exist, for instance, in areas of solid waste 
management and drainage, which help 
to address issues of flooding; provision of 
clean water via seawater desalinization and 
wastewater treatment plants, which can  
provide freshwater to drought- and flood-
prone areas; and irrigation (including 
drip irrigation and hydroponics), which 
supports improved drought and typhoon risk 
management (by supporting earlier cultivation 
of crops, ahead of the main typhoon season, 
as happens sometimes in the Philippines) 
(Benson 2011b). 
Risk reduction and revenue-generating 
investments can also be combined in a single 
infrastructure development. This was dem-
onstrated, for instance, by the Stormwater 
Management and Road Tunnel in the center of 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for which a user toll 
is charged, and the construction of roads on 
top of dikes in Viet Nam.
As the private sector becomes more 
generally involved in the development of a 
significant and increasing share of public 
infrastructure, it is essential that the public 
and private sectors work together to ensure 
that resilience features are incorporated into 
all infrastructure built through public–private 
partnerships, where relevant; that risk 
management plans are put in place over the 
operating life of these core assets; and that the 
additional financing required to facilitate these 
activities is made available. It is anticipated 
that the private sector will meet around 
40% of national and regional infrastructure 
investment requirements from 2010 to 
2020, in part via public–private partnerships 
(Bhattacharyay 2011).
Accessing financial markets. Financial 
markets can provide additional private 
financing for investment in resilience. Indeed, 
both ex ante catastrophe bonds and, in 
high-income countries, ex post reconstruction 
bonds are already being used to finance post-
disaster spending requirements, providing 
access to international and domestic financial 
markets. There has also been some discussion 
about the development of more explicit 
linkages between disaster risk transfer and 
risk reduction. For instance, financing raised 
through the issue of catastrophe bonds could 
be onward-lent for public investment in DRR. 
Should the trigger event subsequently occur, 
investors would be required to forgive the 
debt and the onward loans would be forgiven, 
freeing up public resources for post-disaster 
reconstruction. Should the trigger event not 
occur during the life of the bond, the principal 
would be repaid to investors and the lending 
Figure 17 Harnessing Private 
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turned into, for instance, a regular multilateral 
development bank loan.
Further options of potential relevance to 
investments in resilience are being explored in 
the context of infrastructure investment more 
generally. These may take the form of bonds 
that include guarantees or enhancements to 
protect investors against various risks (e.g., 
fluctuating exchange rates, inflation, com-
modity price risks, credit risk, demand risk, 
and economic risk); that insulate borrowers 
from adverse changes in servicing costs; and 
that are customized to fit the specific needs of 
lenders and borrowers (Bhattacharyay 2011).
Tapping into diaspora earnings and 
savings. Diaspora earnings and savings can 
provide a significant source of financing in 
support of both risk reduction and post-
disaster response. Total developing country 
remittances are huge, reaching three times 
the level of official development assistance 
in 2011, and are expected to rise by at 
least a further 65% from 2011–2014 alone. 
Remittances already contribute, indirectly, to 
strengthened resilience through investments 
in education, health, higher-quality housing, 
and livelihood diversification. Remittances 
also provide a key source of post-disaster 
financing for many lower-income households, 
smoothing income and reducing reliance on 
informal, often highly detrimental coping 
mechanisms such as the sale of productive 
and domestic assets and informal sector 
borrowing. An analysis of 129 countries over 
the period 1970–2006 found that, in countries 
where migrants represent around 10% of the 
origin country’s population, total nationwide 
inflows of remittances increased by $0.50 
for every $1 in direct physical disaster losses 
during the year of a disaster and, during the 
following year, by a further $1 for every $1 of 
losses (Mohapatra, Joseph, and Ratha 2009).
Mechanisms supporting the speedy trans-
fer of remittances help maximize their benefits 
in a post-disaster context. The growth of mobile 
money accounts—a form of virtual banking 
with money transferred via mobile phone—is a 
particularly promising development, overriding 
difficulties and delays created by the physical 
destruction of banking infrastructure.
There are potential opportunities to tap 
diaspora earnings and savings to provide 
further resources to strengthen the resilience 
of individual families and the wider commu-
nity in migrants’ countries of origin. Possible 
products could be developed along the 
following lines:
•	 Migrant disaster risk insurance 
products. The fledgling insurance market 
for migrants, offering coverage against 
disruptions in flows of remittances (e.g., 
as a consequence of loss of job or death) 
and shocks faced by migrants’ families 
in their country of origin (e.g., as a result 
of illness), could be extended to include 
products providing cover against natural 
hazards in a migrant’s home country 
(Powers, Magnoni, and Zimmerman 
2011).
•	 Diaspora reconstruction bonds.  
In the wake of the 2010 Haiti  
earthquake, there was some discussion 
about the extension of diaspora bonds 
for reconstruction purposes (see, for 
example, Ketkar and Ratha 2011; World 
Bank and UN 2010). Diaspora bonds are 
already used by some governments—
including the Government of India—
for development purposes, enabling 
governments to access a relatively cheap 
source of external borrowing in the form 
of patriotic nationals’ wealth accumulated 
overseas (Ketkar and Ratha 2007). 
Overseas nationals are willing to purchase 
these bonds due to a combination of 
patriotic sentiment and a desire to 
contribute to the development of their 
country of origin while simultaneously 
diversifying their personal assets and 
improving their risk management. The 
potential value of such bonds in a post-
disaster reconstruction context would 
depend in part, however, on the speed 
with which they could be issued.
•	 Diaspora catastrophe bonds. Diaspora 
securities along the lines of catastrophe 
bonds could be issued prior to a disaster 
event, offering higher rates of interest 
than those available under more 
traditional diaspora bonds.
•	 Community disaster risk reduction 
funds. Mechanisms could be established 
to secure flows of remittances for DRR 
initiatives that would benefit migrants’ 
communities back home. For instance, 
remittances could be transmitted 
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through migrant organizations such 
as hometown associations, which are 
formed by migrants from a specific 
region or town in the country of origin. 
Hometown associations already facilitate 
the flow of collective remittances to 
support infrastructural and community-
development projects as well as social 
purposes in the community of origin 
(Adams et al. 2012).
Encouraging the growth of private 
insurance markets. Increased penetration 
of private disaster risk insurance can be 
encouraged and supported to spread and 
smooth the cost of disaster recovery and 
reconstruction over time and to reduce 
public contingent liability in the event of a 
disaster. Parametric products can overcome 
some of the problems associated with 
traditional indemnity insurance,  
such as moral hazard, adverse selection, 
and high administrative costs. However, 
they still carry potential challenges related 
to affordability and covariant risk, and also 
present issues of basis risk.
5.3  SuStaining inveStment in reSilience: 
Strengthening caPacity and caPabilitieS
There are various instruments and 
mechanisms that can be applied to ensure that 
efforts to stimulate and secure investments 
in resilience result in sustainable outcomes 
and that resilience remains a key focus of 
governments, civil society, and the private 
sector (Figure 18). They include efforts to 
position DRM leadership strategically within 
government; to maintain and strengthen 
disaster awareness; to ensure that resilience 
strategies and initiatives are informed by 
up-to-date analysis and data on disaster 
risk; to strengthen knowledge on potential 
net returns on investment in DRR; to foster 
replication and scaling up of successful 
resilience initiatives; to keep public and 
private infrastructure in a good state of repair; 
and to track expenditure on both DRR and 
relief, early recovery, and reconstruction.
Providing strategic disaster risk 
management leadership. NDMOs can be 
strategically positioned to strengthen their 
capacity to spearhead the drive for enhanced 
resilience across all relevant sectors and 
levels of government. In many countries, the 
ministry of planning may provide a good 
platform for this purpose. However, this may 
make NDMOs less effective in performing 
their other key role in emergency response. 
A compromise could be to place NDMOs 
in the ministry of planning, but with the 
provision that the office of the prime minister 
(or the equivalent), which is one of the more 
traditional homes for NDMOs, would assume 
command during disaster periods. Such 
changes in institutional arrangements can take 
many years to implement, however. In the 
shorter term, disaster risk focal points can be 
created in individual agencies to guide sector-
specific resilience initiatives, to provide related 
technical support, to share information, and to 
help facilitate a coordinated approach across 
the government. For instance, disaster focal 
points have been established in key national 
government departments in Nepal (Benson, 
Gyanwaly, and Regmi 2009).
A
D
PC
Capacity building and strengthening disaster awareness among communities  
is essential for sustaining investment in resilience. Bangladesh
54 Investing in Resilience
Looking beyond formal institutional 
structures, well-placed high-level political 
champions with relevant expertise and 
knowledge and a deeply ingrained passion for 
strengthening resilience can play a key role 
in galvanizing commitment to the issue. To 
date, such champions are few and far between, 
reflecting the wide-ranging, multidisciplinary 
demands of the position.
Strengthening disaster risk awareness. Con-
tinual public education and awareness-raising 
initiatives can be conducted to improve levels 
of knowledge and understanding of disaster 
risk and thus to foster commitment to 
resilience-strengthening measures.  
A four-pronged approach is particularly 
effective, combining campaigns, participatory 
learning initiatives, informal education, and 
formal school–based interventions, using 
a wide range of tools, publications, cur-
ricula, modules, presentations, e-learning, 
 performing and cultural arts, games and 
competitions, audio and video materials, web 
pages and activities, and social media and 
telecommunications (IFRC 2011).
In localities that have not experienced 
a major hazard event for many years and 
where memories of the last event have faded, 
the very real prospect of a future event needs 
to be kept firmly in mind. This helps ensure 
that the purpose of land use zoning, building 
codes, insurance, and other resilience-
enhancing measures is firmly understood 
and supported. Indeed, awareness-raising 
initiatives are likely to become ever more 
important in countries where disasters occur 
less and less frequently, as a consequence of 
overall success in strengthening resilience, 
but where major disasters will still 
periodically occur. These endeavors need to 
strengthen societal knowledge of both local 
and national risk.
The frequency and intensity of high-
frequency local risks also need to be carefully 
monitored. Changes in frequency and inten-
sity may be almost imperceptible year on year, 
but if watched over a period of several years 
may reveal an underlying upward (or down-
ward) trend. If any such trends are identified 
and understood at an early stage, they can be 
redressed accordingly.
Reviewing risk assessments regularly. Risk 
assessments, including local vulnerability 
and capacity assessments, individual business 
risk assessments, and public disaster-related 
fiscal risk assessments, can be reviewed and, 
where necessary, revised and re-disseminated 
on a regular basis to ensure that DRM and 
DRF strategies, legislation, and individual risk 
management actions reflect the best available 
information. Vulnerability exposure and, 
due to climate change, hazard intensity and 
frequency are changing over time, altering 
disaster risk and thus the most appropriate 
forms of intervention. Scientific modeling 
capabilities are also improving, enabling better 
estimation and thus better management of 
disaster risk.
Figure 18 Sustaining Resilience 
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Strengthening knowledge about potential 
net returns on investment in resilience. 
Knowledge about the cost of measures to 
enhance resilience and their potential net 
returns can be considerably expanded and 
strengthened to encourage the uptake of 
resilience measures. Existing cost–benefit 
analyses can also be collated and placed in 
the public domain. Ex post analyses can 
be undertaken to examine how more- and 
less-hazard-resilient structures performed 
in the event of a disaster, and to compare the 
cost of ex ante strengthening with the cost of 
post-disaster reconstruction.
The cost of strengthening individual 
development investments against natural 
hazards may be as low as an additional few 
percentage points on the baseline cost of 
construction. For instance, much of the cost 
of earthquake design is incurred in making 
the structural frame more robust through 
the use of additional materials, such as extra 
reinforcing steel and concrete. In East Asia 
and the Pacific, this is estimated to add 
only around 2%–4% to the overall cost of 
construction (Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery 2010). The cost of 
longer-term “climate proofing” may be a little 
higher. Internal evaluations by ADB suggest 
that the costs of longer-term climate risk 
management on projects subject to climate 
change risks are likely to range from 5% to 
15% of total investment costs.
Little can be categorically stated about 
the net returns on various types of resilience 
investment, because the existing body of 
evidence is too limited to draw basic rules 
of thumb. Net returns vary according to a 
host of local demographic, socioeconomic, 
geographic, and other factors and, of course, 
are relative to the frequency and intensity of 
the natural hazard(s) faced (Benson 2010) 
(Table 4). The choice of discount rate is also 
critical in determining the results of the 
analyses. However, further research, backed by 
the development of simplified methodological 
tools for this purpose, would generate some 
broad yardsticks, providing a more solid basis 
for rational decision making about investment 
in resilience during preliminary project design 
and development.
Fostering scaling up and replication. Scaling 
up and replication of successful initiatives 
can be encouraged and supported through 
documentation and dissemination campaigns, 
coupled with suitable financing mechanisms 
and legislative reforms. Local governments, 
community-based organizations, and NGOs 
have accumulated numerous local success 
stories about strengthening resilience,  
but they often need support to expand into 
new communities.
The power of demonstration, showing 
how particular interventions have reduced 
losses from subsequent disasters, is enormous. 
Even before an event occurs, there are oppor-
tunities to encourage sharing and replication. 
The steps followed in the identification, 
design, and implementation of an initiative, 
including how funding was secured, and the 
methods employed to overcome barriers 
and obstacles, can be documented either on 
paper or by camera, and lessons learned and 
(expected) benefits can be clearly detailed.
Undertaking routine maintenance.  
A country’s resilience to natural hazards 
can be considerably enhanced by increasing 
levels of funding for routine maintenance. 
For instance, maintenance funding could 
be increased by raising annual budget 
appropriations for this purpose, by setting 
aside for subsequent maintenance purposes a 
portion of international development partner 
support for a particular project or, where 
appropriate, by drawing on user fees, tariffs, 
and other mechanisms. Poorly maintained 
infrastructure—whether homes, factories, 
or public assets—are far more vulnerable 
to natural hazards, potentially escalating 
post-disaster reconstruction costs far beyond 
the ex ante cost of minor repairs. Adequate 
maintenance is particularly paramount in the 
case of schools and other community facilities 
that double as evacuation centers in the event 
of a disaster.
Tracking disaster-related public spending. 
National and subnational governments and 
the international community can establish 
tracking systems to monitor and coordinate 
expenditure on DRR and relief, early 
recovery, and reconstruction response; to 
help facilitate structured, evidence-based 
decision making with regard to the relative 
balance and nature of risk reduction and 
post-disaster expenditure; to compare patterns 
The cost of 
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development 
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an additional 
few percentage 
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Table 4 Benefit-to-Cost Analysis of Investments in Resilience in Asia and the Pacific
Country Hazard Intervention
Benefit-to-
Cost Ratio
Notes on  
Benefit-to-Cost Ratio
Fiji Flood Warning system for the town  
of Navua 
3.7–7.3 Exact ratio depends on the  
frequency of major floods on the 
scale experienced in 2004 over the 
20-year life of the warning system
Indonesia Flood Strengthened resilience of housing 2.7–6.73 Exact ratio depends on assumed 
life span and rate of discount
Indonesia Flood Integrated water management 
and flood protection scheme 
for the city of Semarang
2.5
Nepal Flood Range of community-
based interventions
3.49 Retrospective benefit-to-cost ratio
Philippines Flood Hanging footbridge over river 
connecting two communities, 
sustaining economic activity 
and access to schools and 
health centers during floods
24
Samoa Flood Improved flood forecasting  
system for a river catchment
1.72–1.92 Exact ratio depends on the 
choice of discount rate
Samoa Flood Strengthened resilience of homes 4–44 and 2–28 4–44 for the construction of new 
wooden homes with 
elevated floor heights; 2–28 
for cement block homes
Thailand Typhoon/ 
flood
5- to 7-day typhoon forecasts,  
facilitating the early harvest of crops
1.76 Based on ex post analysis 
of crop losses arising from 
floods in 2006 alone
Viet Nam Typhoon Mangrove planting  
program in eight provinces
55 Based on direct comparison of cost 
of planting program and reduced 
annual cost of dike maintenance 
over the period 1994–2001
Multi-
country
Multi-
hazard
Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation spending of around  
$10 million per annum 
in recent years on activities 
covering the five Hyogo Framework 
for Action 2005–2015 priorities
4–to–7 Estimates based on benefits 
in terms of increased safety
Source: Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2011); Holland (2008); IFRC (2002, 2009); Mechler (2005); Subbiah, Bildan, and Narasimhan (2009); Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (2011); White and Rorick (2010); Woodruff (2008).
of expenditure against national, subnational, 
and local DRR and relief, early recovery, 
and reconstruction priorities; to identify 
any critical gaps in funding; to help evaluate 
the performance of mechanisms for raising 
financing; and to hold governments and the 
international community accountable for their 
actions (Benson 2011b).
Simplified tracking systems that provide 
a broad gauge of disaster-related spending are 
perfectly adequate and help overcome some of 
the complexities of recording relevant expen-
diture down to the last dollar across many 
government departments. All development 
initiatives can simply be tagged as dedicated 
DRR projects, projects that incorporate DRR 
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features at some additional cost, projects that 
contribute to DRR at no additional cost,  
and other projects (Benson, Gyanwaly, and 
Regmi 2009).
Various initiatives are already under 
way to determine public spending on DRR, 
including pilot work undertaken with ADB 
and UNISDR support in India, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines. In parallel, in 2005, the 
Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development introduced a new subcategory 
on disaster prevention and preparedness in 
its official development assistance reporting 
system and, in 2010, introduced a CCA  
marker against which donors will assess new 
aid activities.
There also has been some progress 
in tracking post-disaster expenditure and 
building related national capacity, notably by 
the United Nations Development Programme, 
in consultation with ADB and others, in 
Indonesia, Republic of the Maldives,  
Sri Lanka, and Thailand following the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami, and by the Government 
of the Philippines following two devastating 
typhoons in 2009. These initiatives need to be 
institutionalized into more permanent systems, 
as is already planned in the Philippines 
(Benson and Mahul, forthcoming).

Part II
Visions of the Future: 
Overcoming Gaps  
and Obstacles
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Part II embeds the largely theoretical 
discussion and ideas presented in Part I into 
on-the-ground realities in much of Asia 
and the Pacific through the use of a series of 
hypothetical stories of successful investment 
in resilience. The stories are developed using a 
backcasting approach. Each story begins with 
a vision of a desirable resilient future. This 
vision is translated back into possible steps 
and measures that could be taken to realize 
the vision. The approach draws individual 
instruments and mechanisms suggested 
in Part I together into broader packages of 
action designed to overcome specific gaps and 
obstacles and to strengthen resilience.
The first chapter focuses on strengthened 
resilience for a nation, a city, and a household. 
It presents a series of fictitious first-person 
narratives written from the perspective of 
the head of a national disaster management 
office (NDMO), a city resident, and a poor 
farmer. Each person reflects on their disaster 
experience and the steps taken to strengthen 
resilience over a 20-year period. The second 
chapter considers five development themes 
and sectors where efforts to strengthen resil-
ience are crucial: land use planning, transport, 
livelihoods, education, and housing. 
The backcasting approach, combined 
with the related analysis of existing gaps and 
obstacles, reveals a wide variety of potentially 
useful instruments and mechanisms that 
could be applied to strengthen resilience. 
It also highlights an intricate network of 
backward and forward linkages between the 
different instruments and outcomes, and 
many potential pathways toward strengthened 
resilience. No particular instruments or 
pathways necessarily are better than others. 
Choices must be made in the context of 
desired outcomes; prevailing circumstances, 
including key gaps and obstacles; resource 
availability; and specific opportunities to 
effect change. The advantage of this approach 
is that it encourages planners, policy makers, 
and international development partners to 
explore this bigger picture, examining the 
potential interplay between individual actions. 
It thereby supports the design of broader 
resilience strategies and mutually supportive 
bundles of actions that collectively enhance 
the sum of parts.
 Introduction: The Backcasting Approach 61
Part II examines the seemingly simple but 
as yet largely unanswered question posed at 
the start of this report: How can we ensure 
that the actions that we know are required to 
strengthen resilience are actually taken? We 
know the gaps and obstacles to investment 
in resilience and we have many instruments 
and mechanisms at our disposal to overcome 
them. Yet, in reality, progress in strengthening 
resilience has been far too slow. 
The answer to this question is explored 
through a series of hypothetical stories of 
successful investment in resilience. These 
stories are told from the perspective of a range 
of development themes and sectors and levels 
of administration, based on a backcasting 
approach. Each story is based on a vision of 
a desirable resilient future. This vision is then 
translated back into the steps and measures 
that had to be taken in order to achieve it. 
This backcasting approach is applied in an 
extremely loose sense. It is used to explore 
what could hypothetically happen if some of 
the most fundamental gaps and obstacles to 
strengthened resilience were overcome. The 
fact that the stories tell of no failure, which is 
perhaps an issue for some, reflects not a lack 
of failures in reality but, rather, an abundance 
of opportunities. 
The backcasting approach is intended to 
stimulate more unified thinking and action. 
Individual instruments and mechanisms are 
often designed to address a particular gap or 
challenge but may encounter other gaps and 
challenges during implementation that limit 
their success. Backcasting helps planners and 
policy makers to explore the bigger picture 
and to examine the potential interplay between 
Source: ???
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Box 6 Defining Backcasting
The backcasting approach seeks to determine how to attain desirable ends or visions of the future. It focuses on these 
visions, rather than on present conditions and current trends, seeking to work backward from visions of the future to the 
determination of their feasibility and the policy measures required to achieve them (Robinson 1990). Unlike the more 
traditional forecasting approach, which is based on an extension of dominant trends to determine futures, backcasting 
assumes a potential break in existing trends and may even actively encourage such a break, analyzing and determining how 
undesirable futures can be avoided (Dreborg 1996; Robinson 1990).
Differences between Forecasting and Backcasting Approaches
Forecasting Backcasting
Philosophical 
views
Causality
Determinism
Context of justification
Causality and intentions
Partial indeterminacy
Context of discovery
Perspective Dominant trends
Likely futures
Possible marginal adjustments
How to adapt to trends
Societal problem in need of a solution
Desirable futures
Scope of human choice
Strategic decisions
Retention of freedom of action
Approach Extrapolation of trends 
into the future
Sensitivity analysis
Defining of interesting futures
Analysis of consequences and condi-
tions for these futures to materialize
Methods Various econometric models Partial and conditional extrapolations
Normative models
System dynamics models
Techniques Various mathematical algorithms Delphi methods
Expert judgment
Source: Dreborg (1996).
The backcasting approach may call into question some existing assumptions by providing new information and may 
thereby open up new options for resolving existing problems and obstacles. It should largely be judged in the context of dis-
covery and the generation of new ideas rather than in the context of justification, in which ideas are employed and scientific 
results are validated (Dreborg 1996; Geurs and van Wee 2004).
Backcasting is typically applied to complex and important long-term issues involving many aspects of society, 
together with technological innovations and change (Dreborg 1996). The following situations favor a backcasting 
approach (Dreborg 1996):
•	 The problem at hand is complex, affecting many sectors and levels of society.
•	 Major change is necessary.
•	 Dominant trends form part of the problem.
•	 Externalities that the market cannot treat satisfactorily form a central part of the problem.
•	 A sufficient time horizon is available to allow considerable scope for deliberate choice.
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different instruments and mechanisms (Box 6). 
This facilitates the development of bundles of 
mutually supportive tools, which together can 
overcome key gaps and obstacles and create 
synergies that enhance the sum of parts. In 
other words, it supports the design of wider 
resilience strategies as well as individual tools 
and mechanisms of relevance (Figure 19).
Figure 19 Backcasting Approach
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Looking back on success in investing in 
resilience can help reveal not only what 
happened but also why and how. Hypothetical 
stories of change are developed below, 
focusing on varying geo-administrative scales 
and told by imaginary actors. The stories 
capture progress in strengthening resilience 
at the country, city, and family levels. Various 
gaps and obstacles to strengthened resilience 
are identified and each, in turn, is overcome 
through successive actions and interventions. 
The backcasting approach is applied, 
translating visions of the future into the steps 
and initiatives that needed to be taken for 
them to be achieved.
Seeing the way forward by looking back is 
good. Countries, cities, and families have had 
and will continue to have success in strength-
ening their resilience by using a combination 
of their own and outside resources. These 
resources are packaged as policy, capacity 
development, and investment interventions. 
They address requirements relating to the 
three core needs in investing in resilience: risk 
assessment, risk reduction, and residual risk 
management (Figure 20).
In practice, individual governments, local 
authorities, and households may have far less 
capacity and far fewer financial and human 
resources to implement the measures needed 
to strengthen resilience than is suggested in 
the stories presented below. They will have to 
prioritize limited resources, also taking other, 
non-disaster–related demands into account. 
They may have to overcome a range of indirect 
challenges to strengthening resilience created 
by weak national or local governance, including 
poor policy formulation, weak implementation 
of approved physical and development plans, 
inadequate institutional structures, limited 
The backcasting 
approach 
translates visions 
of the future into 
the steps and 
initiatives that 
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taken for them to 
be achieved
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transparency, and poor budget management. 
Moreover, they may have to contend with issues 
of political disincentives, corruption, and illegal 
economic activity, all of which can directly 
challenge efforts to reduce disaster risk. 
Mechanisms for addressing some of these 
gaps and obstacles are explored further below 
in the context of specific development themes 
and sectors. Ultimate progress in overcoming 
them will depend on the existence of sufficient 
formal and informal political and economic 
incentives for strengthened resilience at all 
levels of government and wider society. The 
role of different stakeholders in creating 
risk, the extent and precise nature of interest 
of different stakeholders in strengthening 
resilience, and their relative positions of power 
will influence outcomes. In the shorter term, 
charismatic leadership will be important too, 
be it, say, at the forefront of government or the 
helm of a concerned citizen group. 
The stories presented below also provide 
just a few brief glimpses, or vignettes, of 
potential paths of change. The actual choice 
of actions and their order of sequencing 
are likely to vary between one context and 
the next, in part dictated by the specific 
opportunities that arise to shift interests, 
to incentivize key players, and to alter the 
workings of government and wider society. 
These opportunities may take many shapes 
and forms. They may arise in the guise of, for 
instance, a disaster event itself, an electoral 
campaign, policy reform, the overhaul of a 
government’s budgetary management system, 
or a socioeconomic research initiative. 
Whether or not each opportunity results 
in change will also depend on capabilities 
at many different levels of government and 
society to recognize potential opportunities 
and to act upon them.
Figure 20 Matching Core Needs and Interventions
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A construction worker reinforces a school building. Hefei, People’s Republic of China
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I have been the director of the National 
Disaster Management Office in Country X 
for many years. It is an extremely challenging, 
often highly rewarding job. My country 
is one of the top 10 most disaster-prone 
countries in the world. It experiences a wide 
range of natural hazards, including floods, 
tropical typhoons, droughts, landslides, and 
earthquakes. The largest city and major center 
of economic activity is located on the coast, 
whereas our capital city is located inland, on 
a major fault line. We have experienced rapid 
urbanization in recent years, and the urban 
population is expected to double again over 
the next 50 years. One-quarter of the urban 
population is already located in informal 
settlements. Growth in these settlements is 
outpacing total urban growth.
The Hazardscape Today
After much hard work on the part of the 
NDMO and some colleagues in key agencies, 
my country adopted a comprehensive disaster 
risk management (DRM) strategy  
3 years ago, just a year after a major flood event 
caused significant socioeconomic disruption 
(Box 7). When the strategy was adopted, I 
was euphoric, believing that this marked the 
beginning of an entirely different approach 
to DRM in Country X. However, 3 years 
have passed and the supporting legislative 
and regulatory framework still has not been 
approved because it is simply not regarded as 
a political priority. We did manage to get the 
need for strengthened resilience mentioned in 
the latest medium-term national development 
plan, but only at the 11th hour and in the 
form of a few stand-alone actions, mainly 
covering structural flood and storm control 
and post-disaster support to vulnerable groups. 
It was not the integrated approach across the 
full spectrum of development that we had 
envisaged in the DRM strategy. Our disaster 
risk financing (DRF) arrangements are very 
weak, too, relying largely on ex post budget 
reallocations in the event of relatively frequent 
lower-impact events, and on the international 
community for support in the aftermath of 
major disasters. Meanwhile, public expenditure 
on risk reduction is low across all levels of 
government.
The NDMO is located in the Ministry 
of Home Affairs. It is still only staffed by 
emergency responders, despite the fact 
that we have made a number of requests to 
create some disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
positions. A climate change adaptation (CCA) 
unit has been established in the Ministry of 
Environment, but despite some clear overlap 
with our own agenda, we have very little 
engagement with them, operating instead 
along parallel structures. The local authorities 
have extremely limited DRM or CCA 
expertise beyond what has been gained from 
our disaster response training programs.
Compliance with building codes and 
land use planning is poor, and in all honesty, 
neither set of regulations is sufficiently rigor-
ous with regard to disaster risk. A system of 
accountability for disaster losses is nonexistent. 
Environmental regulations require consultation 
of hazard maps in designing new investments, 
but this requirement is only partly observed 
at the local level. According to a Ministry of 
7.1  a country’S Journey to reSilience:  
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Planning colleague I spoke to recently, disaster 
risk is hardly mentioned in any of the other 
government guidelines and procedures on the 
identification or appraisal of new investments.
Incentives to invest in resilience are not as 
good as they could be, either. Although we do 
not have sufficient funding for post-disaster 
relief, recovery, and reconstruction, expecta-
tions of such assistance are limiting household, 
community, private sector, local government, 
and even national government investment in 
resilience, together with the use of risk transfer 
and other DRF tools.
The private sector has supported 
post-disaster relief in a corporate social 
responsibility capacity but has little apparent 
appreciation of potential commercial oppor-
tunities in the field of resilience. We have not 
had the resources to encourage private sector 
involvement in resilience nor to scale up some 
apparently very successful community-based 
resilience initiatives.
The Hazardscape,  
15 Years On
Fourteen years ago, tragedy struck our 
country again. A moderate earthquake 
with a shallow epicenter killed thousands 
of people, damaged houses and buildings, 
and led to significant economic losses. 
The earthquake was a powerful driving 
force that finally compelled my country 
to enact comprehensive DRM legislation, 
reform certain aspects of existing legislation 
touching on aspects of DRM, bring 
all disaster-related laws under a single 
framework, and establish clear accountability 
for disasters, shared across the national and 
local governments, the private sector, and 
individual households.
We finally saw the emergence of a 
resilience champion who drove these 
changes—a dynamic legislator whose district 
had previously worked with an international 
nongovernment organization (NGO) to 
implement an affordable earthquake-safe 
housing program. The benefits of this 
program were amply demonstrated when the 
earthquake struck; many lives in her district 
were saved. Along with getting the new 
disaster law through 3 years later, the legislator 
promoted a successful campaign to replicate 
the retrofitting program nationwide and to 
build back safer in the earthquake-affected 
areas. The campaign has received considerable 
financial and technical support from several 
local building supply companies that, in turn, 
have benefited from government endorsement 
and free promotion of their products. It has 
received considerable public support as well 
Box 7 Recent Flood Experience
I recall vividly how nonstop heavy rains submerged low-lying areas and floodplains in a number of provinces during a major 
flood that my country experienced 4 years ago. Our emergency center received numerous calls from people stranded on 
the roofs of one-story dwellings after floodwaters rose too rapidly for them to evacuate. The floodwaters reached almost 
2 meters in some areas. Roads were impassable in many areas; shops and stores were flooded; potable water, food, and 
medicines were all in short supply; and daily lives were severely disrupted.
Recovery from the flood was a struggle, too. Requests for relief and reconstruction assistance poured into our office 
from regional governments but we were simply unable to meet them in full. Instead, the government’s capital investment 
budget had to be realigned over a period of several years to accommodate the reconstruction needs. The reconstruction 
program has only just been completed. These funding issues have substantially prolonged the effects of the flood.
More generally, our country is struggling to meet certain Millennium Development Goals, in part because of the 
intermittent effects of disaster events. For example, loss of school facilities, livelihoods, and income has compelled a number 
of parents to pull their children out of the education system following disasters. In some cases, children were pulled out 
to help supplement household earnings and to save money by avoiding schooling expenses (transport, uniforms, books, 
and other fees); in other cases, it was simply because there is no access to any school within a reasonable distance. The 
subsequent decline in the total net enrollment ratio in primary education has set back progress toward achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education. The losses caused by intermittent disasters are also hindering 
our progress toward other Millennium Development Goals, including those on poverty reduction and access to clean water 
and primary health care.
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because the potential benefits have already 
been so clearly demonstrated.
The legislator also spearheaded a cross-
party investigation to determine why so 
many lives were lost in schools and other 
community facilities as a consequence of the 
earthquake. This resulted in a major schools 
and hospitals retrofitting program with 
international support. 
Looking to achieve yet further change in 
strengthening resilience to all types of natural 
hazard, placing it firmly within the context of 
development policy and practice in our coun-
try, the legislator sought collaboration between 
my office, the CCA unit, and the Ministry of 
Planning. She enlisted the help of the secretary 
of the Ministry of Environment, a bright, highly 
experienced, and forward-thinking man. Sev-
eral years later, both the NDMO and the CCA 
unit were relocated to the Ministry of Planning 
to help strengthen coordination. A joint action 
plan for resilience and CCA was developed and 
a network of DRR focal points was established 
across agencies and local governments.
Following these changes and the much 
stronger political voice that it has given the 
NDMO, we managed to drum up support 
for a detailed analysis of the social and 
economic effects of recent disasters as part of 
the preparation work for our country’s latest 
medium-term national development plan. 
Over the course of the plan’s preparation, we 
also held lengthy stakeholder dialogues on 
potential resilience-strengthening approaches 
and actions. These efforts have led to a much 
greater emphasis on strengthened resilience 
under the new development plan. Resilience 
considerations are integrated right across the 
plan. The plan, moreover, includes a number 
of measures aimed at encouraging and guiding 
private sector and community engagement in 
strengthened resilience. It also sets appropri-
ate monitoring and evaluation indicators to 
measure achievements and to contribute to 
informed decision making. As an offshoot 
of the stakeholder dialogues, a series of local 
partnerships among at-risk communities,  
the private sector, civil society, and public 
agencies also has emerged, focusing on 
strengthened resilience.
To support the implementation of 
the resilience goals outlined in the latest 
development plan, the government has 
also established a multisector budget line 
for resilience initiatives. This budget line is 
overseen by the Ministry of Finance for use by 
national line agencies. A parallel budget line 
for use by eligible local governments has also 
been created and is overseen by the Ministry 
of Local Government. A significant portion 
of the latter funding has been used to help 
support community-based initiatives.
In parallel, the Ministry of Finance has 
sought to avoid yet another major episode of 
funding-related reconstruction delays. Based 
on the clear statement of forms and levels of 
public contingent liability in the event of a 
disaster, detailed in the new legislation, and 
with subsequent technical support from the 
international community, the government has 
established a comprehensive package of DRF 
instruments for disaster relief, early recovery, 
and reconstruction. The package combines 
reserves, insurance, contingent loans, ex 
post domestic and international borrowing, 
post-disaster tax increases, and post-disaster 
reallocations to address different layers of risk.
National and subnational public  
spending targets for DRR have also been 
established, alongside related tracking 
systems to monitor actual expenditure on 
DRR, preparedness, relief, early recovery, and 
reconstruction. Moreover, our government 
has recently reached a relatively late stage in 
the adoption of a public financial management 
program to improve the management of fiscal 
risk more generally and, as part of this, has 
Multi-stakeholder consultation is important in identifying disaster risk reduction 
priorities. Bangladesh
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The legislator 
spearheaded 
a cross-party 
investigation 
to determine 
why so many 
lives were 
lost in schools 
and other 
community 
facilities as a 
consequence of 
the earthquake
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just begun tackling the tricky issue of dis-
closure of disaster-related risks in its annual 
budget accounts.
Disaster risk profiling has been 
institutionalized as an integral part of the 
preliminary screening process for all public 
investments and has been incorporated into 
statutory investment appraisal guidelines and 
procedures. A mandatory stand-alone disaster 
risk screening tool has been introduced for 
all new public investment proposals. Relevant 
training activities have reinforced its applica-
tion. Engineering design and construction 
standards for publicly funded structures such 
as schools, hospitals, roads, and low-cost 
housing have also been adjusted to address 
potential risk from natural hazards. Another 
big step forward is the current application of 
risk-sensitive land use planning.
Private sector interest in resilience has 
picked up too. A number of both small 
and larger-scale commercial ventures have 
emerged. These have been partly stimulated 
by a joint venture between the NDMO and 
the CCA unit to identify potential commercial 
opportunities in the resilience arena and by 
the provision of related international grants 
for research and development. Many firms 
have also developed business continuity 
plans and taken measures to strengthen their 
own resilience, in part because the country’s 
leading lending institutions now require 
disaster risk disclosure by the companies in 
which they invest.
Disaster insurance is also increasing, 
in part due to some changes to the laws and 
regulations governing insurance as part of the 
wider legislative reform process that I have 
already mentioned. These changes include the 
introduction of stricter requirements to ensure 
adequate capitalization of insurance providers 
and mandatory risk-based insurance 
premium pricing. These changes, together 
with clearer, legally binding statements on the 
government’s roles and responsibilities in the 
event of a disaster, have encouraged individual 
households and the private sector to invest 
more in risk reduction and insurance.
Finally, 5 years ago we decided to take a 
lead in strengthening regional coordination 
and planning with our neighboring coun-
tries. To do this, we invited representatives 
from their NDMOs to come and review 
our resilience initiative, giving them an 
opportunity to learn from our experience 
and also to highlight areas where we could 
further improve our systems. This has led 
to an annual regional scenario exercise and 
consolidated our regional vision for mutual 
support in risk assessment, risk reduction, and 
residual risk management.
Acknowledging  
Residual Risks
As Country X continues to become 
increasingly prosperous, we expect levels of 
protection to improve and losses associated 
with higher-frequency, lower-intensity 
hazard events to decline further. Although 
we will remain vulnerable to disasters, we 
have established DRF arrangements to help 
us manage those and to limit the extent of 
socioeconomic consequences. 
Two years ago, we experienced another 
major flood but losses were far lower than 
those experienced 19 years ago and the 
recovery process was much faster (Box 8). 
This disaster highlighted how much we have 
achieved in strengthening resilience and has 
galvanized public support to invest yet further 
in resilience (Figure 21). On balance, I think 
we have come a very long way. I am confident 
that a resilient future is no longer a distant 
reality for us. It is now within our reach.
Disaster risk 
profiling has been 
institutionalized 
as an integral part 
of the preliminary 
screening process 
for all public 
investments 
and has been 
incorporated 
into statutory 
investment 
appraisal 
guidelines and 
procedures
Box 8 Recent Flood Experience, 15 Years On
Our country experienced a flood 2 years ago, yet human and physical losses were lower than losses caused by comparable 
events almost 2 decades ago, despite the fact that the population had expanded by 26% and the economy had more than 
doubled. Indirect losses and secondary effects also were stemmed, thanks to a more rapid early recovery and reconstruction 
program, which is now nearing completion.
The disaster highlighted how much we have achieved in strengthening resilience, thereby reducing our national depen-
dence on international disaster assistance, local government dependence on federal disaster support, and private sector and 
household dependence on public support.
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Figure 21 Strengthening Resilience—Progress of a Nation 
 Comprehensive DRM legislation enacted
 Strong emphasis on strengthened resilience in the medium-term national development plan
 Integration of disaster risk concerns into investment screening, design, and appraisal 
procedures
 Guidelines on implementing resilience and annual training program for central and local 
government officials
 Risk-sensitive land use planning
 Revision of building codes and strengthened compliance mechanisms
 Implementation of affordable safe housing program, and schools and hospitals earthquake 
retrofitting program
 National and local government budget lines for resilience initiatives
 Comprehensive disaster risk financing strategy
 Strong coordination between national disaster management office and CCA unit, both 
situated within the Ministry of Planning
 Private sector engagement in strengthening resilience
 Increasing insurance penetration, following legislative and regulatory reforms
15 YEARS LATER
TODAY
 Comprehensive disaster risk management (DRM) strategy in place but with no supportive 
legislative and regulatory framework or implementation strategy
 Limited consideration of disaster risk in development policies, plans, and project formulation
 Inadequate land zoning and building compliance
 No accountability for disaster losses
 Inadequate disaster risk financing arrangements
 Very limited resources for disaster risk reduction
 Little engagement between DRM and climate change adaptation (CCA) communities
 Limited private sector engagement in DRM
Investment
in resilience
Enhanced
resilience
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Community consultation is crucial to identify high risk areas and develop and 
update disaster risk maps. Jamalpur, Bangladesh
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I have been a resident of City X all my 
life. For more than 30 years, I have served 
as a professional staff member at the city 
administrator’s office, which is under the city 
mayor’s supervision. Our city is a bustling 
coastal city in the tropics. Its powdery white 
sand beaches and scenic dive spots attract 
tourists from all over the world. I love its mix 
of low-lying areas and uplands, with streams 
lining its breathtaking landscape. Home to 
about 3 million people, the city draws its 
main income from tourism; processing of 
marine products for food, cosmetic, and 
pharmaceutical uses; manufacture of diving 
paraphernalia; trading of processed and 
unprocessed products; and provision of 
information and communication technology 
services. Microbusiness enterprises exist side 
by side with larger enterprises.
The Hazardscape Today
Our city, sad to say, faces multiple natural 
hazards—earthquakes, typhoons, storm 
surges, landslides, and floods. Ill-planned 
urbanization, rapid population growth, and 
inward migration of poor families from 
neighboring municipalities and beyond have 
contributed to the massive growth of informal 
settlements. About 30% of the population lives 
in densely populated informal settlements, 
many of them in makeshift housing and in 
low-lying, flood-prone areas with limited 
access to water, sanitation, education, and 
other basic services.
The city government has very limited 
DRM or CCA expertise and very few related 
resources. Although we have a decentralized 
system of government, the city’s mandate 
and institutional arrangements for DRM and 
CCA have not been clearly spelled out, and 
enhanced resilience is not an integral part of 
the city’s development agenda. When disasters 
occur, we rely heavily on national government 
support. However, the bulk of this financing 
takes many months to arrive, and we often 
receive far less than we need.
Little use is made of hazard maps in  
land use planning, and compliance is poor even 
with the relatively weak building codes that 
do exist. It breaks my heart to see this shortfall 
leading to vulnerable patterns of land use, con-
struction of structures and facilities in hazard-
prone zones, adoption of substandard building 
materials and practices, and environmental 
degradation. People also built residential and 
commercial establishments along a major fault 
line, which—as we found out in the worst 
possible way—were at risk of collapse and 
severe damage in the event of even a moderate 
earthquake with a shallow epicenter.
Rapid urbanization is contributing to the 
progressive loss of forest cover in the upland 
areas where we used to go for picnics when I 
was younger. The forests are giving way to the 
construction of new structures, access roads, 
and buried water and sewer pipes. This degra-
dation has triggered soil erosion and landslides, 
in one case tragically destroying a newly 
constructed luxury condominium that had 
just been completed. On the coast, increasing 
construction of new commercial and industrial 
structures is intensifying mangrove deforesta-
tion, reducing our city’s natural buffer against 
7.2  a city’S Journey to reSilience: a Story 
from a long-term city reSident
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strong waves and storm surges. Upland erosion, 
sediment transport, and destructive fishing 
practices are destroying the coral reef, threaten-
ing sustainable tourism and marine produc-
tion. Rainfall patterns seem to be becoming 
more erratic as well, and problems of flooding 
are growing, exacerbated by clogged drainage 
systems, inadequate solid waste management, 
and the effects of construction on natural 
drainage systems. Earlier this year, heavy and 
prolonged rains submerged about 60% of the 
city in floodwaters, causing a number of deaths 
from diarrhea and respiratory infections as well 
as physical damage and disruption.
The private sector provides very generous 
cash and in-kind donations following 
disasters, even relatively minor ones, but does 
not seem to have much interest in boosting 
resilience. Local NGOs are interested, but 
tend to focus on specific issues, which makes 
coordinated action a challenge. The city 
government has not tried very hard to engage 
either group in dialogue on this issue and,  
as I mentioned already, is not on top of it.
Reflecting our relatively poor perfor-
mance in addressing disaster risk, we suf-
fered considerable loss of life and damage to 
property as a consequence of an earthquake 
a few years ago (Box 9). If considerable 
action is not taken to strengthen resilience 
and to ensure that all new developments take 
adequate account of disaster risk in their 
design and location, we will experience even 
more devastating losses in the future.
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Loudspeakers installed as part of actions to strengthen community early warning 
systems. Thailand
Box 9 Recent Earthquake Experience
A few years ago, my country experienced an earthquake of intensity 6.3 on the Richter scale. The epicenter was almost 
below us. I will never forget that day. It was 4:00 in the afternoon. I was resting at home after an exhausting series of visits to 
far-flung city districts. Suddenly, I was jolted by intense shaking. I was terrified! I dove under a sturdy table and waited for the 
shaking to subside. It seemed to take an eternity, although the quake only lasted 50 seconds. Afterward, I rushed down the 
stairs of my low-rise condominium building as fast as I could. I felt a strong aftershock even before I got out of the building.
We lost 5,000 people that day in our city alone. A further 30,000 were injured, and 100,000 were left homeless. The earth-
quake’s epicenter was relatively shallow, causing intense shaking on the surface, which resulted in the collapse of houses, 
schools, and other buildings that had not adhered to basic earthquake-resistant construction methods. Those along the 
earthquake fault and on unstable slopes suffered severe damage. In other areas, some hotels, restaurants, and other facilities 
were damaged, including water, wastewater, and electric facilities. Some sections of roads and highways cracked. However, 
the airport, shipping ports, and other sturdy facilities remained intact.
The tourism industry experienced a sharp downturn and livelihoods were disrupted. Delays in the flow of reconstruction 
financing exacerbated the problems. The percentage of the population below the poverty line rose from 19% before the 
disaster to 21% after it, and our progress toward other city-level Millennium Development Goals was set back as well. It took 
almost a decade to complete the reconstruction efforts in full.
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The Hazardscape,  
15 Years On
The trauma and destruction brought about 
by the earthquake 17 years ago provided a 
wake-up call and a historic turning point for us. 
The earthquake caused considerable economic 
loss and dislocation as well as deep grief  
among those who lost family members, 
relatives, colleagues, and friends. However, it 
also created an opportunity to implement bold 
changes to strengthen our resilience.  
I remember our city mayor’s call to action: 
“This recent earthquake has been disastrous. 
Never again will we allow ourselves to be 
unprepared and distraught when natural hazard 
events strike us. I call on everyone to join our 
effort to make our city safe. Our financial 
resources and expertise may be limited at 
present, but we will not be daunted. Together, 
we will forge ahead with strengthening our 
capacity to resist, absorb, and recover from the 
effects of natural hazards. In line with this, we 
will seek and develop partnerships with local, 
national, and international groups.”
National developments associated with 
the overall legal and regulatory framework 
favored the new path that our city was about 
to take. The national legislature amended 
the decentralization law to provide local 
governments with a clear legal mandate for 
DRM and CCA. It also approved a supporting 
framework for DRM and clarified institutional 
arrangements, financial responsibilities, and 
accountability at various levels. In charting a 
new journey to resilience, our city embraced 
the national government’s DRM and CCA 
protocol, along with the post–Hyogo 
Framework for Action principles, which aim 
at the effective integration of disaster risk 
considerations into development policies, 
planning, and programming at all levels. The 
city government also reviewed the 10-point 
checklist for making cities resilient, published 
by UNISDR (Box 10). City officials, together 
with utility providers and other associations 
dealing with local public risk management, 
adopted the 10 First Steps checklist, moving 
toward an International Organization for 
Standardization (2009) ISO 31000 framework 
for efficient risk management.
In line with the UNISDR checklist, the city 
government created a city disaster management 
office to organize and coordinate DRM and 
CCA actions. The disaster management office 
is run by permanent staff and is funded by 
the city’s regular budget. It has received strong 
support from all successive city mayors since its 
creation, regardless of their political persuasion. 
The national 
legislature 
amended the 
decentralization 
law to 
provide local 
governments 
with a clear 
legal mandate 
for disaster risk 
management 
and climate 
change 
adaptation
Box 10 Ten-Point Checklist for Making Cities Resilient
1. Put in place organization and coordination to understand and reduce disaster risk, based on participation of citizen 
groups and civil society. Build alliances. Ensure that all departments understand their role in disaster reduction  
and preparedness.
2. Assign a budget for disaster risk reduction and provide incentives for homeowners, low-income families, communities, 
businesses, and the public sector to invest in reducing the risks they face.
3. Maintain up-to-date data on hazards and vulnerabilities, prepare risk assessments, and use these as the basis for 
urban development plans and decisions. Ensure that this information and the plans for your city’s resilience are readily 
available to the public and fully discussed with them.
4. Invest in and maintain critical infrastructure that reduces risk, such as flood drainage, adjusted where needed to cope 
with climate change.
5. Assess the safety of all schools and health facilities and upgrade these as necessary.
6. Apply and enforce realistic, risk-compliant building regulations and land use planning principles. Identify safe land for 
low-income citizens and develop upgrading of informal settlements, wherever feasible.
7. Ensure education programs and training on disaster risk reduction are in place in schools and local communities.
8. Protect ecosystems and natural buffers to mitigate floods, storm surges, and other hazards to which your city may be 
vulnerable. Adapt to climate change by building on good risk reduction practices.
9. Install early warning systems and emergency management capacities in your city and hold regular public  
preparedness drills.
10. After any disaster, ensure that the needs of the survivors are placed at the center of reconstruction with support for 
them and their community organizations to design and help implement responses, including rebuilding homes  
and livelihoods.
Source: UNISDR (2012b).
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To boost collective responsibility for resilience 
and to augment existing resources, the office 
has also successfully nurtured close links with 
various government agencies, civil society orga-
nizations, the private sector, and international 
development partners.
The integration of DRM and CCA into our 
city’s policy-making, planning, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation processes makes 
perfect sense to me. To help start the process, a 
risk assessment was undertaken, with funding 
from an international partner and technical 
support from two of our local universities, to 
identify high-, medium-, and low-risk areas. 
Some experts were then brought in to help us 
prepare and implement a strategic master plan 
to strengthen resilience against earthquakes, 
floods, and other major hazards and to design 
a related implementation strategy. Various 
participatory consultations and interactive 
meetings were conducted as part of this 
process, to help us explore and understand our 
vulnerability, analyze potential physical and 
socioeconomic consequences, and contribute to 
the development of a  coherent DRM approach.
A relative of mine who also works for 
the city government told me that new budget 
lines have been created for DRR and CCA, in 
addition to the existing budget line for disaster 
response. Some national government funding 
has been secured to boost resources. The city 
government has also obtained some interna-
tional grant funding for several DRM initia-
tives and some technical support to strengthen 
DRM capacity across local governments.
The director of the city disaster manage-
ment office recently gave a presentation to 
all the city government departments, cover-
ing progress to date, as well as a short press 
conference afterward. I managed to get to the 
meeting and was really impressed with what 
he had to say. He raved about the long-awaited 
strengthening of early warning systems and 
of DRM and CCA capacities. Regular educa-
tion programs and training on resilience have 
been conducted, complemented by public 
preparedness drills, in which I myself have been 
involved. Hazard risk maps and other relevant 
information have been updated and placed 
on a newly created city disaster management 
office website. Building codes have also been 
revised, compliance mechanisms have been 
strengthened, and risk assessments of critical 
public facilities such as hospitals, schools, 
bridges, and evacuation centers have been 
undertaken. A large-scale retrofitting program 
is currently under way, with assistance from 
several international development partners and 
jointly coordinated by the disaster management 
office and the local office of the national public 
works department.
The chief city urban planner spoke at the 
same event. He outlined how strengthened 
resilience has been carefully integrated into the 
city’s new 10-year urban development plan. 
Shifting to risk-sensitive land use planning, 
the city has disallowed new construction in 
hazard-prone areas—near earthquake faults, 
riverbanks, floodplains, and erosion-prone 
areas. Safe zones for the installation of utilities 
and urban services have been prioritized, to 
encourage industries and residents to locate 
there. The city government eventually intends 
to convert extremely high-risk areas into 
no-occupancy zones and public parks and has 
already begun to transfer some of the informal 
settlements to safer areas. The chief planner 
mentioned that the relocation program met 
with some fierce initial opposition, which I had 
read about in the media, but people eventually 
agreed to move after they were assured that 
they would be supported in acquiring and 
leasing land; in accessing low-cost housing, 
community facilities, and services; and in 
improving their livelihood opportunities.
After the presentations, I chatted with 
the director of the city engineer’s office. He 
was happy about the repair of damaged road 
transport infrastructure, along with stricter 
Periodic preparedness drills play an important role in strengthening community resilience. 
Cambodia
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quality enforcement for all construction works. 
Procurement systems, according to him, have 
been made more transparent and competitive, 
to reduce corruption risks, and third-party 
monitoring of road projects has been intro-
duced. He thinks this should have a notable 
benefit when hazards strike, considerably reduc-
ing levels of loss and annual maintenance bills.
The city government intends to invest 
considerable additional resources in resil-
ience over the medium term, particularly to 
tackle the issue of flooding. It is developing 
a number of public–private partnerships for 
this purpose and is also hoping to access CCA 
funds that have recently become available.
A Green the City community campaign 
has just been launched by a local NGO. This 
should help as well—and is certainly being 
met with great enthusiasm. The campaign 
aims to engage residents in planting trees 
across the city, particularly on slopes, to help 
reduce runoff and flooding and to put pres-
sure on the government to ensure that forest 
protection laws are fully enforced. The city 
government has also entered into a partner-
ship with insurance companies to replant 
mangroves along stretches of coastline within 
the city’s jurisdiction. This should help protect 
human lives and property against strong 
waves and storm surges.
The tourism association is also doing its 
part, actively advocating the protection of 
coral reef ecosystems. In cooperation with 
the city government, the diving association, 
and the fishers association, it has supported 
the establishment and management of marine 
protected areas in designated zones, to boost 
tourism and other livelihoods. These efforts 
have stimulated renewed interest in the diving 
sites of City X, attracting a stream of ecologi-
cally minded tourists. They also have boosted 
the sustainable supply of products for process-
ing and are contributing to more  
stable ecosystems. 
I should mention our annual disaster 
preparedness day as well, an event in which I 
regularly participate. A number of years ago, 
our city government approved a resolution that 
established this event, with the intention of 
keeping disaster risk firmly in people’s minds. 
The day includes street parades, television 
reports on past disasters, posters, exhibitions on 
safe construction, and earthquake simulation 
drills. It also includes interactive open meet-
ings with DRM and CCA practitioners and 
experts, who share their experience in dealing 
with earthquakes, floods, and other hazards. 
Spearheaded by city officials and supported by 
various stakeholders, observance of this event 
has become a milestone in our calendar and, 
remarkably, has transcended electoral cycles 
and changes in political leadership.
Acknowledging  
Residual Risks
As City X continues to improve its capacity 
to manage risk, losses from hazard events 
are expected to fall, despite continuing 
urban expansion. Challenges remain, but 
I think that the strong partnerships that 
the city government has developed with 
civil society organizations, international 
development partners, and the private 
sector augur well for the future. Indeed our 
city experienced a strong typhoon a year 
ago, which demonstrated that, unlike other 
cities affected by the same event, we are well 
prepared for typhoons at least and relatively 
capable of withstanding such events (Box 11). 
I think I can speak for all in saying that we are 
extremely proud of City X and the journey we 
have embarked upon (Figure 22).
Box 11 Recent Disaster Experience, 15 Years On
Our city experienced a strong typhoon a year ago, which was accompanied by strong winds, wave surges, and heavy rains. 
Unlike other cities affected by the same event, City X was well prepared. The community-based early warning system 
worked extremely well and those in potential danger moved swiftly to their designated evacuation centers. Consequently, 
our casualty rates were much lower than those experienced in other cities. The damage to infrastructure and other assets 
was also much reduced, thanks to various actions to strengthen resilience over the past 15 years. Moreover, gender focus 
groups were established to take the special needs of women into account in the relief, early recovery, and reconstruction 
process and to help lessen existing inequalities; and informal settlement focus groups were established to enable the most 
marginalized in society to participate in the rebuilding and, particularly, relocation of their homes, taking their livelihoods, 
welfare, and social support networks into account. We really have come a very long way.
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Figure 22 Strengthening Resilience—Progress of a City 
 Amended decentralization law, providing clear local government mandate on DRM 
with associated regulations and implementation programs
 Establishment of a city disaster management office
 Development of strategic master plan for strengthened resilience
 Integration of disaster risk considerations in local development plan, policies, 
and specific implementation programs
 Increased funding for DRM
 Strengthened flood and storm early warning systems
 Training and education outreach on strengthened resilience and regular 
preparedness drills
 Update and dissemination of hazard maps
 Introduction of risk-sensitive land use planning
 Revision of building codes and strengthened compliance mechanisms
 Initiation of a large-scale public infrastructure retrofitting program
 Public–private partnerships for strengthened resilience under way
 Specific involvement of women and poor in resilience strengthening and reconstruction 
focus groups
 Public, private and community environmental regeneration initiatives
15 YEARS LATER
TODAY
 Unclear local government mandate on disaster risk management (DRM) 
despite a decentralized system of government
 Limited DRM funding
 Limited DRM expertise or capacity
 Minimal land use planning practice
 Poor compliance with building codes
 Growth of informal settlements in hazard-prone areas
 Environmental degradation linked to rapid urbanization
 Little private sector or nongovernment organization engagement 
in disaster risk reduction
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I am a farmworker living on a river 
embankment. My family and I have just 
survived the worst floods to hit this reach  
of the river in more than 30 years. Although 
our situation is still not ideal, we have made 
major progress over the past few years, 
without which we would have suffered much 
greater losses.
We shifted to this location just 5 years 
ago, after abandoning the land I grew up on 
and trying a few other locations that did not 
work out along the way. The annual monsoon 
floods had swelled the river to the point where 
it eroded away what was left of our old small 
plot of land in my home district. No amount 
of rocks or sandbags could stop the relent-
less undercutting of the torrent as, meter by 
meter, our land slumped into the water and 
was washed downstream. When I went to the 
district administration for assistance, I learned 
that the land records had not been updated 
for many years. I also learned that, before we 
could get any compensation, our land tax 
arrears needed to be brought up to date—
including arrears for land claimed by the river 
in my father’s time. I was crestfallen. I felt that 
it was easier to move my family elsewhere and 
try to start again.
The spot where we eventually resettled 
was vacant for a reason—it too was vulnerable 
to river erosion and flooded every monsoon. 
Although I found daily wage work on the 
surrounding farms, each year I lost around 2 
months of income when my employers’ land 
flooded. Access to the nearest towns (and the 
daily laboring jobs that could sometimes be 
found there) was also cut off until the waters 
receded. My children could not get to school, 
despite the bicycle the government provided 
my eldest daughter as an incentive to finish 
her secondary education. Food ran out quickly 
and prices skyrocketed as crops everywhere 
were ruined. Sometimes the government 
provided emergency rations, but more often 
than not, by the time my wife or I got to the 
collection point, all the food had been handed 
out. To add to our misery, the goats in which 
we had invested our scanty savings sickened 
and died because we could not collect enough 
fodder for them. My family was often sick 
during the floods, and purchase of medicine 
was a further drain on our resources, forcing 
my wife to sell her jewelry piece by piece.
Our situation started to turn around 
when the provincial government, with funding 
and technical support from a bilateral donor 
agency, started to implement an integrated 
flood and river risk management project. The 
project not only tackled the infrastructure 
side of things—physically improving the river 
embankments, thus greatly diminishing the 
erosion and flooding problems—but also 
improved the capacity of the government 
agency responsible for planning and imple-
menting flood and river erosion prevention 
programs. The local government called a 
community meeting and explained to us that 
part of the program would involve some kind 
of science to predict the river’s movements, 
enabling early planning for bank protection 
works as flood and erosion risk zones change 
with the ever-changing river course. They 
would also help our village and some of the 
other most-at-risk communities along the 
river strengthen our capacity to manage the 
flood and erosion risk and to implement some 
Women making gabion baskets. Makira, Solomon Islands
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coping strategies. And they would give some 
funding to a local NGO to help people like 
me, living in extremely vulnerable locations, 
to improve our livelihoods and, at the same 
time, to strengthen our resilience.
At first, I was not convinced that all these 
grand plans would really help, but I began to 
change my way of thinking when a woman 
from a local NGO urged me to come to a 
meeting with all my neighbors at my daughter’s 
school. I still vividly recall what she said, “All 
of you could join a project that would teach 
you how to prepare yourselves better for flood 
events. Everyone living in this area is welcome. 
It doesn’t matter if you are landowners or infor-
mal settlers or men or women. There are lots 
of simple things you can do as a community 
that will help increase everyone’s resilience.” 
This was the catalyst for me. I began to realize 
that since floods and erosion were going to 
happen every year, my family and I had to start 
formulating a plan to reduce our risk.
Perhaps our first tangible benefit from the 
government program was that we actually got 
to know our neighbors. Because they came, like 
us, as refugees from various other localities, we 
had been wary of each other. Where we come 
from, our neighbors are our relatives. We were 
not used to having friends who spoke different 
languages, practiced different rituals, and ate 
different food. Personally, my suspicion was 
compounded by my own guilt about squatting 
on what is essentially government land.  
I felt like other people might try to displace us 
or compete for the same work. There was no 
natural sense of community. The NGO high-
lighted the fact that, despite our differences, my 
neighbors and I faced common challenges. By 
working together, we could improve the situa-
tion for everyone. In addition to organizing the 
community to implement practical measures, 
such as a monsoon fodder bank, raised cattle 
platforms, and raised block steps to form key 
access routes to the school, the program has 
given my family another extremely important 
benefit—a network of friends to support each 
other during difficult times.
The NGO told us how we could get early 
warning about floods from the radio—and 
that soon this would evolve into an automated 
“text burst” system for a small monthly fee.  
I had recently bought a cheap mobile phone, 
like many of the other men in the village, 
making payment in installments. Initially,  
I used my phone to find out who was hiring 
workers, thus saving valuable time in going 
to various places to inquire. The NGO helped 
us to set up a phone tree for the village. 
Now, when anyone gets information about 
a weather threat, they send this information 
on to three contacts, who send it to three 
contacts, and so on down the tree. When I 
received information about heavy rain this 
July, my wife and I made sure our tools and 
animals were secure, got everything up high in 
our house, and ensured we had enough food, 
fuel, and water to last at least a week. This was 
not easy to do, and I still marvel at how the 
advanced warning information we received 
and the new feeling of having a greater sense 
of control spurred my family on.
One of the most important tools we had 
secured a while back was my wife’s loom. She 
began participating in a self-help group about 
4 years ago. With some help from a livelihoods 
project targeting flood- and river erosion–
affected people, my wife has been able to turn 
weaving, which has always been a part-time 
activity, into a small but steady income stream. 
The self-help group has given her access 
to credit with which to buy cocoons, and 
she spins these into thread. The project has 
connected her to a company operating with 
an inclusive business model. This company 
has provided some training and designs, and 
it buys her products at an agreed-upon price, 
Year-round access to community facilities supports resilience. Ha Noi, Viet Nam
A
FP
My neighbors and 
I faced common 
challenges.  
By working 
together, we 
could improve 
the situation for 
everyone
80 Investing in Resilience
provided the quality is good. It also was will-
ing to subsidize the purchase of an improved 
loom, but after discussions with other mem-
bers of the weaving collective, she decided to 
stick with the simple loom she already has, 
because it is very easy to pack up and lift when 
we get flood warnings. My wife has taken out 
a microinsurance policy, however, to protect 
her tools and inputs in case of a major event. 
Our neighbor’s wife used her credit from the 
self-help group to buy a solar panel, which 
she uses to keep a truck battery charged. With 
this, she provides lighting for us and for two 
neighbors and also charges mobile phones 
for a fee. Our lighting is free, in return for my 
wife’s services in looking after the neighbor’s 
baby when our neighbor runs errands. Our 
neighbor also plays a radio, which my wife 
listens to while she weaves.
My wife’s steady income from weaving has 
slowly replaced the money she used to earn for 
participating in a government work scheme 
about 3 months each year. This scheme requires 
the state to provide each household with a 
minimum of 100 days of manual employment 
annually at the statutory minimum wage. It 
aims for 33% participation by women and 
equal wages for women and men. Through her 
involvement in the scheme, my wife helped 
repair flood-damaged embankments, although 
she found the heavy manual labor rather tough. 
Most of her workmates were women as well, 
because quite a few of the men around here 
seek work in the cities during the agricultural 
lean season, leaving the women to look after 
their children and houses.
The livelihoods project also has a 
subproject that targets educated youth. When 
my daughter finished secondary school 2 years 
ago, we did not have enough money to pay for 
any further education or training. However, 
the livelihoods project helped us, subsidizing 
her participation in a technical skills class with 
a work-experience component. Now she is 
working as a nurse aide. I am so proud of her. 
The extra income from my wife and daughter 
has enabled us to slowly accumulate some 
savings. I am a sharecropper now, not a day 
laborer, and this year, for the first time, I have 
been able to lease my own land.
Last year, I saw the benefits of crop 
insurance when my neighbor suffered crop 
loss in a storm. He did not have to wait for 
an assessor or pay a bribe—verification was 
done based on weather data and the agreed 
sum was paid immediately. I was really 
impressed and have signed up for the same 
weather index–based insurance product. 
With this insurance in place, I think I may 
try out a higher-value crop next year. We 
could end up losing more if there is a flood 
or storm, but the insurance will cover those 
losses. And if the weather is kind, we will 
make more money. Another neighbor has 
started growing a variety of rice with high 
flood tolerance. I may think about that 
option a bit more, too.
The land I have leased is farther from the 
river and less flood-prone than the land I used 
to work on. Over the next 2 years, we want 
to relocate our house there. We are waiting 
until we can afford to construct a house with 
disaster-resilient features, such as high ground 
clearance and roof water collection. The 
NGO that provided our village with flood risk 
reduction training also provided some train-
ing to local builders on this, gave them some 
sample plans, and spoke to the whole village 
about how we could better protect our homes.
Friends who have lived in our new 
village for many years tell me that the physical 
improvements to the river embankments that 
I mentioned earlier have definitely reduced 
the incidence of flooding and waterlogging 
in the area behind the embankments. Private 
investments are now increasing in that area, 
including new industries providing jobs. My 
son has his sights set on a building apprentice-
ship in the near future. I hope those  
embankments really do prove adequate  
over time, though.
To wrap up, in relatively few years my 
family and I have taken advantage of several 
programs that have targeted our geographic 
vulnerability (Figure 23). We have made 
enormous progress, increasing our savings, 
diversifying our income, leasing our own land, 
investing more in our own lives, and securing 
insurance. I worry much less now, and I think 
we face a much brighter future.
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Figure 23 Strengthening Resilience—Progress of a Family 
Introduction 
of integrated 
flood and river 
management 
program
Relocation
 Located on a river embankment subject to annual flooding, resulting in progressive 
erosion of family plot into river
FIVE YEARS 
BEFORE
STARTING
THE CHANGE
 Daily wage laborer on land subject to annual flooding, with subsequent loss in earnings
 Annual flooding prevents access to nearby town; affects health, nutritional, and 
educational status; and erodes savings in cash and kind
 Small but unstable income from wife’s weaving
 Periodic employment of wife in government work scheme repairing flood-damaged 
embankments
 Reconstruction of embankments
 Local government and community disaster risk management capacity strengthening
 Community-based disaster risk management actions
 Weather forecast and flood warning transmission via mobile phone tree
 Livelihood diversification initiative supporting expansion of wife’s weaving into higher 
steady stream of income
 Technical skills training leading to employment of daughter as nurse’s aide
  Higher, more stable household income permits switch from day laborer to share cropper
 Greater community cohesiveness
5 YEARS LATER
Enhanced
resilience
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Efforts to strengthen resilience are particularly 
crucial in the context of five development 
themes and sectors: livelihoods, land use, 
transport, education, and housing. These are 
each considered in turn below and a sixth 
theme, disaster risk financing, is examined in 
Part III. Each discussion begins by examining 
general and specific vulnerability issues and key 
gaps and obstacles to strengthened resilience. 
Potential macro and micro entry points for 
overcoming these gaps and obstacles and 
related policy, capacity development, and 
investment interventions are also considered. 
A vision of a resilient future is then set 
and potential paths to the achievement of that 
vision are explored, employing the backcasting 
approach. In these visions, resilience is 
integrated into thematic and sectoral strategies, 
policies, and plans; legal, regulatory, and 
institutional arrangements; projects; budgets; 
and monitoring and evaluation frameworks, 
together contributing to risk-resilient national 
and subnational economies, societies, and 
households (Figure 24). The actions described 
do not provide an exhaustive list of options. 
They do, however, emphasize the report’s 
focus on DRM as an integral element of 
development. These thematic and sectoral 
visions, if achieved, will contribute toward 
risk-resilient economies and societies.
The presentation of development 
opportunities for investing in resilience begins 
with livelihoods, a key development issue and 
one that encompasses both the macro and 
micro scales in economic, social, political, 
and physical terms; the multisector issues 
of development; and investing in resilience. 
Livelihoods refer to the capabilities, assets 
(both material and social resources), and 
activities required to procure a means of 
Thematic and Sectoral Opportunities 
for Investing in Resilience8
There are opportunities for investing in resilience across many development themes and sectors.
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Figure 24 Visions of a Resilient Future Viewed through a Thematic and Sectoral Lens
LIVELIHOODS
 Routine hazard 
risk assessments, 
informing livelihood 
policies, plans, 
programs, and 
individual 
interventions
 Strengthened 
resilience of 
livelihood assets
 Livelihood 
diversification 
 Widespread access 
to microcredit and 
microinsurance
 Strong governance 
framework, limiting 
political, security, 
and ecosystem 
instability
LAND USE 
 Risk-sensitive land 
use planning and 
management 
policies, laws, and 
regulations
 Risk-sensitive land 
use plans
 Coherent 
supporting 
institutional 
arrangements and 
capacity across all 
levels and sectors of 
government
 Strong public and 
private incentives for 
compliance
ROAD TRANSPORT
 Risk-sensitive road 
transport policy and 
investment decisions 
and engineering 
design guidelines
 Strict construction 
and maintenance 
quality controls
 Use of 
nonengineering as 
well as high-tech 
engineering risk 
reduction measures
 Adequate routine 
maintenance 
capacity and funding 
 Pre-establishment 
of post-disaster 
institutional, 
capacity, and 
financial 
arrangements 
EDUATION
 Risk-sensitive 
school site planning, 
design, and 
construction, 
reflecting local 
conditions
 Strict land use 
regulations and 
building code 
compliance controls
 Retrofitting of 
existing schools
 Adequate capacity 
and funding for safe 
school construction 
and routine 
maintenance
 University 
catastrophe 
insurance pool 
HOUSING
 Strong public, 
private, and 
community risk 
assessment 
capabilities
 Enforcement of 
risk-sensitive local 
planning, zoning, 
and building 
regulations 
 Local builders, 
masons, and 
craftspeople trained 
in safe building 
techniques
 Incentives for 
construction of safe 
new homes and 
retrofitting 
 Innovative safe 
building materials 
and construction 
technologies 
 Major new 
affordable safe 
housing schemes
 Regularized tenure 
for illegal and 
informal settlements
Supportive thematic/sectoral vision
Resilience is integrated into thematic and sectoral strategies, 
policies, plans, legal, regulatory and institutional 
arrangements, projects, budgets, and monitoring and 
evaluation frameworks
Overall vision:
A risk-resilient 
future
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living. For the lower-income segments of the 
population, livelihoods are generally at the 
center of poverty reduction efforts in develop-
ing countries. The vulnerability of livelihoods 
to natural hazard events stems from the lack 
of information about hazards and risks, which 
can undermine informed decision making; 
the destruction of livelihood assets crucial for 
sustained production of goods and services 
for income; a lack of livelihood choices that 
are hazard-resistant or are pursued in risky 
locations; and the disruption of livelihood 
processes and networks after a disaster. Most 
often, poor families without savings, with low 
skill levels, and with only very basic shelter 
are the most vulnerable. Families lose their 
income when lives are lost and injuries occur, 
dwellings are damaged or destroyed, market 
connections are broken, local prices escalate, 
and disaster relief and recovery to restore 
livelihoods are inadequate or misguided.
Land use is the real-time spatial mani-
festation of all of society’s values, efforts, and 
decisions. This manifestation comes about pri-
marily through land use planning and man-
agement. The development process focuses on 
management of land resources, wherein the 
land is used in accordance with society’s wants 
and needs and the land’s natural qualities and 
is made productive to yield benefits. Land 
use, however, is vulnerable to natural hazard 
events due to a faulty land management 
system (including equitable access to land to 
support broad-based growth); environmental 
degradation; rapid, ill-planned, or unplanned 
urbanization at all scales; weak enforcement of 
zoning, construction codes, and regulations; 
poverty and disparity; and accelerated land 
use management conflicts arising from natural 
hazards, including climate change effects.
Transport, and specifically road trans-
port, defines and ties livelihoods to land 
use in a physical sense, shaping the nature 
and spatial location of social and economic 
investments. The region needs safe, reliable, 
affordable, and environmentally sustainable 
transport to support economic growth, rising 
incomes, expanding populations, increasing 
trade, and urbanization. However, natural 
hazard events are undermining efforts to 
meet this need. They are causing significant 
damage to transport infrastructure in both 
ever-growing cities and peri-urban provincial 
and rural areas in Asia and the Pacific. There 
are insufficient resources to keep up with the 
demand for new roads and also to build and 
maintain roads in accordance with appropri-
ate risk management practices. The road 
network is also increasingly responsible for 
creating and increasing the vulnerability of 
surrounding areas, particularly of poor coastal 
ecosystems and river valleys at all elevations.
Schools, like other public and private 
sector facilities, are the physical manifestation 
of the educational, economic, social, and 
cultural presence of society in the community 
as well as the seat of the education sector. They 
come in various shapes, sizes, and materials 
and are managed in as many ways. They 
come about through numerous complicated 
processes involving multiple stakeholders in 
both the public and private sectors. Many, if 
not most, school facilities—old and new, large 
and small, urban and rural—in a number of 
countries in the region are vulnerable to natural 
hazard events. This vulnerability is often a 
result of ignorance, errors, or omissions, in 
turn leading to inappropriate or poor choices 
of physical structures and locations. They 
manifest in a lack of readily accessible technical 
information or capacity to manage natural 
hazard risk, and the creation of risk where none 
existed before, due to land use changes.
Housing is the micro complement to 
livelihoods, set in the context of land use, and 
is attached to the road network and to schools 
and other community facilities. The majority of 
housing is built by individuals in the informal 
sector or by private developers in the formal 
sector, in some cases with minimal and in some 
cases with substantial government involvement. 
Perhaps one-third of the urban population in 
the region lives in informal settlements, and a 
further 10%–15% live in substandard housing 
in need of repair, renovation, or replacement. 
Many more should be relocated because they 
are in harm’s way. Thus, perhaps one-half or 
more of the urban and rural population of the 
region lives in unsafe housing. Households are 
driven into hazard-prone areas by poverty, lack 
of access to affordable land and dwellings, and 
lack of awareness of natural hazard risks. Weak 
enforcement of land use planning and building 
regulations, the use of substandard housing 
materials in construction, poor maintenance of 
completed housing structures, and inadequate 
preparedness for hazard events exacerbates 
their vulnerability.
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Ensuring Wider 
Socioeconomic Resilience
This report covers just six development themes 
and sectors (including DRF in Part III) in 
some detail. A fully-functioning, sustainable, 
inclusive economy and society comprises, of 
course, a wide array of additional development 
themes and sectors. Many of these also play 
an important role in determining resilience 
and, likewise, need to integrate measures 
to strengthen resilience into their policies, 
investments, and capacity-building programs.
Within this wider context, the six 
development themes and sectors of particular 
focus in this report can be thought of as six 
faces of a geodesic sphere (Figure 25). The 
resilience of individual themes and sectors 
is essential in contributing to sustainable, 
equitable socioeconomic advancement. 
However, their contribution to national 
resilience depends not only on internal 
resilience within each theme and sector but 
also on resilience in other areas—that is, on a 
geodesic sphere comprising a complete set of 
rods denoting the use of policy, investment, 
and capacity-building efforts to promote 
resilience. A geodesic sphere is an inherently 
stable structure if all rods are in place but is 
weakened if any rods are missing or broken. 
Each and every join between the rods and 
nodes must also be secure—that is, the 
selected policies, investments, and capacity-
building efforts to address resilience must 
be both appropriate to the issue at hand and 
properly implemented. If they are not—for 
instance, due to insufficient incentives or 
corruption—then, again, the sphere—and 
disaster resilience—will be weaker.
8.1  Strengthened livelihood reSilience  
to diSaSterS
Put simply, a livelihood is a means to support 
an existence. A livelihood comprises the 
assets, capabilities, and activities required 
for a means of living. These activities flow 
from a household’s stock of assets and 
capabilities, in turn in effect a form of human 
asset. Thus, livelihoods are built on assets, 
whether physical (access to infrastructure, 
services, tools, and technology), social 
(access to support, advice, and assistance 
from one’s community or networks), 
financial (access to savings, credit, insurance, 
and markets), human (one’s practicality, 
health, education, and ambition), or natural 
(land, water, forests, and biodiversity). 
Livelihoods are complex systems. They are 
holistic in that they are non-sector-specific 
and recognize multiple influences, multiple 
actors, multiple strategies, and multiple 
outcomes. Livelihoods build on families 
and their communities’ inherent potential. 
They connect macro and micro, local and 
global. Working connections across these 
multiple dimensions make livelihood systems 
resilient through four primary stakeholders: 
the livelihood owners; the community, 
with its formal and informal groups and 
organizations; the private sector, both formal 
and informal; and the government.
Modern technology helps farmers communicate with suppliers and markets and 
access weather and crop information services, supporting strengthened livelihood 
resilience. India
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Livelihoods and 
Vulnerability
Livelihoods sit within a context of 
vulnerability comprising
•	 the political and economic environment, 
in which policy changes and economic 
upswings and downturns affect liveli-
hoods;
•	 the security environment, in which di-
sasters, civil disturbances, or restrictions 
such as access to water can cause major 
disruption to supply chains, markets, and 
even labor availability; and
•	 the ecosystem, in which alteration, dam-
age, and destruction of the environment, 
as well as its very makeup, constantly have 
varying consequences for livelihoods.
Overreliance on certain assets, particularly 
natural and physical livelihood assets, as 
exemplified in agriculture endeavors, can 
mean greater vulnerability to shocks. These 
shocks include natural hazard events, because 
droughts, erosion, floods, storms, volcanic 
eruptions, earthquakes, and tsunamis all have 
great potential to destroy, damage, or alter 
natural resource–based livelihoods or disrupt 
the supporting infrastructure. Similarly, one’s 
physical location—in relation to earthquake 
fault lines, sea and river coastlines, wetlands, 
floodplains, mountains, transport routes, and 
remote or disputed land (whether formal 
or informal, homogenous or disparate 
settlements)—is also a key factor determining 
livelihood risk.
Realizing Livelihood 
Resilience: A Vision  
of the Future
Finding entry points for strengthening 
resilience begins with an analysis of livelihood 
assets and vulnerability to natural hazards.  
To enhance sustainability, the analysis can also 
factor in the range of opportunities that could 
be accessed either by strengthening livelihood 
assets or by minimizing vulnerability (Table 5). 
For the poor, securing a resilient livelihood 
is often the most direct route out of poverty. 
For governments, investing in the livelihood 
resilience of poor households makes sound 
economic sense because millions of people are 
assisted to become more regular producers 
and consumers of goods and services rather 
than recipients of welfare. It also makes 
sound social sense because more-resilient 
individuals, families, and communities can 
become regular participants and beneficiaries 
of educational, health, cultural, and civic 
actions rather than desperate, disenfranchised 
victims of natural hazard events with ever-
deepening dependency.
Households and communities with strong 
and varied endowments of livelihoods assets 
are more resilient to shocks. The extent of 
resilience, the most important types of action 
required to strengthen it where necessary, and 
appropriate entry points can be ascertained 
by scoring a household’s or community’s 
endowment of each of the five principal types 
of asset on a score of 1 to 5 and plotting those 
scores on a web (Figure 26). Households or 
communities that score well across all five 
types of asset will have large, evenly-shaped 
shaded areas in the center of the diagram. 
More vulnerable households or communities 
will have relatively smaller, or perhaps highly 
irregular, central shaded areas. For example, 
for a community scoring 3 for social, physical, 
human, and financial assets, but just 1 for 
natural hazards would need to place particular 
emphasis on, perhaps, enhanced environmen-
tal management or improved access to natural 
resources to enhance its resilience.
The backcasting approach is applied below, 
using assets as entry points to explore how 
some of them could, indeed, be exploited to 
strengthen investment in resilience. It is written 
in the past tense, looking back from a vision of 
a resilient future 20 years hence and telling a 
hypothetical story about how that vision might 
have been achieved. The vision paints a picture 
of strengthened livelihood resilience built on 
several key accomplishments that collectively 
result in strengthened resilience of physical, 
social, financial, human, and natural assets: 
•	 Hazard risk assessments are routinely 
undertaken to inform livelihood policies, 
plans, programs, and individual inter-
ventions.
•	 Initiatives to strengthen livelihood assets 
and support livelihood diversification 
are being undertaken with the support of 
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Table 5 Policy, Capacity, and Investment Actions for Risk-Sensitive Livelihood Development
Core Needs Policy Capacity Investment
Assessing risk Require the use of risk-sensitive 
land use plans/ risk maps to 
identify hazard-prone areas and 
link risk-related information 
to livelihood planning.
Train community members in 
vulnerability and risk assessment 
as means of supporting goals of 
risk reduction in local livelihoods.
Build capacity of agriculture 
and related extension workers 
in using weather information 
for agriculture planning.
Identify and assess highly 
vulnerable areas and the 
livelihoods within those areas.
Improve the collection and analysis 
of local and regional hazard data.
Reducing risk—
avoid, eliminate, 
and reduce 
Ensure that eligibility for training 
programs, microcredit, and 
local government assistance 
are not dependent on 
landowning status or gender.
Promote development and use 
of disaster-resilient food crops, 
such as flood-resistant rice, 
drought-resistant maize, etc.
Design government social protection 
programs (such as minimum 
employment guarantees, education 
assistance, and emergency 
food assistance) for the poor in 
at-risk areas and for the disaster-
affected, to reduce the risk of 
asset sale and indebtedness.
Review the mobile phone 
network coverage in high-risk 
areas and consider allocation of 
at least one phone per village.
Consider relocation of 
communities in high-risk areas.
Develop long-term livelihood 
diversification strategies for highly 
vulnerable areas where people 
cannot be relocated and where 
livelihoods are overly dependent 
on one asset (e.g., land or fisheries)
Build community and local 
government capacity in high-
risk areas in organized disaster 
preparedness, response, 
and recovery, including 
protection of assets.
Conduct national-level awareness-
raising campaigns on community-
based disaster risk management 
(DRM) and resilient livelihood via 
radio, print, or television, directing 
people to resources and programs 
and informing them about self-help 
in the absence of a formal program.
Integrate disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) elements into local credit, 
livelihood, and self-help group 
capacity development curricula.
Encourage formation of livelihood 
groups, cooperatives, youth groups, 
self-help groups, and credit groups 
to build social capital and engender 
formation of a social safety net.
Invest in programs for community-
based DRM and resilient livelihoods 
in identified at-risk zones and 
disseminate the results.
Invest in vocational training, 
particularly for women and youths 
and particularly in rural areas, to 
increase the number of income 
earners and diversify the sources 
of income in at-risk families.
Encourage the formation of 
savings with banks and credit 
companies, rather than through 
accumulation of physical assets.
Invest in community-based 
ecosystem management for DRR. 
Managing 
residual risk—
share and 
transfer
Ensure national policies regulating 
insurance providers allow 
for microinsurance delivered 
by a second party, such as a 
microcredit organization.
Build local knowledge about 
available microinsurance products.
Encourage the accumulation of 
savings as a buffer against times 
of interrupted income earning 
and unexpected expenses.
Train schoolchildren and adults 
so that they understand the 
content of a radio or text-based 
civil defense warning.
Reduce disaster-related morbidity 
through training in first aid and 
good hygiene practices.
Seek public–private partnerships in 
provision of micro asset protection 
and weather index–based insurance.
Implement government social 
protection programs for the disaster-
affected, to reduce the risk of asset 
sale and increased indebtedness.
Improve hazard monitoring, 
and early warning systems
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Figure 26 Strengthening the Resilience of Livelihood Assets
Resilience
Vulnerability
Asset
 Formal education
Strengthen with 
affordable market- 
focused education, 
transition from 
informal to formal 
sector jobs
 Extended family
Strengthen with 
community mobile 
mobilization, 
community-based 
disaster risk 
management
 Land   
 Forests
Strengthen with
 environmental
management
 Tools    
 Roads and power
Strengthen with 
improved access to 
information and 
communication 
technology, retrofitting 
dwellings, government 
services, affordable 
public transport, access 
to markets
 Savings and credit 
 Inflow of remittances
Strengthen with 
improved access to 
insurance
Social 
assets:
Low 
access
Natural assets:
Medium access
Physical 
assets:
Low 
access
Human
assets:
Medium 
access
Financial 
assets:
Medium 
access
3
2
4
5
1
government, civil society, and the private 
sector.
•	 There is widespread access to microcred-
it and microinsurance.
•	 A strong governance framework is in 
place, limiting vulnerabilities caused 
by political, security, and ecosystem 
instability.
Strengthened Physical Assets
Interventions to strengthen physical assets 
began with access to safe building sites. 
Households were empowered over several 
years to take the initiative to reduce their risk 
by physically relocating to areas more suitable 
for a sustainable livelihood. Whether through 
government, NGO, or private sector–based 
initiatives, access to safe building sites through 
purchase or negotiation using consents, tax 
advantages, purchase, barters, donations, 
and/or zoning easements benefited tens 
of thousands of households. When social 
housing schemes were included as part of 
slum upgrading projects, the preservation of 
existing livelihoods and social networks was 
paramount during the planning, design, and 
construction process. Structural risk reduction 
works, financed by international development 
partner loans and grants, permitted local 
governments and households to significantly 
decrease the primary physical risk to 
livelihoods, such as overcrowding and reliance 
on inadequate infrastructure. These settlement 
dwellers became more stable, enfranchised 
citizens. Meanwhile, municipal governments 
captured savings from reduced demand for 
disaster relief, security, and social services, 
and these savings were reinvested in other 
settlements and in provision of improved 
urban services.
In settings where relocation was not 
possible, the most viable action was to reduce 
risk through retrofitting dwellings. Given that 
affected livelihoods were intrinsically linked 
to existing locations that would continue 
to remain hazard prone, such as coastal 
fisheries, local and provincial governments 
specified housing designs and community 
infrastructure, using hazard mapping and 
Access to safe 
building sites 
through purchase 
or negotiation 
using consents, 
tax advantages, 
purchase, barters, 
donations, and/or 
zoning easements 
benefited tens 
of thousands of 
households
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zoning to minimize loss of productive assets. 
The necessary technical studies and funding 
for retrofitting came about through targeted 
DRM, CCA, public sector small business and 
low-income housing programs, and loans 
and grants supported by the international 
community, whose assistance priorities shifted 
from reactive to proactive investment in 
resilience. Discounted insurance for retrofitted 
housing and redesigned community 
infrastructure enhanced the incentive for 
public and private infrastructure service 
providers and households to provide the 
necessary qualifying investments.
Another important part of the invest-
ments made by the government and the 
private sector, which significantly enhanced 
livelihood resilience, was in the area of 
information and communication  technology. 
Access to dependable and continuous 
information on a variety of subjects as broad 
as livelihoods themselves expanded oppor-
tunities for remote communities and urban 
households alike. Information on disaster 
preparedness and response was integrated 
into formal and informal education systems. 
The expansion of mobile phone  technology at 
increasingly affordable prices meant farmers 
could receive text messages on such topics as 
weather forecasts and market prices. Techni-
cal assistance and investment to expand 
information and communication technology 
networks, develop useful information portals, 
disseminate user information, and increase 
access came about through public sector 
policy and investment as appropriate for 
market-driven pricing in telecommunications 
and equipment access.
Strengthened Social Assets
In areas identified as disaster prone due to 
chronic or extensive exposure to natural 
hazards, community-based DRM proved 
to be an essential investment in livelihood 
resilience. The community-based DRM 
approach, conducted by NGOs well versed in 
working with communities on economic and 
social development needs, brought flexible, 
multi-objective programming and project 
funds. Initial community awareness-raising 
was followed by facilitation of community 
risk assessment capacity building. Risk 
assessments included community mapping 
to better understand the spatial nature, 
severity, and frequency of natural hazard risks; 
evacuation pathways; and the expected effects 
of disasters on local economic and social 
infrastructure. This enabled the identification 
of assets, needs, and coping strategies. Most 
importantly, the risk assessments identified 
residual risks that would not be reduced in 
the short term, particularly risks beyond the 
control of individual households. Addressing 
the management of residual risks at the 
community level was undertaken by local 
government and included provision of 
understandable warning information by radio, 
evacuation shelters, and disaster-resistant 
transport routes. Local community-based 
DRM committees and voluntary working 
groups drew up pre- and post-disaster 
activities, such as continuing public 
awareness, periodic risk assessment updates, 
local early warning systems, own-account risk 
reduction activities, and evacuation protocols, 
and linked these with urban, district, or 
provincial plans, resources, and funds. In 
addition to NGO resources, local government 
funds and private grants and donations were 
used to support these activities.
Participation in livelihood interest 
groups, self-help groups, and civil society 
also reduced livelihood vulnerability by 
using knowledge gained from the experience, 
practices, and technology employed by others 
facing similar risks. Linking these groups 
with community-based DRM programs 
promoted the introduction to group members 
of specific livelihood resilience enhancements. 
These included strategies for protecting key 
documents and productive assets. Piloting, 
demonstration, scaling up, and replication of 
successful local group-based activities, includ-
ing training of trainers, enhanced the resil-
ience of more at-risk communities and the 
nongovernment sector. These activities also 
transferred social capital among communities, 
districts, and provinces. Support for linking 
these groups with community-based DRM 
programs, and the ensuing activities, was 
underwritten by own-account cost sharing.
Increased Financial Security
In the past, it was far too common for 
an insurable loss—such as death or 
incapacitation, prolonged illness, or total 
or near-total loss of shelter or the means of 
livelihood—to push a family into permanent 
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poverty. Surveys would later show that, among 
small-scale farmers, illness or accidents of 
family members from all causes cost those 
under the poverty line about 25% of annual 
household income. Natural hazards, especially 
floods, caused losses equivalent to a further 
23% of annual family income—similar, 
for instance, to levels of loss observed in 
Viet Nam (Central Institute for Economic 
Management 2012). Insurance coverage at 
the household level was very low, leading 
to further indebtedness after a disaster, 
and further impoverishment. Traditionally, 
insurance had been provided through 
qualified brokers linked to formal companies 
and had largely failed to reach the poor or 
near-poor.
However, improved access to insurance 
was identified as a key factor in increasing 
livelihood resilience. Insurance products acces-
sible to the poor were therefore reformulated 
to be easily understood, to be more affordable, 
and to provide quick payouts. The insurance 
products offered became straightforward and 
claim procedures were simplified. To stimulate 
their development, the government also 
provided guarantees to insurance companies 
and developed partnerships with organizations 
such as microfinance providers, which already 
had trusted relationships with low-income 
households. Microinsurance already had a 
very high demonstration effect—people would 
purchase an insurance product after seeing 
others being compensated for losses. As such, 
pilot programs were an important element in 
encouraging participation.
One example of addressing vulnerabilities 
to natural asset–based livelihoods was weather 
index–based insurance. Payouts were trig-
gered by a weather-calibrated index based on 
a predetermined threshold, such as an excess 
or shortage of rainfall or other weather vari-
ables affecting selected crops. The threshold 
was determined through risk modeling that 
as closely as possible correlated crop loss 
patterns with weather variables to identify 
expected crop losses. Index insurance greatly 
reduced the prospect of fraud and solved three 
of the most difficult challenges of agricultural 
insurance: moral hazard, adverse selection, 
and cost of loss adjustment.
•	 Moral hazard: Farmers cannot influence 
an index that is based on weather.
•	 Adverse selection: Farmers opting in or 
out of the insurance program have no 
impact on the risk or therefore the cost of 
provision.
•	 Cost of loss adjustment: No visit to the 
individual farm is needed to calculate 
losses.
There were three action areas for this 
insurance scheme. First, it was necessary to 
update the policy and regulatory framework 
of the insurance industry to eliminate impedi-
ments and distortions in its development and 
promotion. This included development of 
regulations and guidelines, legal bases, and 
consumer protection protocols. Legislation 
required updating to allow partnerships 
between insurance companies and microfi-
nance organizations, thus facilitating access by 
the poor.
Second, it was required to upgrade the 
national meteorological infrastructure and 
analytical capacity to use the data captured 
in a timely and accurate manner. Activities 
included installation and maintenance of 
functional weather gauging stations and the 
training of technical staff of governments, 
community-based DRM groups, and private 
institutions to collect, relay, analyze, and apply 
the information. Advanced technology such 
as remote sensing and geographic informa-
Livelihood diversification and raised homes can strengthen resilience.
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tion systems complemented the information 
generated locally through community-based 
DRM programs. In many cases, this was 
undertaken with financial assistance from the 
international community.
Third, technical assistance through 
private sector partnerships was required to 
develop and pilot viable insurance products. 
This included use of weather data to create 
models that determined area-based risks and 
therefore prices, thresholds for payout, and so 
on. It also included facilitation of appropriate 
marketing strategies and models of partnership 
among insurance companies and rural banks, 
microfinance operations, and public agencies. 
These were supported by national policy and 
legislative initiatives and budgets for proactive 
risk reduction. There also was expansion and 
improvement of public sector climate hazard 
analysis, in cooperation with the international 
and national agriculture industry. Much of this 
was achieved through governments identifying 
these requirements as essential components 
in their respective national development plans 
and negotiating with the international com-
munity to have them included in respective 
country partnership strategy negotiations.
Access to savings and credit was strength-
ened to enhance livelihoods. Savings was 
encouraged to facilitate access to credit. This 
developed financial literacy, built financial 
and social capital, and promoted access 
to a network of business information and 
services. Accumulation of savings or access 
to credit enabled families to invest in other 
livelihood asset improvements and to ride out 
the income downturns invariably caused by 
seasonal or labor force fluctuations, without 
selling tools or income-producing assets or 
borrowing at unattractive terms.
Strengthened Human Assets
A Millennium Development Goals campaign 
had previously prompted government efforts to 
improve enrollment and retention of youth in 
formal education, but with only partial success. 
Those who could afford further education 
and those who could attract scholarships 
moved on to tertiary education, facilitating 
access to a professional, administrative, or 
technical livelihood. The rest of the working-
age population faced fierce competition for 
jobs requiring only a secondary education, 
which were most likely to exist in urban areas. 
Those in rural areas or whose performance 
or attendance resulted in minimal academic 
preparation were less competitive and often 
confronted less lucrative livelihood choices, 
thus heightening vulnerability for those who 
were often already the poorest.
Technical assistance and investment by 
the government, NGOs, and the international 
community had an effect on income diversi-
fication and job creation, leading to localized 
economic growth and resilience. This was 
accomplished by developing affordable or free 
market–focused, short- and medium-term 
education programs such as vocational skills 
training, in some cases provided as block 
courses involving just a few days of intensive 
training per month. Vocational training was 
often paired with infrastructure investments 
to ensure that required regular maintenance 
could be undertaken locally. The government 
incentivized the private sector to provide jobs 
and training by formalizing and subsidizing 
apprenticeship programs. Supporting the 
transition, particularly of educated youth, 
from informal to formal sector jobs increased 
livelihood resilience because formal sector 
employment not only provided regular, 
predictable income but also often came with 
social protection benefits such as paid annual 
and sick leave, preferential access to group 
insurance, and maternity leave for women.
Where opportunities for income diver-
sification were scarce and existing livelihoods 
were unsustainable, migration was common. 
The government was aware of the  growing 
receipt of remittances by low-income families, 
sometimes including as many as 50% of 
households nationally—similar to levels 
observed in, for instance, Nepal (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2011). However, only a 
fraction of the remittances were used for capital 
formation, compared with the much larger 
expenditures for daily consumption. Such 
migration locations became priority targets for 
raising awareness about ways to leverage the 
transformative potential of using remittances 
for disaster-resilient job creation, savings, and 
purchase of income-producing assets. This was 
carried out by community groups and govern-
ment agencies, using own-account budget 
funds, and by the international community, 
which supported information and discussion 
to enhance financial literacy for both migrants 
and recipients.
Migration 
locations became 
priority targets 
for raising 
awareness 
about ways to 
leverage the 
transformative 
potential of using 
remittances 
for disaster-
resilient job 
creation, savings, 
and purchase 
of income-
producing assets
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Strengthened Natural Assets
Environmental management was another 
entry point for both public and community 
disaster-resilient livelihood enhancement 
initiatives. Protection and enhancement of 
the environment was based on site-specific 
natural hazard risks and targeted the 
needs and opportunities of the vulnerable 
population. Experience had shown that, 
following disasters, survival of tidal surges 
and flooding was greater in coastal areas 
with reefs, dunes, and good mangrove 
cover that broke the force of waves. Thus, 
protection of reefs, control of sand mining, 
and reforestation of mangrove areas was 
undertaken in coastal areas. This included 
programs to build local knowledge of and 
capacity for the preservation and sustainable 
use of these naturally occurring ecosystem 
structures and functions. Propagation of 
mangrove plants became a viable business for 
local groups and individuals. In the same way, 
improved watershed management practices 
were used to reduce the damage associated 
with erosion and flash floods while improving 
aquifer recharge. At the same time, livelihoods 
were enhanced through improved supply  
of animal fodder, enhanced water 
productivity, and less damage to agricultural 
land from flooding.
The government, the private sector, the 
international community, local community 
groups, and NGOs increased the effectiveness 
of such programs through responses simul-
taneously covering policy and information, 
capacity building, infrastructure and insur-
ance, community participation, and diversifi-
cation of livelihoods. Investments in the form 
of both post-disaster assistance and newly 
formed risk reduction technical assistance 
grants, loans, and lending took a long-term 
view by factoring in the potential avoided 
disaster assistance costs of displacement, loss 
of life, loss of income-earning assets, and 
reduced expenditure on disaster relief. In this 
way, disaster-resilient livelihood development 
assistance utilized earmarked disaster-driven 
outlays by explicitly integrating risk reduc-
tion into poverty alleviation programs, with 
little additional cost over previous, reactive 
programs. The result for the local population 
was improved income diversification, sustain-
ability, and the ability of the poorest to invest 
in their own futures.
Reducing the Context of 
Vulnerability
The targeted strengthening of physical, 
social, financial, human, and natural assets 
for livelihood resilience was made sustainable 
by an improved governance framework that 
limited vulnerabilities caused by political, 
security, and ecosystem instability. This was 
achieved in part by an NGO instituting a 
community scorecard system, whereby they 
very publicly rated the services received 
by various local and regional government 
agencies and encouraged members of the 
community to expect better. After some 
initial public inquiries, service providers 
started to work with communities to 
actively improve both their services and the 
transparency with which they were provided. 
This type of improved regional and local 
governance gave families and communities 
the confidence to plan and invest with more 
certainty. Incidences of strikes, riots, and 
demonstrations went down. Knowing that 
policies would be upheld, infringements 
would be penalized, services would be 
available without the need to pay bribes, 
and institutions would be accountable for 
the funds and responsibilities with which 
they were entrusted also built the level of 
business confidence. Thus, the private sector 
also prospered, offering yet more areas for 
employment and investment, and so further 
diversifying sources of livelihood. 
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Land use planning is a complex, formal, 
and bureaucratic undertaking. The process 
of land use planning takes place with 
nested and interweaving levels of authority 
and responsibility in its implementation. 
Consequently, the development of a land use 
plan for a metropolitan urban area or city 
could take several years and include many 
steps, with an anticipated implementation 
life span of at least a decade and sometimes 
longer. Risk-sensitive land use planning is a 
new concept for planners and development 
professionals. It adds two new considerations 
to the conventional approach to land use 
planning (Figure 27):
•	 Disaster risk reduction parameters and 
objectives. Hazard, vulnerabil ity, risk, 
and capacity parameters, together with 
the disaster/emer gency management 
requirements, are identified, collected, 
and integrated with traditional land 
use planning information (e.g., 
socioeconomic profiles, demographics, 
and transport networks), and DRR goals 
and objectives are formulated.
•	 Integration through formal government 
activities. Measures are taken to ensure 
understanding, acceptance, and support 
for the plan; to improve the competency 
and knowledge about risk-sensitive land 
use planning among planners and other 
professionals; and to raise the awareness 
and support of all stakeholders.
These two additional considerations 
require a series of information analyses, 
reviews, and evaluations gathered from 
government, the targeted communities, 
nongovernment entities, and the private 
sector, which are then incorporated as the 
plan is formulated. The plan implementation 
and enforcement processes are indicated in 
rules and regulations typically embodied in 
a zoning ordinance. Plan monitoring and 
evaluation are the responsi bility of the plan’s 
administrators.
Land use planning involves an interactive 
and continuous process to regulate the use 
and development of land, allowing feedback 
among government planners and other 
stakeholders, who may have multiple and 
sometimes competing interests (Box 12). The 
resulting consensus and trust is manifest in 
the ownership of and support for implementa-
tion and enforcement of the resulting land 
use plan. Land use management provides 
regulatory tools that enable the government to 
establish its mandate on land use (Table 6).
Land Use and  
Vulnerability
In developing countries, land use planning 
and land use management have resulted 
in challenges and failures when the 
formal process has been inadequately or 
improperly administered. The informal 
process has produced slums and substandard 
informal settlements and has given rise to 
significant land use inefficiencies, both of 
which require significant and long-term 
investments to reestablish a more sustainable 
built environment in the face of risk. The 
juxtaposition of natural hazards with 
inadequate land use and land management 
practice is a major cause of increased loss of life 
and property in all sectors. The following are 
the specific roots of vulnerability:
8.2 riSk-SenSitive land uSe Planning 
Community consultation is an important part of risk-sensitive land use planning, supporting 
the identification of high-risk areas and prioritization of risk reduction measures.
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Box 12 Kathmandu Risk-Sensitive Land Use Plan
For highly vulnerable cities such Kathmandu, Nepal, the development of a risk-sensitive land use plan offers an opportunity 
to incorporate risk reduction into development and spatial plans through a participatory process that engages govern-
ment institutions, the private sector, civil society, international development partners, and other key stakeholders, such as 
academia and the media. The Kathmandu Metropolitan City Risk-Sensitive Land Use Plan is a 15-year guide (2010–2025) 
for realizing the city’s desired spatial pattern of development, with due consideration to the city’s seismic risks, emergency 
response, and disaster risk management capabilities, through different land use policies and urban renewal schemes. It 
addresses specific risk and vulnerability reduction strategies; restores and protects cultural heritage sites; improves the 
private investment environment; and elaborates sustainable development strategies that are predicated on more efficient 
transport systems, sustainability of environmental and natural assets, and better living conditions for inhabitants. 
Source: Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative (2010).
Figure 27  The Content of Risk-Sensitive Land Use Planning
Integration
process
 Mobilization of 
stakeholders
 Awareness and 
education campaign
 Training and 
capacity building
Legislative and 
administrative 
process
 Plan evaluation, 
review, and adoption
 Plan implementation 
and enforcement
 Plan monitoring and 
evaluation
Disaster risk 
management
parameters
 Multi-hazard 
assessment
 Vulnerability 
assessment
 Risk and capacity 
assessment
 Disaster risk 
management 
requirements
Conventional 
planning process
 Data collection and 
situational analysis 
 Setting of the 
risk-sensitive land use 
planning vision
 Setting goals and 
objectives
 Alternative 
development strategies, 
selection of preferred 
strategies
 Detailing of preferred 
strategies
 Formulation of policies 
and implementation tools
Source: Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative (2010).
•	 Deficient land use planning and land 
management. The rapid growth of cities 
has not been supported by appropriate 
levels of investment in infrastructure, 
basic services, and habitable 
settlements. Inadequate and insufficient 
infrastructure, typically poorly 
maintained, coupled with uncontrolled 
urbanization often feeds the growth 
of informal settlements and slums, 
reinforces poverty, and diminishes a 
city’s ability to deal with disaster events.
•	 Deficient environmental 
management. The inappropriate 
exploitation of natural resources; 
occupation of naturally vulnerable 
ecosystem areas such as floodplains, 
seismic fault easements, marshes, 
wetlands, dunes, and forests, whether 
by choice or by force; and inadequate 
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disposal of solid and liquid waste 
increase vulnerability to recognized 
natural hazards.
•	 Lack of compliance with and 
enforcement of construction codes 
and regulations. Schools, hospitals, 
essential facilities, housing, commercial 
and institutional property, and 
major infrastructure may be poorly 
constructed or designed without 
satisfying minimum safety standards. 
Even when construction standards have 
been adopted, enforcement of these 
standards is often lacking.
Realizing Resilience 
through Land Use 
Management: A Vision  
of the Future
Risk-sensitive land use planning can be 
achieved by applying the three basic groups of 
instruments of intervention—policy; capacity 
development, particularly at the local level; 
and investment—to support enhanced risk 
assessment, risk reduction, and management 
of residual risk. Table 7 outlines sample policy, 
capacity building, and investment actions 
that can be taken to address risk assessment, 
risk reduction, and residual risk management 
needs and thus to achieve risk-sensitive land 
use planning.
The backcasting approach is applied 
below to determine how some of these 
instruments could indeed be applied 
to achieve a vision of resilient land use 
management 20 years hence. This vision is 
built on several key accomplishments:
•	 Policies, laws, and regulations on risk-
sensitive land use planning and manage-
ment are in operation.
•	 Risk-sensitive land use plans are in place.
•	 Institutional arrangements for risk-sensi-
tive land use planning and management 
are coherent and effective across all levels 
and sectors of government.
•	 There is adequate capacity for risk-sen-
sitive land use planning and management.
Table 6 Processes and Tools for Risk-Sensitive Land Use Management
Processes and tools for risk-sensitive land use management
Regulatory, location-based Zoning and microzoning
Subdivision regulation
Buyouts
Eminent domain
Taxation
Special economic zones
Regulatory, design-based Building codes
Retrofit standards
Hazard-reduction standards
Environmental standards
Standalone ordinances
Easement (to trade for other resilience features)
Non-regulatory Public information
Training programs
Information and awareness
Low cost loans and subsidies
Other incentives 
Source: Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative (2010).
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•	 Strong public and private incentives for 
compliance with risk-sensitive land use 
plans have been established.
The story is told in the past tense, look-
ing back in time from that point 2 decades in 
the future. In each case, the entry point for 
applying the instrument, the protagonists in 
its application, and their motives for seizing 
the opportunities for investing in resilience 
are noted. The stories are hypothetical sto-
ries, but in some cases are based in part on 
actual achievements, and all are considered 
well within plausible grasp. 
An Enabling Policy Environment
An expanding population, coupled with 
weak public planning institutions, lack of 
knowledge of hazard risks, and a lack of 
skills, which led to decades of misuse of 
land resources, had to be overcome. The 
international community considered the 
country and several of its major cities to 
Table 7 Policy, Capacity, and Investment Actions for Risk-Sensitive Land Use Planning
Core Needs Policy Capacity Investment
Assessing risk Adopt policy to develop 
hazard, vulnerability, and risk 
assessments for urban areas.
Build capacity in undertaking 
hazard, vulnerability, 
and risk assessment. 
Train engineers in rapid 
assessment of building 
vulnerability.
Develop risk assessment 
information technology 
platforms for data sharing.
Identify highly vulnerable 
buildings and infrastructure.
Reducing risk—
avoid, eliminate, 
and reduce 
Adopt policy to mainstream 
disaster risk management (DRM) 
and climate change adaptation 
in planning processes.
Decentralize the process for risk-
sensitive land use planning and 
strengthen its linkages with local 
investment planning process.
Adopt policy to make 
urban redevelopment 
projects risk-sensitive.
Amend planning laws 
and regulation to make 
them risk-sensitive.
Strengthen land use control 
regulation to restrict and control 
development in hazardous areas.
Strengthen laws and regulations 
related to building control and 
building code compliance.
Train planners in risk-sensitive 
land use planning.
Develop the capacities of local 
governments to improve project 
planning and project execution.
Establish peer-to-peer sharing 
programs in land use planning.
Develop ownership through 
participatory processes, training, 
and capacity building.
Develop capacities of 
local government staff to 
better enforce zoning and 
building regulations.
Undertake extensive educational 
campaigns on risk-sensitive land 
use planning and the importance 
of community participation 
in the planning process.
Develop industry standards, 
guidelines, and case studies for 
risk-sensitive land use planning.
Update planning guides for 
various government agencies 
to make them risk sensitive.
Based on risk-sensitive land use 
plans, develop site-specific and 
scenario-specific participatory 
DRM plans for vulnerable areas.
Establish a system for 
prioritizing substandard 
infrastructure and public 
buildings for public action.
Support priority funding 
for upgrade of vulnerable 
infrastructure and housing.
Invest in retrofit and 
rehabilitation of critical facilities. 
Seek public–private 
partnerships in risk-sensitive 
urban redevelopment 
programs.
Buy-back land and property 
in high-risk areas and 
transform into buffer zones.
Managing 
residual risk—
share and 
transfer
Develop long-term vulnerability 
reduction programs for 
highly vulnerable areas that 
cannot be relocated.
Undertake emergency 
drills and exercises.
Promote options for risk 
protection and insurance.
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be repetitive disaster states, stimulating the 
government and private sector to take action 
to develop more sustainable land use policies. 
The government gained support for the 
development of a network of sustainable 
economic and social infrastructure as part of 
its effort to develop a common natural hazard 
risk reduction agenda among the relevant 
stakeholders. With this support behind it, the 
government then adopted various policies 
to improve its approach to risk-sensitive 
land use planning and land management. 
These included a comprehensive national 
policy integrating risk parameters in land 
use planning and land use management 
processes at the local level. This policy denied 
requisite legal addresses for development in 
designated no-build hazard zone areas where 
development controls and land transforma-
tion initiatives had failed, but recognized 
such stature for areas formally declared to 
meet acceptable levels of risk. In the urban 
sector, a policy linking public sector project 
funding to integration of risk parameters 
and reduction of risk was established, again 
denying support for projects in hazardous 
zones and, to the extent possible, placing all 
future critical infrastructure outside of these 
zones. Local DRM and land use planning laws 
mandating risk-sensitive land use planning 
and management processes, including zoning 
and building code regulations, were also put 
in place. Finally, a comprehensive national 
policy following regional guidelines for good 
governance and anticorruption benchmarks, 
monitoring, and enforcement of applicable 
laws was adopted.
Institutional arrangements were 
strengthened as well. The distribution of 
responsibility and authority in the country 
had been such that the central government 
controlled a much larger share of authority and 
resources than local governments, while the 
latter struggled with increasing responsibility 
and declining resources (Figure 28). Support 
from international development partner 
technical assistance programs was used to 
foster decentralization as a key condition for 
solving inter-institutional structural problems 
and effectively aligning the practices of land 
use planning and management, DRM, and 
CCA. The country strengthened institutional 
arrangements and improved efficiency through 
the following actions:
•	 Adopting a policy of decentralization, 
enabling more efficient inter-
institutional and intersector 
coordination mechanisms and 
integration of DRR and CCA with land 
use planning, using scientific approaches 
and international standards such as the 
ISO 31000 framework (ISO 2009), thus 
minimizing regulation and confusion for 
business development interests.
•	 Making central government funding for 
DRR and CCA competitive among local 
governments, based on substantiated 
Figure 28 Reverse Pyramid of Resources and Responsibility in Governance
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progress in risk reduction, tied to local 
adoption of indicators to monitor and 
measure progress toward enforcement of 
land use and building code regulations.
•	 Making information on risk a public 
resource, open and freely available 
among disciplines, institutions, and 
agencies, to facilitate its integration into 
planning processes and to motivate 
investment in DRR.
Capacity Development
DRM, CCA, and land use planning had been 
poorly coordinated in the past. The central 
government instigated a more coherent and 
effective approach, strengthening the linkages 
between the three areas with support from 
academic and education partners by
•	 developing an improved educational 
curriculum for planners, covering risk 
identification and assessment, including 
climate risks;
•	 developing planning guides containing 
explicit and clear explanations of the con-
cepts and practice of DRR and CCA;
•	 securing the participation of profession-
als, researchers, and practitioners from the 
public and private sectors in studies and 
discussions of policy implementation and 
regulatory regimes and their effects, using 
both research and technical assistance 
projects as the basis for the exchange; and
•	 disseminating sound case studies 
demonstrating the integration of DRM 
and CCA in land use planning and land 
management.
The central government, in conjunction 
with the academic community and local 
governments, also developed step-by-step 
guidelines and manuals for development 
professionals and planners at all levels. These 
guidelines and manuals covered hazard, vul-
nerability, and risk data collection, process-
ing, and analysis; and urban planning and 
design methodologies. They supported the 
transition of risk-sensitive land use planning 
practice from concept to implementation. 
Case studies were documented as well and 
guidance was provided on the preparation of 
risk profiles for major cities and their envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas. Risk-sensitive 
zoning ordinances were prepared to provide 
a legal environment for enforcement.
In addition, work-study programs were 
created in academic institutions and govern-
ment agencies by the central government, with 
support from the private sector, public and 
service infrastructure entities, and the insur-
ance and finance communities to strengthen 
risk assessment capabilities in the field of land 
use planning. Actions initiated through these 
programs included
•	 the promotion of the use of computing, 
remote sensing, and geographic infor-
mation system technology to effectively 
analyze and disseminate risk identifica-
tion and assessment parameters;
•	 the formulation of communities of 
practice around these technologies, 
to support further training, methods 
development, and sharing of outcomes 
so that studies were more broadly 
disseminated, understood, and improved 
upon; and 
•	 the engagement of local research capacity 
in undertaking risk assessments, vulner-
ability analyses, and hazard profiling, 
including multiple approaches where data 
resources skill levels were improving.
Finally, local governments received 
considerable technical support in project 
planning and project execution capabilities 
from the central government and specialized 
NGOs to ensure that DRR goals were not 
diluted or ignored due to lack of experience 
or knowledge. Through monitoring and 
evaluation, the participating professionals 
showed successful implementation of plan 
components, including assigned budget 
expenditures, thus reinforcing international 
community interest in the country’s risk 
reduction initiatives.
Investing in Urban Resilience
The policy and capacity building activities 
required investments to support their 
implementation. Financial resources were 
limited, especially among local governments. 
However, technical assistance grants 
increasingly became available from the 
international community to underwrite 
governments’ risk-sensitive land use planning. 
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Such planning encompassed many sectors and 
affected natural resource exploitation, enabling 
the government to tap funding and investment 
instruments from a wide range of sources.
Independent of the source of funding, 
risk-sensitive land use planning provided 
tangible financial returns to government, 
private investors, communities, and 
individuals. Redevelopment focused on 
risk reduction increased the economic 
and social potential of at-risk settlements 
and transformed informal settlements 
and slums into viable neighborhoods with 
enabled infrastructure that attracted private 
investment (von Einsiedel et al. 2010). 
The government stimulated investment 
in transport, water, sanitation, and DRR. 
The private sector—developers, private 
individuals, and service providers—found 
viable investment opportunities for developing 
housing, utilities, and services. Communities 
participated by engaging in housing  
and livelihood preparedness and risk 
reduction (Box 13).
Government concentration of much of its 
infrastructure investment in less hazard-prone 
areas also helped direct private sector, commu-
nity, and household investments toward these 
areas. In some cases, a property tax surcharge 
was placed on less vulnerable land where public 
infrastructure investments had taken place, and 
a portion of this revenue stream was put back 
into public infrastructure risk reduction mea-
sures in areas where the government wanted 
to direct growth. Other benefits captured from 
investing in less hazard-prone areas came from 
more attractive infrastructure financing and 
lower insurance costs.
The government optimized private invest-
ments through various debt instruments, 
including municipal infrastructure bonds. 
To further encourage private investment, the 
government used instruments such as build–
operate–transfer, build–operate–own, and 
private sector participation projects for road 
transport, water, and sanitation infrastructure. 
The location of businesses and homes in less 
vulnerable areas permitted continued access 
to credit as loan approvals became in part 
dependent on the level of disaster risks faced. 
In addition, areas with less vulnerable public 
infrastructure were monitored and evaluated 
for private sector–induced increases in risk, 
which triggered offsetting surcharges to cover 
financing of increased contingent liabilities, 
thus making visible the benefits of private and 
public investments in resilience.
The government used legal and planning 
instruments to improve private and individual 
investment and to improve access to land and 
property for the lower- and middle-income 
populations. Eminent domain laws, purchase 
development rights, and buyouts enabled 
governments to acquire land for the purpose 
of development and/or conservation of risk-
prone areas. Land use planning instruments 
included land pooling, land consolidation, 
and other land management techniques that 
enabled a more efficient approach to land use 
and an opportunity for investing in resilience.
Box 13 Risk-Sensitive Redevelopment Planning for Barangay Rizal
The Risk-Sensitive Urban Redevelopment Plan of Barangay Rizal in Makati City, Philippines, demonstrates how a long-term 
plan can be developed to guide future development with the ultimate goal of reducing exposure to hazards. Barangay 
Rizal is a low-income neighborhood that sits on an active earthquake fault and is subject to frequent flooding. The goal 
is to transform this high-risk community into a safer, disaster-resilient neighborhood while simultaneously enhancing its 
urban fabric, economic vibrancy, social cohesion, public safety, and environmental quality. The challenge is to work with 
the stakeholders to develop options to reduce these risks and to have these options understood, accepted, and supported 
on the basis of compromise. The redevelopment plan is designed for a 10-year period with short-term, medium-term, and 
long-term actions. The priorities in the action planning were driven by input from the stakeholders and were chosen based 
on their ability to secure community acceptance while also developing the conditions to stimulate public expenditure and 
attract private investment. 
Source: Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative (2010).
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Transport networks, including land, sea, and 
air travel networks, enable the economic 
development of a society. As is true of 
any sector, road transport infrastructure 
is delivered through a combination of 
policies, planning, and implementation 
initiatives. Countries usually develop 
transport policies and related tools that are 
put into practice and financed through a 
variety of instruments and mechanisms, 
such as regulations and guidelines, detailed 
operational plans, projects, special purpose 
vehicles, program support, budget support, 
private sector investment, or foreign direct 
investment. The term project in the context 
of transport is used here to refer to any 
action that aims to improve transport 
services, such as stronger policy formulation, 
increased capacity, the construction and 
rehabilitation of roads, maintenance, and so 
forth. In reality, many projects comprise a 
combination of policy development, capacity 
development, and physical works.
Most countries have crosscutting poli-
cies and regulations in place that must also 
be considered when implementing sector 
policies. These policies and regulations cover 
issues such as DRM, climate change, gender 
equality, poverty eradication, environmental 
safeguards, and anticorruption protection. 
However, these are not always adhered to.
National policies, planning, and 
implementation guide equivalent processes 
sub nationally and locally, where the 
national road network is present and 
connects to other jurisdictions’ networks. 
Acting on strengthened resilience requires 
simultaneous improvements of policy, 
planning, and implementation across all 
levels of a road network.
The Road Transport 
Sector and Vulnerability
Natural hazard events can have far-reaching 
consequences for transport infrastructure, 
especially for road networks. Direct physical 
damage can disrupt the transportation 
of people, goods, and services, with 
consequences for livelihoods, commerce, 
and trade. It can hamper relief efforts and 
the rehabilitation of livelihoods and broader 
economies as well.
Decisions on the location of road 
networks can also influence levels of disaster 
risk more widely. The construction of a road 
can disrupt natural drainage patterns, poten-
tially increasing the risk of flooding in their 
immediate locality, or can increase landslip 
potential, especially in hilly areas with seismic 
or high rain aspects. The siting of roads can 
also influence settlement patterns, potentially 
resulting in population concentrations in 
more hazard-prone areas if hazards are not 
taken into account in the design of transporta-
tion networks.
Much of the damage and destruction of 
roads by natural hazard events is a result of 
insufficient application of financial resources 
to construct to higher standards of resilience, 
lack of regular maintenance, environmental 
degradation, poor coordination among the 
various participating professional disciplines 
and agencies, and, often, simply high exposure 
New high-level bridge in the village of Maepua. Makira, Solomon Islands
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to natural hazard events. The main challenges 
to strengthening resilience across the road 
transport sector briefly are
•	 poor existing baseline capacity and 
resources for designing and maintaining 
existing infrastructure;
•	 high cost and environmental manage-
ment challenges of building roads in 
high-risk areas;
•	 insufficient data, knowledge, and skills 
for consistent application of engineering 
guidelines, and lack of qualitative decision 
support tools for considering risk;
•	 poor intersectoral coordination and 
skills for considering and implementing 
the broad range of measures required to 
strengthen resilience;
•	 insufficient input of risk information into 
upstream transport network planning; and
•	 lack of long-term monitoring and evalua-
tion of the effect of actions to strengthen 
resilience.
Strengthening Road 
Resilience: A Vision  
of the Future
The road transport sector can be made more 
resilient by
•	 improving structural engineering to bet-
ter manage the effects of natural hazard 
events;
•	 improving management and planning 
(i.e., integrated land use management, 
targeted operations, and maintenance 
programs); and
•	 establishing plans and funding 
arrangements to restore functioning 
transport systems as rapidly as possible 
in the aftermath of a disaster (Figure 29).
Table 8 outlines some potential policy, 
capacity building, and investment instru-
ments and mechanisms that support prog-
ress along these avenues. These variously 
contribute to enhanced risk assessment, risk 
reduction, and management of residual risk. 
The backcasting approach is applied 
below to determine how some of these 
instruments could indeed be applied to 
achieve a vision of a resilient road network 
20 years hence. It is written in the past tense, 
looking back from that vision and telling a 
hypothetical story about how it might have 
been achieved. The vision paints a picture of 
strengthened resilience built on several key 
accomplishments:
•	 Disaster risk concerns are taken into 
account in road transport policy and 
investment decisions. 
•	 Road engineering design guidelines 
incorporate natural hazard 
considerations.
•	 Strict quality controls are in place for 
construction and maintenance.
•	 A wide range of nonengineering and high-
tech engineering risk reduction solutions 
has been developed and related training 
has been provided to government officials, 
road construction contractors, and local 
communities.
•	 There is adequate capacity and funding 
for routine maintenance, and at-risk roads 
are prioritized for maintenance work. 
•	 Institutional, capacity, and financial ar-
rangements are in place to support rapid 
restoration of the road network following 
a disaster.
Engineering and Structural 
Measures
Actions for investing in resilience began 
with a review of road transport design 
guidelines. Existing guidelines contained 
provisions for the consideration of flood and 
seismic risk, but the data and knowledge 
of local hydrology and geology in the 
country were insufficient to undertake the 
extended analysis required. The Ministry 
of Transport therefore adopted guidelines 
more appropriate to local needs, while also 
requiring the preparation and incorporation 
of hazard information into transport master 
planning, and the strengthening of capacity 
for expanded data collection and analysis. 
The ministry also required stricter quality 
controls in construction and maintenance 
contracts. This was done by prioritizing road 
projects with DRR actions to be taken with 
international development partners, who built 
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Figure 29 Road Transport Sector Interventions for Increasing Resilience
Management 
and planning
 Early warning and 
maintenance planning
 Master planning, 
alignment, and land-use 
planning
 Environmental 
management
 Natural hazard, 
vulnerability, and risk 
information
 Consistent and reliable 
nancing
ACTIONS
Engineering
 Subsurface conditions
 Materials 
specications
 Cross section and 
standard dimensions
 Drainage and erosion
 Protective engineering 
structures
 Retrotting
Natural hazard, 
vulnerability, and 
risk formation
ACTIONS
Preparing
for disaster
 Critical infrastructure 
continuity
 Emergency preparation 
and response
 Recovery planning and 
capacity building for 
emergency response
 Repair and maintenance 
program and funding
 Disaster risk nancing
ACTIONS
Resilient Road
Transport
Source: Adapted from ADB (2011).
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Table 8 Policy, Capacity, and Investment Actions for a Resilient Road Transport Sector
Core Needs Policy Capacity Investment
Assessing risk Mandate risk assessment in 
developing the transport 
master plan and designing 
individual transport projects.
Seek the contribution of 
academia to the development 
of risk-based decision-
making support tools. 
Run work-study programs 
with national and academic 
institutions for analysis 
of at-risk road assets.
Strengthen interdepartmental 
coordination to identify and 
address underlying factors that 
contribute to vulnerability. 
Make risk modeling and 
decision-making techniques 
available to decision makers. 
Provide training in geographic 
information system mapping 
and scenario building 
and interpretation.
Make data on hazard 
frequency and intensity 
available in designing 
investment projects. 
Make hazard monitoring 
and forecasting data 
available in developing 
maintenance schedules.
Expand hazard and 
vulnerability data collection 
and risk analysis.
Reducing risk—
avoid, eliminate, 
and reduce 
Incorporate hazard and resilience 
considerations in policies and 
plans, including in transport 
master plans, and integrated 
road transport planning.
Provide economic incentives 
for proactive risk reduction. 
Mandate attention to life 
safety in road design.
Integrate risk-sensitive 
land use, development, 
and transport planning.
Provide sufficient project 
funding to meet agreed 
standards of resilience.
Ensure equipment and 
contractors are in place 
for early road damage 
detection and repair. 
Strengthen capacity to 
integrate natural hazard 
information into transport 
planning and design.
Strengthen intraregional 
exchanges between areas 
of similar hazardscapes 
and disaster risk 
management issues.
Implement a hazard-
sensitive transport master 
plan in coordination with 
other line agencies and 
local government.
Incorporate consideration of 
hazards and related measures 
to strengthen resilience in 
transport design guidelines. 
Strengthen existing 
transport network via 
retrofitting and improved 
environmental management.
Ensure that routine 
maintenance of existing 
transport networks is 
adequate and occurs 
on schedule. 
Enforce strict quality 
controls in construction and 
maintenance contracts. 
Managing 
residual risk—
share and 
transfer
Mandate contingency planning 
to identify lifeline transport 
infrastructure and determine 
alternate transport networks. 
Establish contingency 
budget lines for disaster 
repairs and reconstruction. 
Provide an enabling environment 
for the development of disaster 
risk financing instruments. 
Ensure availability of 
appropriate transport 
sector equipment for 
emergency response. 
Run work-study programs 
on the management and 
implementation of risk-sensitive 
road maintenance, repairs, 
and emergency response.
Protect critical transport 
infrastructure necessary for 
emergency response systems. 
Introduce performance- 
based funding for disaster 
repair and reconstruction, 
linked to prior standards 
of resilience and upkeep.
Establish risk transfer and 
contingent credit options to 
support rapid reconstruction 
of transport network in the 
aftermath of a disaster.
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these actions into their country development 
strategies, lending, grant, and technical 
assistance documents. The country also called 
for strengthened regional exchange of data 
and experience among countries dealing with 
similar hazardscapes and risk management 
issues, and for academia to contribute to the 
development of risk-based decision-making 
support tools that could be used to assess risk 
levels and solutions qualitatively, rather than 
relying only on data-driven tools.
A sectorwide capacity review and follow-
up training program was undertaken with 
international technical assistance to address the 
lack of skilled staff with a broad understand-
ing of risk assessment. The training program 
included integrating into transport design the 
natural hazard information from other govern-
ment agencies responsible for hydrology and 
water resource management, geology, environ-
mental management, forestry, wetlands, and 
climate change. It also covered maintenance 
monitoring and emergency reconstruction.
In terms of implementation, the cost 
of high-tech risk reduction solutions was 
balanced with priority use of nonengineering 
solutions. Pilot projects undertaken with 
the support of the international community 
demonstrated a broad range of resilience 
strategies. To overcome some of the challenges 
in implementing higher engineering 
standards in remote and marginal areas, the 
Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry 
of Transport trained local populations in 
resilient construction methods, with the help 
of engineers.
The Ministry of Public Works and the 
Ministry of Transport increased maintenance 
resources and design standards in regions of 
the country with the greatest road infrastruc-
ture vulnerability. Resources were raised by 
reallocating funds from other road projects 
and by taking advantage of increased inter-
national grants and loans for strengthened 
resilience. Performance-based contracts were 
increasingly used as a tool to strengthen the 
sustainability of road network resilience, with 
incentives linked to the achievement of lower 
disaster-related losses.
Local governments were encouraged to 
set up performance-based arrangements with 
maintenance contractors for the upkeep of 
local, district, and, in some cases, provincial 
roads. This work included clearing debris 
from drainage, managing roadside vegetation, 
and making small repairs. Protocols were 
set up with communities to alert officials to 
larger problems that needed to be addressed 
so that damage would be minimized in the 
event of regular natural hazards in particular. 
These actions all contributed to increasing the 
structural integrity of the roads in the case 
of natural hazard events and to increasing 
employment opportunities in rural areas.
Management and Planning
In the past, the approach for construction 
and development of road infrastructure (the 
project) would be handed over to a technical 
assistance team, which would be given 
certain predetermined parameters such as 
location and technology, but with DRM issues 
typically left to the discretion of the project 
team. This was changed by mandating the 
incorporation of resilience considerations into 
the policy and planning stage. Later, when the 
project was handed over for implementation, 
more emphasis was put on adhering to 
stipulated resilience parameters. Financing 
for the development and implementation 
of risk-sensitive road transport planning 
was made possible by the fact that disaster 
risk considerations had been integrated into 
the transport master plan. Although this 
strategy was complex to implement, the 
country asked the international community 
to support the approach through the use 
of resilience planning tools and strategies. 
As a sign of national support, the country 
increased coordination across ministries by 
requiring that the land use management and 
road sector master plans be complementary. 
Opportunities also arose to increase secondary 
benefits of transportation infrastructure by 
maximizing the flood control potential of 
elevated roads and underpasses.
The country’s transport assets had 
been poorly inventoried, due to a lack of 
skilled professionals and technical analysis 
equipment. The Ministry of Transport, 
through a work–study program formed in 
cooperation with academic institutions, 
implemented a program to monitor  
at-risk road assets regularly. From this, an 
inventory was developed that was used 
to prioritize and direct maintenance and 
The country 
also called for 
strengthened 
regional exchange 
of data and 
experience among 
countries dealing 
with similar 
hazardscapes and 
risk management 
issues
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investment resources to strengthen resilience. 
Local capabilities were also strengthened to 
ensure that this inventory would be regularly 
updated and that there was adequate local 
capacity to prepare maintenance programs 
and develop capacity for construction and 
maintenance using newer road technology. 
Mechanisms were also put in place to support 
continuing improvements in knowledge and 
know-how (data generation, information 
sharing and learning across regions, 
monitoring, and evaluation) and informed 
decision making (cost–benefit analysis, 
integrated risk assessment, and integrated 
multisector planning).
Actions also were taken beyond the 
transport sector to increase the resilience 
of the road network. These actions entailed 
greater multisector cooperation and 
planning—integrated land use planning, 
for instance. These actions were most easily 
coordinated at the level of local, district, or 
provincial governments.
The principal action focused on improved 
environmental management, including 
upstream watershed management initiatives 
to reduce debris flows and flash flooding. The 
road transport sector, in turn, contributed to 
improved environmental management—and 
hence its own resilience—by adjusting road 
design and construction and maintenance 
practices to limit the effects on the surround-
ing environment.
Close coordination and negotiations 
with various government agencies at different 
levels were required throughout the road 
development process, to avoid any duplication 
of efforts and to ensure that resilience 
measures would be successful. Increasingly, 
multimodal and multisector programs  
were used as the vehicle for directing 
construction financing.
Managing Residual Risk
Retrofitting existing road infrastructure and 
building more resilient new road infrastructure 
led to a significant reduction in hazard-related 
damage. Plans were needed, however, to 
manage the residual risk, the largest risk 
management challenge facing the road 
transport sector, in view of the large existing 
inventory of vulnerable road infrastructure 
and the extended time—up to 50 years—that it 
would take to replace that infrastructure.
The transport master plan developed by 
the Ministry of Transport not only addressed 
risk reduction but also laid the basis for the 
management of residual risk. Investment 
parameters such as location, preferred 
technologies, designs, and alignments were 
determined based in part on the identifica-
tion of highly vulnerable populations and the 
related need to ensure that these populations 
had secure evacuation routes and access to 
post-disaster relief assistance. In view of its 
fundamental economic and social roles, the 
plan also required the development of public 
DRF instruments to help meet the costs of 
post-disaster repair and reconstruction of the 
road network and thereby to help ensure that 
a fully functioning road network could be 
restored as rapidly as possible.
The Ministry of Public Works and the 
Ministry of Transport also strengthened staff 
capacity to manage residual risk. Professionals 
in the central and local governments 
participated in work–study programs that gave 
them the tools to use emerging risk assessment 
information to design and implement 
strategies to prioritize and act on vulnerable 
infrastructure and to prepare for and respond 
to emergencies. This capacity building initiative 
was undertaken in conjunction with other 
ministries that were undertaking similar efforts 
to strengthen staff capabilities. Support for 
the program came from public sector budgets 
focused on a comprehensive DRM program, in 
partnership with technical inputs from national 
and regional DRM institutes and relevant 
university departments.
Several DRF tools were developed to 
help cover contingent financial liabilities 
for emergency response, rehabilitation, 
and reconstruction in the road sector. The 
Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of 
Transport increased their annual maintenance 
budget to ensure that some funding could 
be readily accessed for minor emergency 
repairs without derailing  routine maintenance 
operations. Any remaining funding at 
the end of the fiscal year was rolled over 
into a trust fund for post-disaster repair 
and reconstruction of the road network. 
Some contingent funding for post-disaster 
reconstruction support was also included 
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Schools, the physical manifestation of the 
education sector, come about and are managed 
through a complicated process. Schools and 
other community facilities present a vast array 
of shapes, sizes, materials, and complexity in 
how they come into existence, are managed, 
and relate to natural hazard risk. These other 
facilities include those for health care, water 
and sanitation infrastructure, as well as facilities 
for religious observance, culture, and the 
arts. In most societies, however, educational 
facilities, from preschools to universities, are 
the major focus of sorrow and lament when 
lives are lost and great damage occurs in the 
wake of a disaster.
Schools and Vulnerability
The vast majority of school facilities in use 
today, whether public or private, came into 
existence during the modern development 
period, which began in the mid-1960s. Many 
of these school facilities—old and new, large 
and small, urban and rural—are vulnerable to 
natural hazards. Even the newest schools and 
schools that have been rebuilt and repaired 
following a disaster are not necessarily safe. 
School plans for emergency response, 
beginning with life safety actions (monitoring, 
alerts, evacuation, and search and rescue), are 
increasingly common. Such plans come about 
because knowledge of the prevalent hazard 
and exposure of the structure is sufficient to 
warrant basic life safety actions. However, the 
precise extent of risk of damage and destruc-
tion is often unknown to the communities 
they serve, the school administration hierar-
chy, and the government in general. Indeed, 
there is precious little available detailed 
information covering school facilities and the 
particulars of hazard, vulnerability, and risk 
characteristics associated with each school. If 
risk information is known, it is often not made 
public until damage or loss occurs or a risk 
reduction initiative is undertaken.
Cursory review of school construction 
history indicates that, on average, no more 
than 2% of the existing building stock is added 
Concepts on natural hazards and disaster risk management introduced as part of 
school curriculum. Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
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as part of a larger multilateral development 
bank road sector project, thus supporting 
rapid access to financing in the aftermath of 
a disaster. In the event of a major disaster, the 
road transport sector would receive a share 
of the payout from a parametric sovereign 
disaster risk insurance policy taken out by the 
government.
To help facilitate a speedy operational 
response, the Ministry of Transport 
also adopted an approach that draws on 
preapproved local private sector contractors 
for emergency response, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction efforts, as previously pilot 
tested in other countries of the region. The 
government negotiated retainers with local 
contractors hired for medium-sized to large-
scale construction contracts, ensuring their 
rapid mobilization for emergency response, 
utilizing their heavy equipment to help  
secure access to affected communities; 
for emergency rehabilitation, such as 
undertaking temporary repair to critical 
damaged roads; and for reconstruction.
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in any given year in any given country. The 
implication is that the vulnerable classrooms 
and other facilities of today comprise upwards 
of 98% of the vulnerable buildings of tomorrow. 
It will take up to 50 years to replace the existing 
stock, not counting the need for additional 
schools to meet population growth. Even 
assuming that all new schools are safe, a period 
of 50 years to build toward a totally safe school 
inventory is unacceptable. This underlines the 
need for a systematic and sobering approach 
to building new schools and highlights the 
importance of retrofitting the existing building 
stock. Under present circumstances, it is also 
unlikely that a 100% safe school inventory 
(assuming life safety but not continuity of 
operation standards) would be created during 
those 50 years.
The vulnerability of school buildings has 
often been the result of errors, omissions, or 
ignorance, and a reflection of past and cur-
rent approaches to school safety on the part 
of the public and private sectors alike. These 
factors contribute to the poor quality, inap-
propriateness, and/or absence of the conditions 
necessary for proper policy, programming, 
budgeting, project preparation, site selection, 
design, contracting, and construction of school 
facilities as well as for the retrofitting, recon-
struction, repair, and maintenance of existing 
schools. Faulty execution of any of these steps 
in the school development process has the 
potential to compromise the resilience of school 
structures. Three, in particular, are associated 
with significant obstacles that make dealing 
with school vulnerability very difficult: an 
absence of knowledge about hazards, vulner-
ability, and risk, to use in shaping investment 
in resilience during project design; the absence 
of due diligence in the design and construc-
tion of school facilities; and a lack of financial 
resources to manage residual risk in existing 
school facilities. 
DRR and emergency management begins 
with the identification of hazards, the evalu-
ation of vulnerability, and the analysis of risk 
(Box 14). Without such assessments, there is 
little likelihood that an investment will be made 
to reduce expected damage or ensure continuity 
of service in either new or existing buildings. 
Risk assessment is particularly important 
during project design, when the site is selected 
and the building is designed. It is during this 
step that decisions on the acceptable level of 
risk, including choices between human safety 
and continuity of service, should be made. Due 
diligence during the construction phase can 
ensure compliance with codes, regulations, per-
mits, and professional and building trade sound 
practices to reduce risk. Adequate maintenance 
and repair and the establishment of adequate 
DRF arrangements support the management of 
residual risk. The precise actions an institution 
takes to address these three needs are in part 
determined by the resources at its disposal. 
Nevertheless, the stark reality is bleak: these 
needs are currently only partially met in  
many countries.
Realizing Safe Schools:  
A Vision of the Future
Safe schools can be achieved by applying 
the three basic groups of intervention 
instruments, focusing on the creation of 
an enabling policy environment, capacity 
development, and investment, to help address 
some of the challenges faced in assessing risk, 
reducing risk, and managing residual risk. 
Table 9 presents some potential instruments, 
according to type of intervention and core 
DRM need. 
Three specific opportunities for 
investment in resilience, combining a 
range of instruments, are explored in more 
Box 14 The ABCs of School Vulnerability Reduction
Three basic steps are required to enhance the resilience of school facilities:
A:  Act on assessments of the risk to life, safety, and physical structures.
B:  Build to lessen risk to acceptable levels, through retrofitting and new construction.
C:  Continue to monitor, evaluate, and manage residual risk through risk finance, repairs, and maintenance.
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detail. They have been developed using the 
backcasting approach, based on a vision of 
safe schools 20 years hence. The hypothetical 
stories are told in the past tense, looking 
back from that point 2 decades in the future 
to explore possible paths to achieving that 
vision. The opportunities focus on the three 
steps in the school facility development 
process as entry points and describe how 
investment in resilience came about, who 
accomplished it, and with what support. The 
achievement of this vision rests on several key 
accomplishments:
•	 Natural hazard maps and risk assessments 
guide decisions on site planning, design, 
and construction of new schools in accor-
dance with local risk.
•	 Strict controls are in place to ensure 
compliance with land use and building 
code regulations. 
•	 Risk assessments have been conducted 
for all existing schools and a retrofitting 
program is under way.
•	 Adequate capacity and funding is avail-
able from government and private sector 
institutions for safe school construction 
and routine maintenance.
•	 A university disaster risk insurance pool 
has been established through a public−
private partnership.
Retrofitting Existing Schools
Retrofitting existing vulnerable schools 
nationally involved all the development 
process steps, in one way or another. 
Education sector development policy and 
Table 9 Policy, Capacity, and Investment Actions for Resilient Schools
Core Needs Interventions
Policy Capacity Investment
Assessing risk Mandate use of hazard 
information as a public good, 
free of charge during site 
selection for new schools.
Require vulnerability 
assessment of both public 
and private schools, especially 
in hazard-prone areas.
Strengthen local community 
hazard awareness and capacity 
to assess risk while selecting sites 
for community-built schools.
Build capacity of engineers 
to undertake vulnerability 
assessment of existing 
school buildings.
Assess the vulnerability of 
individual school buildings, both 
public and private, especially 
in hazard-prone areas.
Make hazard and vulnerability 
data and risk analysis available 
to agencies responsible 
for school construction. 
Reducing risk—
avoid, eliminate 
and decrease
Mandate compliance 
with and enforcement 
of applicable zoning and 
construction regulations. 
Mandate the coordination 
entity responsible for school 
building program and project 
oversight to look into aspects 
related to disaster risk.
Mandate incorporation and 
use of funds for structural 
risk resilience features in 
school construction.
Provide training to masons 
and engineers in retrofitting 
and risk-resilient school 
construction techniques. 
Strengthen decision making 
on retrofit program priorities.
Enhance capacity and capabilities 
to monitor and evaluate 
construction projects and 
enforce compliance with zoning 
and construction regulations.
Incorporate resilience features 
in the construction of all 
new school buildings.
Undertake a school retrofitting 
program in hazard-prone areas. 
Managing 
residual risk—
share and transfer
Mandate institutional 
and financial planning for 
reconstruction of schools to 
higher standards of resilience.
Provide an enabling environment 
for the development of disaster 
risk financing instruments 
for the education sector. 
Conduct regular disaster 
preparedness drills in schools.
Establish a university 
risk reduction fund 
covering retrofitting and 
contingent liabilities.
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mandates, programming, and funding set 
the retrofit project in motion, and following 
the programming and design of the retrofit 
project, the succeeding construction and facility 
operation steps were followed correctly.
Critical to the successful creation and 
implementation of a school retrofit project was 
the risk assessment, which involved analyzing 
the prevalent hazards and the characteristics 
of the school. In fact, the absence, improper 
execution, or disregard of the findings of a risk 
assessment was the origin of the vulnerability 
issues that led to the need for a retrofit. As a 
financial cost, the risk assessment represented 
less than 1% of the total cost of the retrofit 
project when spread out over the thousands of 
candidate schools whose risk was addressed. 
This was a necessary but not sufficient step 
for investing in resilience. Also needed was 
investment in capacity building to facilitate the 
risk assessment.
Almost without exception, the retrofit 
program had to address the lack of informa-
tion about which schools needed attention, 
why, how, and at what cost and priority. 
Determining an answer to those questions 
enabled an understanding of the level of risk 
so that resources could be brought to bear 
on the retrofit program (Vishokarma 2012; 
Vishokarma et al. 2012). Addressing this core 
need included the following:
•	 Natural hazard assessment. Informa-
tion on natural hazard type, zones 
(location), severity, and frequency was 
collected or generated. The Ministry of 
Education designated a particular hazard 
type, school construction type, or geo-
graphic area as the target of the retrofit 
program. The ministries of education, 
environment, and others, as well as 
universities and international develop-
ment partners,  supported professional 
salaries and fees for research, training, 
and analysis of hazard risk.
•	 Complementary school information. At 
the same time, information was collected 
on the location, building type, technical 
regime under which the school buildings 
were constructed, education level, size, and 
number of candidate schools. The Ministry 
of Education mandated annual inventories 
of school building information, and the 
Ministry of Education and universities 
cooperated to encourage students and 
faculty from a variety of disciplines to 
carry out the surveys.
•	 Correlation and analysis. The natural 
hazard and school building information 
were correlated and analyzed to identify 
the technical, administrative, economic, 
social, and political profile of the vulner-
able schools meeting the retrofit criteria. 
The Ministry of Education and affiliated 
public sector school administration enti-
ties and universities participated in the 
preparation of the retrofit program with 
the participation of students and faculty 
of various disciplines.
•	 Decisions. After the group of vulner-
able schools was identified and their 
related student populations and costs 
of retrofitting were determined, schools 
were selected to be included under the 
retrofitting program and the schedule of 
work was determined. The Ministry of 
Education, universities, and local stake-
holders held joint consultations on this 
process. University faculty and students 
were invited to observe and subsequently 
prepared related case study materials for 
use in academic courses.
After the program design step 
was completed, the construction and 
administration steps followed, with a 
residual risk management focus. The result 
was an investment in resilience for selected 
primary and secondary schools and a 
greater awareness of DRM among project 
participants and stakeholders.
Regulatory Compliance and 
Enforcement
The majority of new primary and secondary 
school projects were executed through formal 
government channels, with designated public 
institutions playing various, significant 
roles. The government was involved in the 
development of new school facilities up to 
the point of project design, in line with the 
policies and mandates of the education sector. 
Even in the case of new schools that were 
funded in part or entirely by the community 
or the private sector, government agencies 
were involved in sponsoring, endorsing, and 
supporting the project.
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A problem had arisen, however, in 
compliance with and enforcement of site plan-
ning, zoning, and building codes, ordinances, 
and regulations, and with occupancy permits 
during construction. This is perhaps the 
most significant obstacle to safe primary and 
secondary schools in the region. The building 
design provided by the government was quite 
adequate for a generic site, but the challenge 
came in adapting that design to actual site 
conditions, including natural hazard risks, 
and complying with and enforcing location-
specific site and construction requirements. 
These activities often fell on local authorities, 
specialized public institutions, consultants, 
or a combination of all three; on the owner/
operator; or on no one at all. In some cases, 
these activities were undertaken by individu-
als and institutions with no previous working 
relationship with the entity that provided the 
building design, funding, or site.
To overcome this challenge, various 
actions were instituted to support proper 
compliance and enforcement. These actions 
necessitated investment in policy, capacity, 
and financial support. Actions taken included 
the following:
•	 Compliance and enforcement of all 
applicable regulatory measures covering 
school construction by responsible 
national and local government officials 
were mandated.
•	 A local coordination entity was created 
for the overall construction process, in 
conjunction with those responsible for 
individual components.
•	 Expenditures related to risk 
management were not isolated as 
discretionary spending nor cut  
if construction costs became  
an issue.
•	 Budgeted funds, including funds related 
to building to the acceptable level of risk, 
were disbursed in accordance with the 
construction contract.
•	 Strict construction and maintenance 
quality controls were introduced. 
•	 There was full accountability for proper 
installation of all specified materials and all 
workmanship during these constructions.
•	 Competency was built in monitoring 
and evaluation of the construction, in 
accordance with all regulations.
The opportunities for public sector 
investment came through stipulated 
government functions, typically supported 
by budget allocations. Where possible, public 
sector actions were coordinated with the 
participation of private sector entities as 
builders, owners, and operators of school 
facilities, supported by in-kind or financial 
resources and technical assistance. Depending 
on the private sector relationship to the 
project, the private sector could be legally 
obliged to pay for certain professional services 
related to compliance with and enforcement 
of regulations.
Establishing a University 
Insurance Pool
Many universities fund, build, and operate 
facilities in much the same way as private, 
for-profit corporations. They want a return 
on capital improvements and faculty 
salaries that will cover normal operating 
expenses, loan payments, and continuity 
of operations. However, higher education 
and university facilities in both the public 
and private sectors were always seen as 
extremely complex and costly to design, 
build, and maintain. In general, there 
were few universities that operated under 
comprehensive risk management plans, and 
their approaches to risk were as diverse as the 
institutions themselves. Although hazards 
and some vulnerability and risk may have 
been identified, investments in resilience 
were generally undertaken on a building-by-
building basis, and then only after significant 
loss due to a natural hazard event.
Risk assessments were prepared for the 
four major national universities and over 20 
public institutes offering professional and 
trade-related degrees, with a total student 
population of over 320,000 students. These 
assessments focused on expected human 
capital losses and economic impacts, 
including the loss and disruption of research 
endeavors, to prioritize risk reduction needs. 
They were based on criteria such as potential 
loss of life and building damage, usage and 
downtime, available internal resources for 
reconstruction, the effect on influence in 
education circles, and image. Given that 
laboratory, office, and library facilities 
accounted for 75% of the campus inventory, 
Strict construction 
and maintenance 
quality controls 
were introduced 
for new schools 
in order to 
support proper 
compliance and 
enforcement
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the estimated loss of buildings and contents 
totaled from tens of millions to billions of 
dollars. More than 50% of facilities required 
more than 20 months for repair (Comerio 
2000; University of California, Berkeley 2000). 
These estimates played a role in prioritizing 
risk reduction initiatives, based on Nathe and 
Dimond (2005) highlighting
•	 the effect on the human capital resource 
base and the value of physical losses;
•	 estimated downtime due to damage 
and destruction of buildings and their 
contents;
•	 the need for business interruption plans 
based on worst-case scenarios; and
•	 the need for maintaining a functioning 
primary service network—energy, com-
munications, water and sanitation, and 
road transport.
The design and implementation of a 
facilities risk reduction plan to address exist-
ing vulnerability and risk was built on existing 
policies and implementation mechanisms, but 
invariably the plan had to be modified and 
strengthened. The plan was considered within 
the framework of institutional planning and 
budgeting. In the process, financial stability 
was a fundamental concern for sustainable 
improvement of the physical infrastructure, 
including natural hazard risk reduction. 
Disaster risk financing for infrequent but 
high-impact events was determined to be 
an additional expense that was well beyond 
the reach of individual institutions, whether 
public or private, acting independently.
Risk transfer plans were prepared to 
achieve maximum protection against residual 
risks at the least cost and were based on 
estimates of frequency and severity of loss. 
To handle higher-frequency, lower-intensity 
effects, the institutions chose to plan and 
budget for possible losses through self-
insurance. To handle scenarios with greater 
effects—and until significant risk reduction 
could be carried out—a minimum level of 
coverage for recovery and continuity was 
needed to avoid total or partial collapse of 
institutional functions. A regional university 
insurance pool was created to cover higher-
impact, lower-frequency losses. Participating 
institutions were considered good candidates 
to form such a pool because of their uncor-
related but high exposure to infrequent loss.
Existing regional and subregional politi-
cal, development, and financial organizations 
played a role in creating the insurance pool 
with participating institutions and national 
governments. The pool was built around the 
following:
•	 A long-term commitment to investing in 
resilience.
•	 Legislation mandating the registration of 
a special purpose vehicle and the creation 
and administration of a framework 
agreement with support from existing 
sovereign state organizations. The pool 
was large enough to capture sufficient in-
stitutional participation but small enough 
to reflect shared economic, risk manage-
ment, and educational continuity goals 
and objectives, on a regional, subregional, 
or national basis, as appropriate.
•	 A legally binding commitment to partici-
pate in the framework agreement for a 
minimum of 20 years.
•	 A format that allowed for participation of 
both public and private institutions.
•	 Institutional planning and budgeting 
that supported continuing investment 
in risk assessment and risk reduction to 
agreed-upon levels, as well as managing 
(declining) residual risk within an agreed-
upon time.
•	 Ongoing individual institutional contri-
butions to their respective contingency 
funds to facilitate continuity of function 
and recovery functions, if needed.
•	 A national government role in sustaining 
in-kind contributions (such as hazard 
information or support for technical 
services) and budgeted contributions to 
the contingency fund, together with in-
kind contributions from the institutions 
themselves, in the form of research and 
technical services to the pool, overseen by 
an advisory group, in return for insurance 
premium credit.
•	 Formal corporate risk management 
partnerships with framework universities, 
funding their participation in teaching, 
research and development, and fund 
management.
•	 International development partner 
participation through sustained contribu-
tions for risk analysis and risk reduction 
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Traditional construction technique saved the house from the massive earthquake 
that hit Nias Island. Indonesia
A
FP
Across Asia and the Pacific, making housing 
safer is a major concern. The issue has two 
dimensions: the exposure of existing dwellings 
to natural hazards, and the likelihood that 
future housing units will be located in places 
that put their occupants at risk.
Improving safe housing involves taking 
actions to ensure that dwellings are capable 
of withstanding natural hazards—tropical 
storms, floods, earthquakes, landslides, and 
fire. If houses are not located, designed, and 
constructed to take account of local hazards, 
they are unsafe. Increasing the resilience of 
housing requires attention not only to the con-
struction of new homes but also to retrofitting 
the existing stock of vulnerable dwellings.
Housing and 
Vulnerability
Four principal gaps constrain retrofitting 
dwellings and construction of resilient housing:
•	 Knowledge and skills. The site planning, 
design, and construction know-how 
of owner-builders, contractors, and 
developers may be too limited to 
meet local building codes and zoning 
regulations or to build safe housing. 
Moreover, when dwellings are modified, 
or when households or governments 
become aware of exposure to natural 
hazards, there may not be the know-
how to retrofit houses for hazard 
resilience. Skills upgrading at all levels is 
needed. However, solving the problem 
is complicated by low wages and job 
instability. The difficulties of investing in 
skills training make matters worse.
•	 Awareness. Many homeowners, develop-
ers, and contractors are unaware of the 
vulnerability of certain locations or the 
standards to which housing structures 
should be built. This applies to families 
in middle- to high-income residential 
areas as well those living in low-income, 
informal, and slum areas.
•	 Planning, regulation, and enforcement. 
Inadequate and inappropriate planning, 
zoning, and building regulations for 
housing or to address natural hazard risk 
lead to vulnerability. A lack of proper 
governance, institutional capacity to 
enforce compliance, and risk transfer 
mechanisms also leads to vulnerability.
•	 Secure dwellings. Families seeking 
to acquire safer housing, particularly 
technical support, and grants to support 
the pool’s administration and reserves 
during the first 5 years of existence.
•	 Private sector investment initiatives 
with public sector participation in the 
creation, marketing, and purchase of 
risk-based financial instruments to 
cover contingent liabilities—the cost 
and return to investors reflected the 
institutions’ commitment to investment 
in resilience, verifiable physical risk 
reduction, and sustainable financial  
risk reduction resources for continuity 
of operations.
8.5 Safe houSing
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poorer households, face problems related 
to security of tenure, if investments 
in resilience are hampered by fear of 
eviction; problems of location, where 
existing vulnerability, land use changes, 
and changing natural hazards can 
threaten a site; problems with quality of 
construction, when an owner or renter 
is ignorant of or powerless to ensure 
continuity of operation or even life 
safety; and the inability of the majority to 
afford safer housing. In addition, limited 
access to safe land, poor governance, 
lack of access to finance and insurance, 
substandard building materials, bad 
designs and shoddy construction, and 
poor maintenance all contribute to 
insecure dwellings.
Low incomes can mean that many fami-
lies are left with no alternative but to live in 
hazard-prone areas in substandard housing, 
often without services, and in many cases on 
land that is illegally occupied.
Realizing Safe Housing:  
A Vision of the Future
The gaps constraining investment in safe 
housing reflect the need for improved risk 
assessment, risk reduction, and management 
of residual risk. Four specific areas of 
interventions are necessary to bridge these 
gaps (Table 10):
•	 Capacity to strengthen knowledge and 
skills. Improve house design and con-
struction know-how by training masons 
and home builders.
•	 Policy and capacity to strengthen 
awareness. Provide better education 
and information to enhance community 
awareness about likely disaster scenarios, 
risk reduction options, individual and 
household preparedness measures, and 
response procedures when natural hazard 
events strike.
•	 Policy and capacity to strengthen plan-
ning, regulation, and enforcement. In-
corporate and enforce necessary building 
regulations and construction compliance 
provisions that take into account natural 
hazard and associated risks.
•	 Policy, capacity, and capital outlays to 
incentivize safer housing.  
Adopt measures that encourage house 
owners and occupants to incorporate 
appropriate disaster-resilient features, 
covering technical measures, including 
retrofitting houses, and financial 
arrangements such as insurance coverage.
There are a number of potential entry 
points to introduce these interventions relat-
ing to land, governance, finance and insur-
ance, training, building materials, and design 
and construction (Figure 30). 
The backcasting approach is applied below 
to explore how these interventions could be 
utilized to strengthen resilience. As before, it 
is written in the past tense, looking back from 
a vision of a resilient future 20 years hence to 
explore possible paths to the realization of that 
vision, including the role of various stake-
holders. The vision rests on a number of key 
accomplishments:
•	 Hazard maps and data are widely and 
freely available. 
•	 There are strong public and private risk 
assessment capabilities. 
•	 There is strong community awareness of 
disaster risk. 
•	 Risk-sensitive local planning, zoning, and 
building regulations covering housing 
sites, building materials,  
design, and construction are enforced. 
•	 Local builders, masons, and craftspeople 
are trained in safe building techniques.
•	 Incentives to construct safe new homes 
and invest in retrofitting are available for 
both developers and individual house-
holds.
•	 Cost-effective, innovative safe building 
materials and construction technologies 
are widely used. 
•	 Major new affordable safe housing 
schemes are in place.
•	 Municipalities have regularized tenure 
for illegal and informal settlements.
Knowledge and Skills
Better education, skills training, and knowledge 
to support construction and renovation 
were seen by government, NGOs, the private 
sector, and householders as basic building 
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Table 10 Policy, Capacity, and Investment Actions for Resilient Housing
Core Needs Policy Capacity Investment
Assessing risk Mandate relevant housing 
approval agencies and housing 
finance institutions and banks 
to require property disaster 
risk assessments before issuing 
approvals and housing loans.
Build capacity to use results 
of risk assessments during 
housing approvals and loans. 
Encourage local governments 
to undertake risk assessments 
with the participation 
of the community.
Provide technical assistance 
for risk identification and 
analysis, with support from the 
international community and 
the construction industry.
Reducing risk—
avoid, eliminate, 
and reduce 
Mandate the use of hazard 
information in site selection 
for housing construction.
Enforce risk-sensitive land 
use plans, zoning, and 
building regulations covering 
housing sites, materials, 
design, and construction.
Support municipal 
regularization of land tenure 
within informal settlements.
Enforce local government 
accountability in planning 
and building compliance and 
enforcement in regard to 
disaster-resilient standards. 
Mandate housing finance 
institutions and banks to 
require compliance with 
zoning regulations and resilient 
construction standards before 
approving housing loans.
Involve local governments in 
using hazard, vulnerability, 
and risk information to inform 
awareness, compliance, and 
enforcement of housing design 
and construction processes.
Provide technical assistance 
to local governments to 
strengthen their capacity 
to enforce policies on 
disaster-resilient housing.
Provide training in safe building 
techniques to local builders, 
masons, and craftspeople, 
supported by local public–
private partnerships.
Implement joint programs for 
development, production, and 
application of cost-effective, 
innovative, building materials 
and construction technologies, 
and involve stakeholders 
in the standardization and 
adaption of building materials.
Provide technical guidance 
and community organization 
support for self-build 
housing schemes.
Build industry and local 
government partnerships 
to strengthen capacity for 
monitoring and inspection 
services related to resilient 
housing construction.
Purchase properties at risk and 
implement in-city relocation of 
residents through land swaps.
Provide technical guidance on 
safe housing construction. 
Provide tax exemptions on 
resilient house construction. 
Provide microfinance 
for investments in 
retrofitting housing.
Provide incentives in the form of 
tax relief and insurance premium 
reductions for retrofitting.
Managing 
residual risk—
share and 
transfer
Mandate housing finance 
institutions and banks to 
require disaster insurance 
before approving 
housing loans.
Build local knowledge about 
available housing insurance 
and microinsurance products.
Implement property 
insurance, community-based 
microinsurance and mutual 
aid schemes, supported with 
public and private sector 
microenterprise funding.
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Figure 30 Entry Points for Safe Housing—Where and How to Bridge the Gaps
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blocks for safe housing. These were provided 
through public and private trade schools, 
supported by trade associations and public 
and private housing construction groups that 
incorporated upgrading in each discipline to 
focus on specific hazards, building types, and 
hazard-resistant construction. The planning, 
regulation, compliance, enforcement, design, 
construction, and insurance communities, 
represented by public agencies and private 
enterprises, provided additional knowledge  
on hazard and vulnerability reduction  
to attain safe housing. Partnerships were also 
formed with public and private agencies, 
providing better spatial and time-based data on 
natural hazards.
Training programs involved local  
builders, masons, and craftspeople and  
highlighted the increasing demand for 
knowledge about safe building techniques. 
They were supported and developed by 
local public–private partnerships compris-
ing enterprises in the building materials 
and construction industry, trade and labor 
organizations, and higher education and 
vocational schools (Box 15). Apprenticeship 
training increased the supply of skilled labor 
in certain professions—plumbers, electri-
cians, carpenters, bricklayers, and the like. 
Programs were delivered through national 
research institutes and supplemented by 
trainers from engineering and technical col-
leges that served as resource institutes. These 
focused on prevalent hazard risk manage-
ment, building regulations, codes, and safe 
construction.
The government, with support from the 
construction industry and the international 
community, enhanced the capacity of public 
sector technical agencies to identify and 
analyze disaster risks. The capacity of local 
governments to incorporate hazard and 
risk assessment information, strategies, 
and approaches into housing development, 
planning, and implementation was strength-
ened as well. After much public discussion 
and at the insistence of local governments 
and private sector advisory groups, public 
agencies involved in planning, building 
compliance, and enforcement were charged 
with increased accountability. Local govern-
ment partnered with the building industry to 
strengthen monitoring and inspection ser-
vices as building materials and trade associa-
tions improved their practices and products. 
Under joint programs dealing with housing 
and poverty, the development, production, 
and application of low-cost, innovative build-
ing materials and construction technologies 
was sponsored by the government, with 
118 Investing in Resilience
private education and industry participation. 
This was part of engaging stakeholders in the 
standardization and adaption of building 
materials.
Owner self-building schemes for 
permanent housing gained access to technical 
guidance and community organization support 
through NGOs acting in coordination with 
government and the building industry to 
benefit homeowners, contractors, and skilled 
labor. These participants were sponsored 
by local building materials suppliers and 
distributors. On a larger scale, tax exemptions 
and product endorsement by the public sector 
were considered, to encourage similar business 
groups to get behind national housing schemes.
Awareness
Complementing knowledge and skills 
upgrading, there was a broadening and 
deepening public awareness of hazards, 
vulnerability, risk, and actions to build 
resilience (Box 16). Taking the lead from 
public sector initiatives—made increasingly 
visible through planning, budgeting, approval, 
and implementation processes for the use 
of public revenues—the private sector 
responded by marketing resilient housing 
as a proper investment providing long-term 
financial benefit and continuous security to 
householders. People were made more aware 
of the potential dangers where they live, and 
how they could respond to known potential 
natural hazards.
Community awareness was also strength-
ened through formal and on-the-job training 
and support, and through written or visual 
material tailored to various literacy levels. 
Although local governments initiated these 
programs with international community 
and NGO support, private entities, including 
vocational and education institutions, played a 
major implementing role.
Planning, Regulation, and 
Enforcement
Local governments became visibly more 
committed to safe housing and more willing to 
control development and prohibit occupancy 
of structures in high-risk areas. With private 
sector participation, major new affordable 
safe housing schemes were introduced to 
increase the supply of safe new dwellings and 
reduce the need for illegal land occupation 
and informal settlements. Enforcement of an 
array of technical, regulatory, compliance, 
legislative, and judicial rules was carried out 
objectively. Local governments amended 
housing and land tenure regulations and 
incorporated appropriate provisions for DRM 
in the implementation of laws and regulations. 
Adopted measures focused on updating 
and enforcing zoning and building code 
regulations and incorporating natural hazard 
information into land registration processes. 
They provided for close and continual joint 
effort on DRR initiatives between emergency 
management and local public service 
infrastructure entities. Inventories of formal 
housing were also gradually developed as full 
public disclosure of natural hazard risks in  
all real estate offerings and transactions 
became mandatory.
Local land use plans, zoning, and 
regulations covering housing sites, building 
materials, design, and construction were 
developed and implemented, using processes 
that included financial lending and insurance 
measures. For instance, building resilience 
certificates were required in order to secure 
mortgages and insurance cover. To enhance 
quality control in housing construction, a 
limited number of norms, standards, and rules 
were provided for basic dwelling design and 
construction, along with design advice and 
quality control. Independent inspectors, using 
both public and publicly recognized private 
Public agencies 
involved in 
planning, 
building 
compliance, and 
enforcement 
were charged 
with increased 
accountability
Box 15 Training for Masons under a Public–Private Partnership
Masons were trained in safe construction methods under a public–private partnership arrangement in Uttar Pradesh, India 
(UNISDR 2008). The partnership involved Tata Steel, India’s largest private sector steel company, which, using funds available 
for market development and promotion, had a program for orientation of masons and home builders, showing customers 
the benefits of using the company’s products. In 2008, some 10,000 masons were trained—more than would have been 
possible under the government budget. The model was adopted by the Indian government for replication in other provinces.
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mechanisms, verified compliance, which was 
systematically enforced with budget support.
Developers also were offered incentives 
such as lower fees, tax waivers, and exemp-
tions to adopt higher standards than those 
required by law. These allowed for exemptions 
from other planning and building regulations, 
such as, for example, a relaxation of height 
limits and density requirements.
In the planning arena, governments and 
housing finance institutions took a stake in 
collecting needed risk assessment data. Data 
sharing and joint financing of hazard maps 
were encouraged. This initially was under-
taken through public–private partnerships but 
ultimately was placed in the public domain as 
a public good.
Secure Dwellings
The benefits from investment in knowledge 
and skills, awareness, and regulations 
encouraged the construction of more-secure 
new dwellings and the retrofitting of existing 
ones. Locally mandated land use plans, 
zoning, and regulations covering housing sites, 
building materials, design, and construction 
strengthened resilience against subsequent 
natural hazard events. When these events 
occurred, fewer losses were suffered and less 
expensive insurance coverage ensued. These 
savings were passed on to homeowners.
In the case of illegal and informal 
settlements, the mandated controls 
were applied in conjunction with the 
regularization of tenure by the municipality, 
building on ample evidence from other 
countries that the poor are willing to invest 
in improved housing when they have an 
assurance against eviction, whether through 
formal title or simple occupancy rights. These 
controls were built around risk assessments, 
with the help of the local government 
and through community participation. 
At each step of the formalization process 
of land settlement, natural hazard risk 
information was incorporated into related 
legal documentation, programs, and project 
formulation. International development 
partners provided financial support and 
technical assistance for this process, which 
in turn catalyzed local public agency and 
housing and insurance sector participation. 
Additional technical support and community 
data were provided to the local government 
to develop housing policies that met the 
varying needs of the population to build 
more-resilient structures. These actions 
facilitated access to financing and insurance 
coverage, and prompted further investment 
in retrofitting and modification of previously 
unsafe dwellings. 
Secure housing also resulted from 
government purchase of at-risk properties 
and relocation of residents to safer, in-city 
sites. Qualifying households were offered less 
vulnerable home sites together with a govern-
ment commitment to provide continued 
investment in needed service infrastructure 
in these locations. Where possible, the secure 
housing program was financed partly through 
land swaps as part of large-scale transporta-
tion, commercial, and industrial development. 
It was also financed through long-term 
development loans for new and improved 
service infrastructure.
Measures to improve the resilience of new 
dwellings required relatively little additional 
expenditure. Families used savings to make 
modest investments in resilience over time. 
Quality materials, design, and construction 
practices became increasingly available 
because of demand. Retrofits often were 
financed through microfinance, and small 
Box 16 Awareness and Education Campaigns
Public awareness and education turned available knowledge into local actions that encouraged safer housing in Aceh 
and Nias, Indonesia, after the 2004 tsunami; in the Philippines after typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng in 2009; in Pakistan 
after the 2005 earthquake; and under the development workshop program in Viet Nam since 1999. In these countries, 
nongovernment organizations and the government conducted community-based awareness and education campaigns, 
and plans were prepared that enabled people to build their housing back to higher standards of resilience. Households 
responded after they learned what was required, were convinced that the actions would be effective, and came to believe in 
their own ability to undertake them.
Measures to 
improve the 
resilience of 
new dwellings 
required 
relatively little 
additional 
expenditure
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housing loans were taken out as mortgage-
style debt, secured against either homeown-
ers’ equity or revenues from home-based 
income-generating activities (Box 17). This 
was particularly important for poorer families, 
whose dwellings played a significant role in 
their noncash, imputed, and cash  
income streams.
Premium reductions were offered for  
the insurance of more-resilient structures. 
Formal housing finance institutions and 
banks used natural hazard risk information 
in their appraisal process for evaluating and 
mandating loans. Some insurance companies 
began linking coverage and premiums to 
actual risk levels, thus encouraging investment 
in risk reduction and industry competition. 
In the informal settlements, community-
based microbusiness loans that incorporated 
insurance were supported with public and 
private sector microenterprise grants, after 
tenure regularization. National governments 
provided incentives for reducing risk and 
acquiring adequate hazard insurance through 
tax relief based on insurance cost and interest 
payments on retrofit loans.
Box 17 Partnering with the Private Sector to Improve Housing for the Urban Poor
In 2002, the Asian Development Bank approved a $3.6 million grant under a pilot project called Strategic Private Sector 
Partnerships for Urban Poverty Reduction in Metro Manila. The project involved post–land acquisition development that 
focused on communities and was privately led. Components included establishing revolving funds for housing improvement 
and reducing and managing risk in communities vulnerable to disasters. Funds for housing improvement were provided to 
homeowners’ associations, and these were attractive to informal workers, who rarely before had access to formal bank loans. 
The project created a revolving fund for housing improvement that involved loans for new construction, home improvement, 
and services such as electricity connections.
Traditional circular construction of huts is safer in seismic areas, Gujarat, India’
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Part III considers the potential role that 
disaster risk financing (DRF) can play in 
strengthening resilience in Asia and the 
Pacific. It takes up several aspects of DRF 
raised in Part I and, drawing once again on 
the backcasting approach applied in Part II, 
considers how DRF capacity could be 
developed more fully in the context of new 
investment opportunities
Part III begins by considering how DRF 
supports an integrated approach to disaster 
risk management (DRM) and how a robust 
DRF capacity can strengthen resilience. The 
second chapter focuses on the present state of 
DRF in Asia and the Pacific and the insurance 
industry’s perspective on the market. The 
following chapter shifts attention to the path 
forward, exploring what types of DRF invest-
ment are necessary and feasible. The final 
chapter identifies obstacles and challenges to 
the further development of DRF and identifies 
investments that may assist in overcoming 
those challenges. It closes with a discussion of 
the potential consequences of a more vibrant 
DRF market and why it is important to ensure 
the sustainability of those benefits.
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Supporting Resilience 
through Disaster Risk 
Financing: A Vision of  
the Future 
In 20 years, DRF is an accepted, institutional-
ized, and routinely employed part of DRM 
policy and practice. In the same way that 
governments, businesses, and households 
employ financial instruments and practices 
to manage their affairs, financial tools and 
analysis are a basic element of the DRM 
tool kit. Developing countries in Asia and 
the Pacific have a much higher level of 
understanding of sovereign, commercial, and 
household vulnerability to natural hazards, 
including the fiscal vulnerability of state 
budgets—and that enhanced capacity now 
routinely drives budgetary, fiscal, develop-
ment, and investment decisions. DRF is built 
into DRM, such that a new constituency 
of DRF users, including local governments 
and cities, are continuously innovating and 
fine-tuning the deployment of financial tools 
against disaster risks. We also see the transfer 
of some of these risks to reinsurance markets 
or to capital markets through securitization 
and other means, as well as international 
and domestic and risk-sharing arrangements 
through active partnerships between the 
private sector and public authorities. Finally, 
we see increased resilience to natural hazards 
that, in the event of a disaster, manifests 
itself in faster response times, reduced fiscal 
impacts, moderated macroeconomic effects, 
Financing is a crucial element of disaster risk management. Philippines
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and more prompt recovery of infrastructure 
and livelihoods. 
With this enhanced state of DRF, certain 
preconditions have been met. For example, risk 
assessment capacity has been expanded to the 
point where disaster data have been system-
atically tracked, are accessible, and are more 
reliable. Risk reduction investment has been 
developed, driven in part by financial incen-
tives. The DRF community, including stake-
holders from the public and private sectors, 
has also developed new financial approaches to 
deal with residual disaster risk, including new 
forms of public–private partnerships.
At a minimum, these are the critical ele-
ments that will need to precede the arrival of 
a future DRF environment that delivers on its 
promise. Some of this critical path is laid out 
in further detail below and both obstacles and 
solutions identified. 
Why Disaster Risk 
Financing Is Fundamental 
to Building Resilience
Governments and their development partners 
in the private sector, civil society, and the 
international community have come to 
realize the need to develop more integrated 
and holistic approaches to DRM. In doing 
so, it has become evident that developing 
financial resilience to disasters plays a central 
role in that framework. Stated succinctly, the 
financial consequences of disasters require 
financial solutions, and such solutions are 
within reach of most countries in the region. 
Developed economies have implemented 
these programs through national disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) and insurance and capital 
market solutions as well as through regulatory 
support to enable stable and solvent risk 
transfer markets to serve local governments, 
businesses, and homeowners. However, 
Asia and the Pacific has lagged behind other 
regions of the world in developing similar 
innovative financial solutions and capacities, 
and this has diminished the region’s resilience
It is also quite clear that DRF will not 
live up to its full potential without renewed 
efforts by governments, the international 
community, and the private sector to 
overcome institutional and political obstacles 
to the further development of DRF capacity. 
Part of this renewed effort must come in the 
form of new investment in the field of DRF 
by governments, multilateral development 
banks (MDBs), bilateral donors, and the 
private sector, but the principal impetus and 
energy for the effort must come from govern-
ments themselves This investment can range 
from government contributions of time and 
resources and appropriate legal and regula-
tory frameworks to build financial resilience, 
to MDB and bilateral donor support for 
catalytic investments in DRF strategy devel-
opment and mechanisms, to private sector 
investment in public–private partnerships 
and risk assessment, risk reduction, and risk 
modeling (Box 18). Significant capacity exists 
within the commercial finance and insurance 
market, as well as the alternative risk transfer 
market, to bring expertise, technology, and 
capital to this task. Much has already been 
accomplished in developing partnerships 
and synergy with the private sector, but the 
disappointing results to date suggest that new 
approaches are required.
What Is Meant by Disaster 
Risk Financing?
Terminology used throughout Part III 
generally aligns with accepted practice within 
the DRM profession and the world of finance; 
nevertheless, it may help to explain more fully 
how these terms have been employed within 
the context of this report.
Disaster risk financing is used here to 
describe the application of financial instru-
ments as part of a systematic approach to 
managing disasters in order to anticipate, plan 
for, reduce, transfer, and respond to natural 
hazard events. As such, the term is intended 
to capture various financial mechanisms and 
policy options that enable greater financial 
resilience to natural hazards. Because of the 
interconnected nature of DRF—brought about 
through an integrated DRM framework—
DRF is considered to be a component of a 
resilience paradigm. It includes budget and 
reserve mechanisms, contingent emergency 
liquidity, various insurance solutions, capital 
market instruments, and various forms of 
financing for immediate response, recovery, 
and reconstruction.
The financial 
consequences 
of disasters 
require financial 
solutions, and 
such solutions 
are within reach 
of most countries 
in the region
 The Role of Disaster Risk Financing in Building Resilience  125
Box 18  The Role of Multilateral Development Banks in Building Financial Resilience  
to Disasters
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) will continue to play a significant role in developing a more active and productive 
disaster risk financing (DRF) environment in Asia and the Pacific. Along with bilateral donors and the private sector, MDBs 
form a diverse support team for national and subnational governments wishing to enhance their DRF capacity. Reflecting 
their dual roles as financial institutions and development organizations, MDBs have a unique opportunity to act as catalysts 
to spur governments to take leadership and ownership of DRF issues and programs. 
By acting as catalysts, not long-term market participants, MDBs have an opportunity to shape and accelerate DRF capac-
ity development among governments without becoming permanent fixtures on the DRF landscape. Ultimately, govern-
ments in Asia and the Pacific need to assume ownership of their own financial resilience.
There are many opportunities for MDBs to play this catalyst role:
•  Support and promote the development of DRF products that also act as an inducement or incentive for disaster risk 
reduction. 
•  Intermediate between governments and private insurance markets as part of a broader effort to develop closer partner-
ships between government disaster risk management agencies and global risk transfer markets. 
•  Support the creation of innovative risk transfer vehicles, such as captive insurance vehicles and capital market mecha-
nisms, and serve as catalysts to establish them firmly in the risk management landscape.
•  Lay the groundwork for regional DRF solutions, engaging in consensus building, assessing disaster risk, assessing techni-
cal capacity, supporting risk pools, and assisting governments to access global reinsurance markets.
•  Support knowledge development, acting as a think tank to develop technical data and assess disaster-related public 
contingent liability; to research the fiscal, economic, and social impacts of DRF products and to develop national DRF 
strategies
•  Encourage legal, regulatory, and institutional reforms to allow developing country insurance markets to interface 
competitively with global insurance and reinsurance markets. 
•  Assess the effectiveness of DRF mechanisms, both prospectively through stress testing budgets and retrospectively 
through post-disaster assessments of effectiveness in easing fiscal pressures and supporting timely recovery  
and reconstruction.
•  Support disaster data standardization and data sharing, including by helping to end the patchwork system of data 
collection that often results from MBD’s own development projects.
• Access reinsurance markets directly to leverage MDB’s own DRF capability. 
Risk transfer instruments are considered 
integral to the DRF framework. To build a 
more grounded understanding of DRF, it may 
be helpful to think of risk transfer in terms 
of spreading risk over space and time, rather 
than merely shifting the risk to others. Most 
forms of insurance, at heart, involve renting 
someone else’s capital to support potential 
losses that the insured cannot or chooses not 
to retain because of the size or unpredictabil-
ity of the losses. This is true at the household, 
business, and state levels. In the case of 
disaster risk insurance, in particular, the risk is 
not so much being shifted as it is spread more 
evenly over time. One who is risk averse will 
ordinarily be prepared to pay a sum (pre-
mium) in excess of their annual expected loss 
in exchange for the avoidance of potentially 
ruinous losses in any one period, in effect 
financing the most severe losses over time. In 
return, the insurer will put its capital at risk to 
absorb the uncertainty of large losses.
Ex ante and ex post are terms that 
are used in the field of DRM to create a 
 distinction between actions taken in anticipa-
tion of disaster events (such as risk analysis, 
prevention, awareness, reserving, and insur-
ance), which collectively are components of 
DRR, and those taken in consequence of an 
actual disaster event (such as relief, response, 
and post-disaster construction). Within the 
context of DRF itself, a division exists between 
ex ante finance (e.g., reserving; establishment 
of contingent credit; various kinds of risk 
transfer products, including insurance;  
and capital market solutions) and ex post 
finance, or post-disaster response funding 
(e.g., covering response and reconstruction 
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costs via fiscal measures, new borrowing, 
or foreign assistance). Although the whole 
spectrum of finance is considered to be DRF, 
including financing for ex ante risk  reduction, 
the focus of this report is ex ante finance 
for post-disaster relief, early recovery, and 
reconstruction.
How Enhanced Disaster 
Risk Financing Moves 
Us toward the Vision of 
Greater Resilience
The main principle running through 
the concept of integrated DRM is that 
governments should adopt an approach 
that captures all key elements of DRM 
and brings them together in a cohesive 
and systematic framework. However, in 
order to function, DRM systems require a 
high level of ownership and commitment 
from governments that cannot be readily 
substituted by support from MDBs and 
bilateral donor agencies. DRM systems only 
become truly integrated when governments 
themselves invest in making this happen. 
Progress on further integrating the various 
elements of DRM into a holistic framework 
is perhaps the single largest determinant of 
whether the DRM community attains the 
imagined state of DRF in 20 years (Box 19).
There has been a gradual recognition 
among governments in Asia and the Pacific 
that effective DRM must be more compre-
hensive in scope and more systematized 
if it is to cope with the increased exposure 
brought about by economic growth, urban-
ization, increased interconnectivity and 
climate change. By considering DRM as a 
broad continuum that includes several DRR 
components, beginning at risk assessment 
and prevention, passing through risk transfer, 
and ending at reconstruction, it becomes 
more apparent how to efficiently allocate 
scarce resources, establish synergies between 
and among components, and devise a true 
DRM system that can be relied on by national 
and local governments. The development of 
enhanced financial protection is a continuous 
thread that runs along this risk management 
continuum and that enables other compo-
Box 19 Role of Government in Disaster Risk Financing
Governments in Asia and the Pacific play a key role in stimulating the development and ensuring the successful implemen-
tation of disaster risk financing (DRF) instruments and mechanisms. Their role can include the following:
•	 Take	ownership	of	disaster-related	public	contingent	liability.
•	 Provide	leadership	in	the	development	and	implementation	of	comprehensive	DRF	strategies.	
•	 Provide	an	enabling	legal	and	regulatory	framework	to	support	a	stable	and	solvent	risk	transfer	market.	
•	 Establish	preconditions	for	ensuring	access	to	quality	reinsurance,	such	as	a	system	of	risk-based	premium,	sound	
capital requirements, and rigorous insurance regulation and enforcement.
•	 Undertake	legislative	reforms	and	policy	changes,	where	required,	that	would	allow	local	government	to	exploit	
DRF opportunities.
•	 Provide	institutional	leadership	to	establish	common	methodologies,	definitions,	and	metrics	for	assessing	
exposure and losses.
•	 Provide	public	goods,	such	as	hazard	data	and	risk	models,	to	reduce	start-up	costs	in	DRF	product	development.
•	 Collect	and	maintain	accurate	data	on	disaster	relief,	early	recovery,	and	reconstruction	expenditure;	on	disaster	
risk; and on public responsibilities in the event of a disaster to inform annual reassessment of public contingent 
liability.
•	 Adopt	a	liberal	system	for	cross-border	data	collection	and	sharing.
•	 Engage	with	the	private	sector	and	international	community	to	share	data,	draw	on	technical	expertise,	and	
leverage resources.
•	 Encourage	the	development	of	domestic	credit	and	export	credit	insurance	capacity.
•	 Formulate	public	policies	that	stimulate	demand	for	insurance	products—for	example,	enhancing	financial	literacy	
and risk awareness, and making commercial and property loans conditional on insurance of assets.
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nents, such as funding risk assessment, or that 
serves outright as a financing instrument (e.g., 
risk transfer insurance). 
DRF is not solely the domain of national 
governments. Although national governments 
can and do set policy, allocate funds, and 
manage much of a country’s allocation of 
disaster resources, local governments operate 
with their own microeconomies and budgets 
and should manage their own contingent 
liabilities arising from natural hazards. The 
same characteristics that can make DRF an 
opportunity at the national level—in terms of 
reserving for contingent losses or transferring 
those losses to others—also present an 
opportunity for local governments, which may 
have an equal need for immediate liquidity, a 
need to compete with other local governments 
for scarce funding, and be subject to even 
higher popular expectations for quick action. 
In fact, it can be argued that, in some ways, 
local governments’ financial management 
of disaster losses is even more complex 
than national management, because local 
governments must cope with the uncertainty 
of how—or even whether—national disaster 
support funds will arrive as intended.
Linking certain DRF instruments to the 
implementation of risk reduction activities 
can leverage resilience. As was noted briefly 
in Part I, the availability of ex ante financing 
instruments at the sovereign level can be 
linked to the undertaking of new risk reduc-
tion activities. The effect of this is not only 
to provide the added resilience of financial 
protection but also to foster concurrently the 
added resilience brought on by risk reduction. 
Among MDBs, for instance, this linkage has 
occurred in the context of policy matrixes 
agreed upon as part of specific DRF programs 
(such as the World Bank’s Catastrophe 
Deferred Drawdown Option program) or as 
part of more comprehensive DRM facilities 
(such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank’s [IDB] Integrated Disaster Risk Man-
agement program). In both of these cases,  
the availability of incremental disaster liquid-
ity was seen as an inducement to undertake 
other DRF initiatives as well as new invest-
ments in DRR.
DRF can be a key component of commu-
nity risk management. Spreading risk equi-
tably within a community—whether a local, 
national, or even regional community—is an 
established method through which a society 
can reflect its shared solidarity and common 
values. Public disaster contingency funds 
accomplish this by pooling taxpayer funds, 
and traditional insurance products accomplish 
the same result by including as many at-risk 
people and assets as possible and spreading 
those risks as broadly as possible over space 
and time. The effect of this on national or  
local resilience is to reduce actual individual 
disaster event losses to manageable and pre-
dictable proportions (i.e., the net risk retained 
by the insured), which permits the nation, 
city, and individual to carry on with the least 
economic impact.
DRF can also provide helpful price signals 
to guide other resilience investment decisions. 
Risk transfer transactions, when done at arm’s 
length and with adequate risk rating, put a 
price tag on the risk and provide valuable 
benchmarks to determine when it is economi-
cally justified to invest to reduce or prevent 
loss and when the marginal costs of further 
prevention or reduction exceed the cost of 
risk transfer. Although not a substitute for a 
cost–benefit analysis on risk reduction invest-
ment, risk transfer costs do make it clear that 
risk reduction should not be undertaken at a 
cost that exceeds the cost of risk transfer and 
vice-versa. In this context, price markers serve 
as a linkage across the DRM continuum. At 
each point along the continuum, the marginal 
cost of building financial resilience should 
serve to direct the next level of investment in 
resilience. Risk transfer pricing also creates 
a virtuous cycle because the incentive to 
lower premium costs can encourage and steer 
resilience investment into efforts that yield the 
greatest savings.
Segmenting disaster risk by degrees 
of severity and frequency enables the most 
effective application of financial solutions. 
DRF brings an added element of discipline 
to DRM by calling for a rigorous analysis 
of the underlying hazard, its frequency, and 
its severity and then matching those risk 
characteristics with the most cost-effective 
financial instrument. Figure 31 demonstrates 
how this process is applied. More importantly, 
this process carries with it two important 
principles: that the effectiveness of DRF tools 
improves with the underlying risk assessment 
directing the application of those tools; and 
that by determining the break points for 
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frequency and severity of loss, it is possible to 
deploy finance mechanisms more selectively 
and strategically.
The risk layering described in Figure 31 
is only indicative of the process of layering 
financial solutions in proper order and in 
the right degree. In reality, one would want 
to engage in probabilistic risk analysis and 
establish loss thresholds to know where 
various instruments would be most effective. 
Nonetheless, the diagram helps demonstrate 
that DRF is a multifaceted mechanism 
involving a range of financial instruments, 
and that great care must be taken in decid-
ing when a particular DRF mechanism is an 
appropriate solution.
What the diagram does not demonstrate 
readily is the proper balance between ex ante 
and ex post finance. The answer for any given 
country likely revolves around determining 
the point at which natural hazards can derail 
long-term development. At the upper end of 
the scale, there is a point at which long-term 
sustainable development is knocked off course, 
but there is also a point at which risk transfer 
solutions become impractical because of the 
cost of insuring high aggregate losses. Whether 
this occurs at the 500-year return period or at 
a more frequent interval is less important for 
the purposes of this report than to establish the 
existence of such a methodology to support this 
type of analysis.
Figure 31 Risk Layering and the Application of Financial Instruments
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The disaster risk insurance market in the 
emerging economies of Asia and the Pacific is 
still quite small relative to other regions, and 
even when the region’s developed economies 
are included, its disaster risk insurance market 
is substantially smaller than the markets of 
North America or Europe (Figure 32). In 
terms of the market’s capacity to insure disaster 
risk (i.e., the capacity “limit”), the small size 
of the market (excluding Australia, Japan, 
and New Zealand) creates issues of its own. 
Insurers must cope with inadequate insurance 
infrastructure; a lack of awareness about 
DRM techniques on the part of corporations, 
regulatory authorities, and households; and 
a lack of market breadth, which gives rise to 
concerns of adverse selection. In this sort of 
environment, adverse selection can arise when 
insurers are left with a relatively narrow band 
of higher-risk assets that produces insufficient 
premiums to support higher losses. Although 
a relatively undeveloped market for disaster 
risk insurance offers obvious attractions in 
terms of commercial opportunity, the relatively 
immature nature of the market brings with it a 
series of challenges, such as the lack of quality 
historical loss data or data relating to exposure 
and vulnerability of assets. Some insurers also 
have also been deterred by the concentrations 
of risk being presented (especially within 
urban areas) and the consequential threat 
of unbalanced risk portfolios. The high cost 
of risk modeling also has also been noted as 
a deterrent, in addition to the models being 
proprietary and often beyond the reach of local 
insurers.
The cost of capital is a major driver 
of disaster risk insurance and reinsurance 
Commercial Market Perceptions of 
Disaster Risk Financing in Asia10
Economic growth increases potential commercial opportunities in disaster risk financing. Xi’an City, People’s Republic of China
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capacity and pricing. Because disaster risks—
even those with distant return periods—can 
place a call on an insurer’s or reinsurer’s 
capital at any time, these firms must allocate 
and pay for the requisite capital to backstop 
those risks. To the extent that reinsurance is 
relied upon in lieu of capital, the cost of capital 
to the reinsurer is similarly reflected in the 
underlying risk premium and thus becomes 
a driver of premium costs. For the reasons 
noted, the uncertain landscape for disaster 
risk insurance in Asia has in the past given 
some insurers and reinsurers pause before 
committing such levels of capital.
More recently, however, firms with the 
capacity to invest in the Asia and Pacific 
market have been more prepared to explore 
opportunities and to begin the process of 
expanding disaster risk insurance awareness 
and penetration and building the necessary 
infrastructure to develop this market more 
fully, such as attracting local partners, inject-
ing capital and building distribution systems. 
Paradoxically, the rise in interest on the part 
of insurers and reinsurers follows 2 years of 
exceptionally high disaster losses. In 2011, a 
record 77% of global disaster losses occurred 
in Asia and the Pacific, and the region’s eco-
nomic losses resulting from natural hazards 
amounted to $260 billion, or more than 2% 
of gross domestic product. Total insured 
disaster losses within the region amounted to 
$49 billion, or 19% of total economic losses 
(Swiss Re 2012). The record losses within the 
region—and the record insurance payouts—
have spurred demand for both insurance and 
Figure 32 Disaster Risk Insurance Market by Region 
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reinsurance, with greater attention than ever 
being paid to the strength of the reinsurer 
backstopping the policy, due to heightened 
concerns about counterparty risk. 
Insurers across the region face issues 
stemming from the adoption of more 
sophisticated regulatory requirements on 
solvency, risk management, governance, and 
disclosure. Global efforts are under way to 
increase insurer solvency standards, improve 
governance, and increase disclosure and 
transparency of insurers’ financial condition. 
New reporting requirements, both internal 
and external, will require insurers to address 
data quality and reporting frequency. General 
efforts to reform insurance solvency and 
accounting regimes among emerging econo-
mies in Asia, including pressure to align with 
rigorous risk-adjusted capitalization stan-
dards, will have implications for the insurers’ 
capital management. It is anticipated that 
many insurance firms will have some difficulty 
complying with the enhanced capitalization 
requirements, as was witnessed in 2012, when 
Philippine insurers requested a postponement 
of the new capital requirements being imple-
mented by the Philippine Insurance Com-
mission. Capital scarcity is an issue for many 
companies across the region and, given their 
finite resources, some companies will find it 
difficult to meet the new standards; others will 
find it impossible. With limited options and 
limited ability to raise new capital to reduce 
disaster exposures, firms may need to look 
to reinsurance as a means of meeting the 
new requirements. Yet, with scarcer disaster 
risk insurance capacity and weak risk rating 
regulation and enforcement such reinsurance 
and capital market alternatives may remain 
out of reach for these countries, thereby 
challenging the potential growth of the DRF 
market. Firms interested in developing the 
disaster risk market in Asia acknowledge that 
governments are now more attuned to people’s 
rising expectations about the state’s capacity 
to manage and respond to disaster risk—and 
to the political price to be paid for getting it 
wrong. However, despite the trend toward 
rising utilization of insurance and greater risk 
management capacity, the amount of unin-
sured losses continues to grow (Figure 33) 
and the extent of government liability keeps 
rising. The widening gap between economic 
and insured losses is a reminder of the rising 
disaster trend line in Asia, but the gap should 
also alert us to the magnitude of the DRF 
capacity deficit in the region. 
Some insurance firms believe that if 
emerging economies are to make more prog-
ress on managing residual disaster risk, they 
must adopt more iterative DRM schemes—
that is, risk management systems that can 
reliably and consistently bring the full array of 
DRM solutions to bear. These would be mod-
Figure 33 Economic and Insured Losses from Natural Catastrophes in Asia, 
1990–2011a
270
240
210
180
$ 
bi
lli
on 150
120
90
60
30
0
’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11
Economic loss
Insured loss
a Loss amounts indexed to 2011.
Source: Swiss Re Economic Research and Consulting (2012).
Despite the 
trend toward 
rising utilization 
of insurance 
and greater risk 
management 
capacity, the 
amount of 
uninsured 
losses continues 
to grow and 
the extent of 
government 
liability keeps 
rising
132 Investing in Resilience
ern, integrated risk management systems that 
rely on consistently applied methods, includ-
ing risk identification, assessment, prevention, 
reduction, and residual risk management, 
including risk transfer. The insurance market 
acknowledges that this is a long-term process, 
but the increased disaster risk brought on 
by climate change, economic growth, higher 
interconnectivity, and urbanization can 
rapidly outstrip the progress achieved to date. 
In addition, as was demonstrated in Japan 
and Thailand, the amplification of risk arising 
out of the interconnectivity of hazards should 
focus governments’ attention on the task of 
putting in place integrated risk management 
systems capable of adapting to a globalized 
economy and rising risk. 
Although low insurance penetration 
rates can equate to commercial opportunity 
for international insurers, they can also signal 
fundamental problems with the develop-
ment of efficient and effective risk transfer 
markets. Insurance penetration rates measure 
a country’s total premium as a percentage of 
gross domestic product, and within emerging 
markets in Asia and the Pacific as a whole, this 
amounted to approximately 1.1% for nonlife 
insurance (mostly property and auto cover-
age) in 2010, compared to 3.6% in industrial 
markets and 1.5% in Latin America (Swiss 
Re 2011). Low insurance penetration matters 
because it can be a barometer of a popula-
tion’s low risk perception and its mistrust of 
insurance, the unaffordability of insurance, 
or simply poor regulation, less-sophisticated 
distribution systems, or missing incentive 
structures for individuals to take out insur-
ance. Whatever the reason, rising insurance 
penetration is one of the key indicators point-
ing to an improving risk transfer environment. 
Many countries in the region are in either 
the early growth or sustained growth phase, 
suggesting significant potential for increasing 
insurance penetration as wealth increases.
Public policy and regulation can be potent 
drivers of changes in demand, creating the 
necessary preconditions for insurance (such as 
appropriate insurance laws) and influencing the 
operating environment of the industry. Public 
policies not directly linked with insurance 
can also remove constraints and provide the 
building blocks for increased demand by, for 
example, encouraging investment in insurable 
assets (such as property, through property 
rights), facilitating a stable economic environ-
ment, enhancing financial literacy and risk 
awareness, building human capacity (including 
professional actuarial education), disseminating 
risk information, enhancing capital markets, 
and creating stable and effective legislative 
regimes and consumer protection.
The demand for and availability of 
reinsurance capacity within Asia and the 
Pacific has grown in recent years, and market 
participants expect this trend to continue. For 
developing economies of Asia and the Pacific, 
access to high-quality reinsurance is a gateway 
to price-efficient risk transfer. However, like 
much else in the world of DRF, access to 
reinsurance markets is dependent on other 
reforms and changes within a country’s com-
mercial insurance and regulatory system. For 
example, it has been noted that a significant 
concentration of risk and adverse selection can 
arise in a poorly developed domestic insur-
ance market. Shortage of capital, low premium 
retention levels, and failure to cooperate with 
competitors to establish appropriate market 
practices act as a deterrent to reinsurers with 
high credit standing. Similarly, in a poorly 
regulated nonlife insurance market, the 
inability to set insurance premiums using a 
risk-based approach within a competitive 
business environment, the failure to consider 
periodic revision of tariff rates based on loss 
experience, or the inability to enforce those 
tariff rates also may preclude attracting quality 
reinsurance support. 
The key message is that, although reinsur-
ance can be a resource for effective DRM, 
assured access to quality reinsurance does not 
happen without certain preconditions, includ-
ing the ability to produce a diverse portfolio 
of risk, a system of risk-based premiums, and 
sound capital requirements and enforcement 
(Box 20). Governments should also be aware 
that substituting inferior reinsurance for 
contingent disaster risk is no bargain. The 
contingent liability reverting to government 
from a failed reinsurer—whether domestic or 
international—can have the same fiscal impact 
as the disaster itself.
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Box 20 CLIMBS–Cooperative Life Insurance and Mutual Benefit Services  
Microinsurance, Philippines
In 2011, Cooperative Life Insurance and Mutual Benefit Services (CLIMBS) entered into a public–private partnership with 
Munich Re and with German development cooperation through GIZ to strengthen the loan portfolios and sustainability of 
member microfinance organizations in the Philippines. Acting as an umbrella cooperative of over 1,600 individual member 
cooperatives and microlenders, CLIMBS has established an extreme weather event insurance product that is based upon 
a parametric index for each municipality, categorizing wind speed and rainfall into 10-, 15-, and 20-year recurrence events. 
Using these benchmarks as payout triggers, CLIMBS makes payments to local cooperatives based on an agreed percentage 
of their loan portfolios. The payment is meant to strengthen loan portfolios and keep microlenders actively lending at a 
critical time for local disaster recovery. With stronger loan portfolios, the cost of microcredit should also be reduced. The 
microlenders have also agreed to share the insurance benefits directly with the microfinance members. 
Acting as an aggregator of individual cooperatives, CLIMBS provides a preexisting relationship and distribution network 
that offers an efficient and low-cost method to enroll lenders and develop a large critical mass of downstream beneficiaries. 
Munich Re acts as the reinsurer to the project providing high-quality reinsurance capacity to enhance the long-term sustain-
ability of the program. Severe weather events will be monitored in real time via satellite across the entire country and will be 
made available online to all member cooperatives. 
Although the results of the CLIMBS project have yet to be assessed, it does offer an opportunity for a public–private 
partnership that enhances disaster resilience by bringing advanced DRF tools and technology to bear on behalf of individual 
farmers and landholders. Ordinarily, access to global reinsurance markets and the development of parametric triggers are 
not feasible for microinsurance products given the prohibitive costs. However, because of the resources and capacities of 
each of the partners, the CLIMBS microinsurance product may achieve sustainable results through quality reinsurance, broad 
market reach and penetration, and efficiency through a large umbrella organization providing affordable insurance benefits 
to individual cooperative members via their preexisting credit relationships. Such partnerships and connectivity are one of 
the defining characteristics of a more disaster-resilient future.
Source: Munich Re (2010).
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Many obstacles to developing DRF capacity can 
be mitigated with new investment. To reach 
the 20-year vision of DRF becoming a routine 
and effective tool of DRM, capacity gaps must 
be identified, intervention points defined, 
and solutions devised. Doing this effectively 
will require an honest appraisal of the DRF 
landscape today and an acknowledgment that 
Asia and the Pacific has not lived up to its 
potential, either relative to other parts of the 
world or relative to its need. In fact, the region 
has been more ready to adopt the language of 
investing in proactive DRM—and the DRF 
options that form a part of that approach—than 
it has to take actual action on making the hard 
choices needed to invest in future security 
rather than alternative spending opportunities 
that generate more immediate benefits.
In any representative government, 
the transition from the adoption of an 
idea to its execution is not often a linear 
process. In the case of DRF, this process is 
further complicated by the fact that this is 
a technically complex subject, not readily 
grasped by either elected officials or the 
bureaucracy without significant investment 
of time and effort. In addition, DRF spending 
decisions can involve large sums with distant 
paybacks, in the case of infrequent disaster 
events. These decisions also normally take 
place in an environment of fiscal constraint, 
which can pit current needs against future 
safety. These are practical challenges  
that must be acknowledged and resolved  
by all those with a stake in building  
financial resilience.
Use of technology and knowledge is an important component of disaster risk financing capacity building. Nepal
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Built-in tensions exist within government 
about how disasters are financed—whether 
in advance of the event or after. In effect, all 
disaster losses must be financed in one form or 
another. At the sovereign level, disaster losses 
can be financed out of current revenue, new 
revenue, new borrowing, or financing instru-
ments such as insurance. At the household 
level, losses can be taken up by government 
programs, financed out of savings or future 
income, taken up by community resources, or 
financed with insurance. The natural tension in 
the system arises from inexorable efforts to shift 
burdens in all directions. National governments 
will be inclined to shift costs to local govern-
ments and vice versa. Within the government, 
agencies will attempt to shift costs laterally 
to better-funded units in order to preserve 
programs. Within households, there will be a 
tendency to push costs back to government.
A dilemma for government leaders is that 
investing in proactive DRM normally requires 
both forethought and a willingness to defer 
receiving real, measurable benefits. In this 
context, “doing the right thing” requires deci-
sion makers to articulate to key constituents 
the present value of future benefits, in terms 
that have practical meaning and relevance. For 
example, justifying the expenditure of scarce 
public funds for strengthening of public schools 
provides an immediate, valuable, and readily 
grasped benefit to families. However, other 
types of ex ante disaster expenditures, especially 
ex ante expenditures for disaster response, 
require justifying trade-offs of present needs for 
future security. Such decisions are anathema 
to politicians because they do not fit into the 
time horizon of the normal political cycle. For 
example, frequent natural hazards normally 
fall neatly within political election cycles and 
represent relatively easy trade-offs for those 
making spending decisions and being judged 
by the electorate on the wisdom of those expen-
ditures. It is quite another thing to prepare for 
the potentially cataclysmic effects of a 100-year 
disaster event on a generation not yet voting—
and to be able to defend that decision to the 
voters paying the bill today.
There is a tendency for governments to 
view DRF costs as expenditures rather than 
investments. The problem this presents is that 
expenditures typically require evidence of 
value received within the same budget period. 
If risk transfer instruments can only be justi-
fied by same-period paybacks, then insurance 
can never address more severe, less frequent 
events. Aside from the obvious difficulty of 
judging insurance in this manner, the more 
damaging effect is the risk that insurance 
will be used in the least appropriate and least 
cost-effective manner—that is, for relatively 
frequent, low-level losses. Although such an 
outcome is perhaps improbable because of 
the implied costs, the point is that viewing 
insurance purely as an expense makes it more 
difficult to employ advantageously.
This is quite different from businesses’ or 
individuals’ perception of the value of insur-
ance. Typically, individuals are not anxious to 
see an annual “return” on insurance because 
of the personal harm that implies. Businesses 
and households tend to view insurance as 
protecting them against losses that they would 
have difficulty sustaining, not from losses that 
they can relatively easily absorb. Governments 
need support to adopt a similar perspective 
and to begin to invest in DRR to manage 
high-frequency losses and view risk transfer as 
a long-term investment.
It is probably not constructive to simply 
criticize the tendency for short-term thinking 
in most political systems. The attraction of 
quick demonstration of the effects of public 
investment is not about to diminish, and the 
willingness of elected officials to make deci-
sions on behalf of future generations is not 
likely to improve. Therefore, the inevitability 
of the short-term political calculus needs to 
be accepted and respected. However, that 
does not mean that political systems cannot 
accommodate long-term disaster planning. 
Rather, the alternative is to find mechanisms 
to accelerate DRF investment paybacks and 
bring the benefits of DRF forward into current 
political cycles.
To achieve the 20-year vision of DRF, 
governments must accept the primary 
responsibility to develop ex ante structures 
that deliver rewards today for investments 
that also produce benefits tomorrow and 
beyond. Such structures can involve incen-
tives and linked benefits—not to produce 
long-term dependency or subsidies but to 
energize a risk management framework that 
not only tolerates long-term thinking but 
also rewards it:
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•	 Governments can employ their taxing 
power to provide short-term tax credits 
to individuals and firms for insurance 
costs or to provide tax incentives for 
other DRR initiatives. 
•	 Premium taxes on property insurance 
can be eliminated, where they exist, at the 
commercial and household levels, thereby 
eliminating a disincentive to investment in 
resilience. 
•	 Risk pools formed among local govern-
ments can bring forward benefits by 
demonstrating a tangible benefit to the 
regional economy—even though the 
disaster may have occurred in a single 
locality.
DRF instruments linked to investments 
in risk reduction can also produce short-term 
benefits while supporting long-term financial 
resilience. In this vein, the IDB has supported 
development of captive insurance vehicles in 
Latin America to serve as efficient conduits 
of disaster risk into global reinsurance 
markets. Captive insurers, in this context, are 
independently managed, dedicated self-
insurance entities used to more efficiently 
manage and transfer risk to reinsurance 
markets. These vehicles effectively provide 
long-term benefits to these countries, because 
the most meaningful benefits from the captive 
will not accrue until risk reserves accumulate 
and reinsurance costs moderate. Nonetheless, 
the IDB has been able to advocate these 
captive vehicles in the context of supporting 
more immediate ex ante benefits, such 
as contingent credit facilities provided at 
concessional rates of interest (Box 21). As 
noted, care must be taken to guard against 
designing DRF mechanisms to deliver 
short-term benefits that can be delivered by 
more cost-effective methods. For example, 
parametric insurance triggers can be designed 
to respond to frequent, less severe events. 
Doing so may produce a “payoff” in political 
terms but at an excessively high premium cost.
The effects of short-term government 
planning are especially pernicious in times 
of economic uncertainty. It is ironic that 
investments in ex ante DRF mechanisms 
should become more difficult during times of 
economic stress, when the capacity to bounce 
Box 21 Inter-American Development Bank’s Contingent Credit Facility
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) launched the Contingent Credit Facility for Natural Disaster Emergencies (CCF) 
in 2009. The facility was designed under the premise that to be effective, contingent credit lines must be disbursed promptly 
following a disaster and the lending terms must be affordable. The CCF was envisioned as a bridge finance vehicle capable of 
providing urgently needed funds until other financing sources could be accessed. Originally established as a pilot effort with 
an overall loan capacity of $600 million, the facility was expanded in 2012 to a limit of $300 million per country or 2% of gross 
domestic product, whichever is lower with no overall aggregate limit.
The CCF operates with a parametric trigger allowing disbursements for severe, sudden, and unexpected disaster events 
with a recurrence rate of not more than once every 5–10 years, and affecting a significant number of the population (usually at 
least 2%). This “population-based” trigger is a distinguishing feature of the CCF compared to other facilities that use empirical 
measures of hazard severity (such as wind speed) as proxies for disaster losses. As a condition of establishing a CCF program, a 
member country must first put in place an integrated disaster risk management plan that includes measures on risk analysis, 
risk reduction, emergency preparedness, and disaster response, in addition to a sustainable financing plan for the residual risk, 
including risk transfer solutions. An additional feature of the CCF allows the member country the option to access the facility 
through new borrowing or, because of IDB lending constraints, through the “redirection” of available undisbursed balances 
 from a specific list of IDB loans already approved. The choice of new borrowing or the redirection of approved loans provides 
a more efficient use of the IDB’s contingent lending capacity and provides the borrower with options on how to access the 
emergency liquidity.
The CCF represents a useful example of how disaster risk financing instruments can be used as the basis for encouraging 
more integrated disaster risk management practices and systems. Emergency liquidity and the bridging capacity it provides 
often fulfill a basic need of emerging economies to respond adequately and quickly to natural disasters. As such, it offers an 
opportunity to link other aspects of risk reduction and disaster risk financing to the contingent credit as a means to develop 
more systematized disaster risk management. It further represents a flexible source of DRF that conserves both borrowing 
and lending capacity and makes maximum effect of multilateral development bank resources.
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back from disaster effects is at its lowest level. 
In effect, this is precisely the moment when 
disasters can exact their highest toll—when 
the economic resilience of an economy is at 
low ebb and the economic damage inflicted by 
disaster can be the most lasting.
The knowledge component of DRF 
capacity building should not be underesti-
mated. Although much work has been done 
in this area, with key decision makers far 
better equipped with training and technical 
data than ever before, much more work must 
be done to expand the DRF knowledge base 
within government. The international com-
munity, for example, can be instrumental in 
providing public agencies and legislatures with 
access to technical data; support to interpret 
technical data; and fiscal, economic, social, 
and political arguments about how such new 
DRF investments can be shaped to satisfy 
constituent demands. These organizations can 
also engage a broader range of opinion leaders 
on the tools and resources potentially avail-
able to enhance resilience. In this respect, the 
international community could do a better job 
of addressing the people directly, enhancing 
their understanding of what they can reason-
ably expect from government and what they 
can do personally to make their households 
and businesses more secure.
MDBs, in particular, could develop the 
capacity to assess both the hypothetical and 
the real-time effectiveness of DRF mecha-
nisms. For example, fiscal stress test tools can 
be developed to hypothetically measure the 
effect of various DRF instruments on different 
disaster scenarios. Such tools already exist 
(such as catastrophe simulation from the 
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis), but more investment is needed 
to refine them, support their integration 
into government planning, and make such 
resources applicable and available to local 
governments. Investment in the capacity to 
promptly assess the post-disaster effectiveness 
of DRF instruments also should be consid-
ered. Prompt feedback can provide politically 
useful information as well as guidance for 
program corrections. Such impact analysis is 
occasionally produced for ex post response 
spending, providing documentary evidence 
as positive feedback to decision makers. The 
capacity to provide similar feedback on DRF 
spending can be developed.
Many governments in Asia and the 
Pacific cannot reliably gauge their ability to 
fund hypothetical disaster losses—that is, to 
compare public contingent liabilities with 
readily available financing. As a starting point, 
the availability of accurate historical data on 
disaster expenditures is itself often weak and 
would need to be improved before reliable 
gap analysis is achievable. Such analysis can 
be mainstreamed into budgetary analysis 
and thereby routinized and institutionalized. 
Doing so would hopefully lead to a narrowing 
of the gap and to a situation where ex post and 
ex ante finance options are brought into more 
efficient balance. It is also highly likely that 
such analysis would reveal aspects of con-
tingent liability that had gone unrecognized. 
MDBs, acting as “DRM think tanks,” can 
contribute significantly to this effort.
If businesses and households are to invest 
in their own disaster finance resilience, there 
must first be in place an accessible, afford-
able, and credible insurance infrastructure 
(Box 22). In other words, the insurance com-
munity must have a viable distribution chan-
nel, it must have the stature and reputation to 
market disaster insurance to an often-skeptical 
public, and it must have the capacity to 
prudently underwrite the risk while bringing 
insurance within the reach of a majority of 
households. At present, too many countries in 
Asia and the Pacific lack one or more of these 
elements for DRF to take root.
In addition, full access to high-quality 
external reinsurance will remain problematic 
for some countries as long as their insurance 
markets remain relatively protected through, 
for example, regulations that discourage 
ceding premiums to nonnational reinsurers 
or that limit foreign investment in domestic 
insurers. This will continue to be a handicap 
to building resilience among the population as 
a whole.
Accessibility to quality reinsurance is a 
bellwether of the soundness and sustainability 
of the underlying insurance market. The value 
of a well-regulated and open reinsurance 
market was demonstrated following the 2010 
Chilean earthquake. It was one of the largest 
earthquakes to occur in the past 60 years, with 
insured losses of $8.5 billion (approximately 
28% of total economic losses); however, the 
internalized loss to the domestic insurance 
market (its net retained loss) was only 5% 
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(Aon Benfield 2011). Because of strict regula-
tory requirements that Chilean insurers cede 
minimum amounts of earthquake exposure to 
well-rated reinsurers, the net cost of insured 
losses to the economy was small. Equally 
important, however, was the fact that the 
reinsured portion of the earthquake portfolio 
was sufficiently large that it greatly influenced 
the pricing of earthquake risk by the primary 
insurers, thereby strengthening the claims-
paying ability of the primary insurers. Chile’s 
experience offers a lesson on the positive effect 
that healthy reinsurance markets can have 
by upholding underwriting standards and 
externalizing large-disaster probable maxi-
mum losses.
Within Asia, it appears that, despite 
advances and significant investment in 
this area, the quantification of loss largely 
remains a weak link in the DRM chain and 
the  accessibility of data remains relatively 
limited. However, data collection and 
exposure mapping work undertaken by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, and the 
World Bank—the Pacific Catastrophe Risk 
Assessment and Financing Initiative—has 
demonstrated one approach to accomplishing 
this. There are numerous weaknesses in the 
system, but overall, one must ask whether 
the lack of quality data or a reliable system 
to produce and maintain it is an outright 
barrier to implementing DRF programs or 
just a complicating variable driving costs up 
and sustainability down. Clearly, anything 
that tends to raise costs will tend to make the 
creation of DRF instruments more difficult 
and will render their sustainability more 
problematic. Of equal concern is the design  
of finance solutions with inferior risk 
assessment data, which handicap their 
effectiveness from inception.
Box 22 New Zealand Earthquake Commission
The New Zealand Earthquake Commission (EQC) and its antecedent, the Earthquake and War Damage Commission, was con-
ceived in 1944 as a hybrid social policy and insurance framework that balances the obligations of government to absorb the 
costs of disaster reconstruction with the ability to transfer disaster risk to private insurance markets. Since 1993 in its current 
form, the EQC acts as an agent of the government, but administers the country’s Natural Disaster Fund at arm’s length from 
the government. Its principal mandate is to engage in disaster risk management by overseeing the insurance of residential 
property and facilitating research and education in fostering enhanced disaster resilience. 
All residential property owners purchasing fire coverage also purchase EQC coverage on a compulsory basis. Residences 
and contents are covered up to a maximum of NZ$120,000 ($100,800) on a first loss basis although additional coverage may 
be purchased from the private market. With this framework, the EQC insures about 90% of New Zealand’s housing stock 
against earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, landslides, and other natural hazards. To protect the solvency of the Natu-
ral Disaster Fund, the EQC has purchased a NZ$2.5 billion reinsurance program, with the government stepping in—excess of 
the reinsurance protection—to guarantee the fund’s obligations in the event its resources are exhausted. Underlying policies 
are not individually rated so every homeowner pays the same premium rate regardless of location or type of construction. 
The EQC offers valuable lessons on how governments can blend a public commitment to support disaster reconstruc-
tion with the ability of global reinsurance markets to provide added capacity and thereby leverage limited public resources. 
The EQC model also demonstrates the ability to employ a preexisting distribution network (fire insurance policyholders) to 
distribute and enforce the mandatory coverage. The value of the EQC framework has been demonstrated through the years, 
but was especially put to the test during the 2010/11 Christchurch quakes.  
By December 2012, the EQC had received more than 460,000 claims and paid out more than  
NZ$4 billion ($3.3 billion). The EQC’s total Canterbury liability is NZ$12 billion ($10 billion). Taking into account reinsurance 
and investment returns, an estimated NZ$600 million–NZ$1 billion  
($500 million–$840 million) contribution from the government will be needed to cover the shortfall in ECQ assets.
Source: Cowan and Simpson (2012).
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Capacity to collect, analyze and model disaster risk data is crucial for disaster risk financing product development. Philippines
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Although the DRF record in Asia and the 
Pacific remains somewhat meager, it is vital 
to recognize those efforts that have shown 
promise and to sustain them with new 
resources and energy. For example, legislative 
reform efforts to reorganize and redirect 
disaster funding toward local government 
initiatives and to open up avenues of risk 
transfer need to be encouraged, as has been 
already noted in the case of the Philippines. 
Lessons from the Philippines and from 
Indonesia, where significant efforts have 
been made to streamline and devolve DRM 
toward local government, must be supported, 
studied, and replicated where appropriate. 
For example, policy changes to permit local 
governments to exercise greater management 
and oversight of national disaster fund 
allocations, together with the latitude to invest 
in DRR and DRF, may be a necessary step 
before local governments can better exploit 
DRF opportunities. Such efforts to develop 
comprehensive national and subnational DRF 
strategies need to be led by the governments 
themselves, with assistance from MDBs and 
with support from the private sector. 
However, governments in Asia and the 
Pacific still have a persistent bias in favor of 
ex post disaster response financing. Despite 
the advances over the past 10–15 years, 
Governments 
in Asia and the 
Pacific still have 
a persistent bias 
in favor of ex 
post disaster 
response finance
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and despite the apparent consensus that has 
been built around the Hyogo Framework for 
Action, there remains a tendency to rely exces-
sively on disaster response and ex post DRF. 
The principle that, first and foremost, it is the 
risk and not the disaster that needs managing 
remains paramount. Perhaps the biggest cost 
to a country of an excessive dependence on 
ex post finance, however, is the opportunity 
cost of lost resilience. Response and rebuilding 
fulfills a major government responsibility, but 
other than instances where reconstruction 
actively incorporates resilience features (“build 
back safer”), earlier opportunities to reduce 
disaster effects tend to be lost.
Emerging economies often have viewed 
DRF as having zero-sum effects. Some 
economically and geographically larger 
developing countries can argue against the 
need to develop enhanced DRF capability, 
due to their greater ability to absorb shocks 
by diversifying risks over population and 
time. However, some states, less able to cope 
with disaster shocks, also resist adopting ex 
ante DRM policies and altering the status 
quo for fear of jeopardizing a known benefit 
(post-disaster aid) for an unknown one. This 
mind-set can prevail even when the shortcom-
ings of post-disaster response finance are well 
known. Nonetheless, governments often have 
looked at ex ante DRF as having a neutral 
net effect on overall disaster funding. Such a 
zero-sum analysis assumes that international 
development partner support for risk transfer 
or disaster liquidity mechanisms is designed 
to offset international support after disasters 
have occurred. When viewed this way, ex ante 
finance can appear to be a risky trade-off for 
governments because some ex ante instru-
ments, such as insurance, are untested in 
many emerging economies. Ex post finance, 
by comparison, can look more secure. Such 
thinking has colored government DRM poli-
cies and priorities and can be counteracted by 
sharing practical experience, case studies, and 
modeling of comparative DRF mechanisms 
(e.g., the comparative direct and indirect 
costs of contingent credit versus new ex post 
borrowing).
Aspects of Asia’s Risk 
Assessment Capacity 
Limit the Growth of 
Disaster Risk Financing
Given that many Asian countries have only 
recently begun to actively manage disaster 
risk as a government priority, it should not 
be surprising that the collection and analysis 
of disaster loss data also needs significant 
upgrading. It also follows that, in many 
respects, this new investment must precede 
other investments in risk management, risk 
reduction, and risk finance. What is clear is 
that the absence of the capacity to collect, 
analyze, and model this data inhibits further 
DRF product development or at the very least 
drives up the cost of risk transfer.
The absence of sound risk assessment 
can also encourage governments to opt out 
of ex ante risk management responsibilities. 
In other words, it may become too easy for 
a government to claim that they know too 
little about the risk landscape to undertake 
active risk management activities. Likewise, 
poor risk assessment can drive up the cost of 
risk transfer because, in the absence of tested 
data, insurers will need to make more cautious 
assumptions about average annual losses and 
maximum probable losses. In turn, the higher-
risk premium can deter governments from 
engaging in risk transfer to begin with—or can 
render a demonstration project unattractive 
and unsustainable—thereby undermining 
further investment in DRF.
As seen in Figure 34, the science of 
disaster risk modeling is still striving for 
greater precision and certainty. As has been 
noted, the 2010–2011 period provided further 
reminders (if any were needed) of the need 
for the continuous revision and challenging of 
risk modeling assumptions. Updated scientific 
data and new lessons learned require reliable 
funding to be consistently and continuously 
incorporated into existing models. Thus, it is 
imperative that catalytic investment in risk 
assessment occurs—and that it occurs early  
in the development of a DRF strategy. Asia’s 
risk assessment capacity deficit has many 
causes that can potentially be addressed with 
new investment.
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Lack of Data Collection  
Resources
The collection and assessment of natural 
hazard data—including the historical record 
of losses and financial effects—are currently 
underfunded, poorly coordinated, restricted 
from public access, and conducted very 
unevenly across Asia and the Pacific. Too 
often, these risk assessment efforts occur on 
a piecemeal basis without being anchored in 
a comprehensive DRM system. As a result, 
the development of integrated and holistic 
national DRM strategies suffers for lack of 
timely, relevant information produced on a 
consistent, reliable basis. Data collection and 
risk assessment require significant resources, 
provided continuously over a long time, for 
the practice to become institutionalized. Risk 
assessment also requires investment in trained 
personnel capable of employing the most 
up-to-date assessment tools and techniques at 
the national level.
Lack of Data Standardization
The absence of common standards for data 
collection and analysis of losses impedes the 
transfer of knowledge, makes cross-border 
cooperation more difficult and costly, and 
can raise the cost of risk transfer instruments. 
Improved standardization would be a major 
advance in efficiency and capacity building. 
At a basic level, different valuation measures 
of assets and property can lead to wide 
discrepancies in estimates of disaster impacts 
and thereby can affect the apportionment of 
response funding. Variances in accounting for 
victims (whether accounts include the missing, 
injured, or homeless, for example) and even 
of the dates on which disasters occur are not 
uncommon and can affect insurance rates. 
Insurers and reinsurers, too, can use different 
metrics for assessing disaster events, leading 
to substantial variations in loss estimates. Such 
industry losses often estimate only insured 
losses, potentially underreporting losses in 
areas with low insurance penetration rates. 
Databases such as the Centre for Research on 
Figure 34 Catastrophe Modeling—An Imprecise Science
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the Epidemiology of Disasters International 
Disaster Database (EM-DAT) can report 
uninsured losses, but not always with a 
consistent methodology. Governments, with 
the support of the international community 
and in partnership with the private sector, must 
undertake significant investment to establish 
common methodology, definitions, and metrics 
for assessing exposures and losses. This will 
require significant institutional leadership and 
consensus building, but in the absence of a 
common understanding of how we measure 
disaster impacts, the solutions will continue to 
be a mosaic of ad hoc efforts.
Lack of Funding for Data 
Maintenance
The shelf life of disaster data is limited by the 
occurrence of new events, new exposures, 
climate change variables, and altered 
vulnerability factors. Although quality 
historical data always remain valuable, the 
functionality of hazard and exposure mapping, 
for example, requires periodic updating and 
maintenance, including continuous real-time 
collection and analysis. The relevance of this 
data to new probabilistic modeling is also 
limited by the extent and quality of ongoing 
maintenance. To accomplish this, these 
efforts must be supplied with continuous 
new investment—eventually in the form of 
recurring appropriations from governments, 
but initially in the form of catalyst funding 
from MDBs and bilateral donors. In the 
long term, risk assessment capacity requires 
a form of endowment funding that ensures 
that the existing database investment is not 
jeopardized by volatility in funding support.
Lack of Cross-Border Data 
Collection and Sharing
At a sovereign level, disaster data often tend 
to be defined, collected, and interpreted 
in a manner unique to the country and 
the national institutions administering the 
process. Not only does this contribute to 
diverse standards and data heterogeneity, 
but it also inhibits the cross-border sharing 
of data and the regional cooperation that 
might otherwise be undertaken. Because 
natural hazards fail to respect national 
boundaries, the management of those 
hazards will inevitably benefit from regional 
or subregional cooperation. Until there 
is a more liberal system for sharing data, 
however, that cooperation will be limited. 
Some governments remain sensitive to 
releasing certain categories of data, for 
national security reasons. Others have tended 
to take a proprietary view of their national 
DRM programs and resources, which tends 
to render the sharing of outputs relevant to 
neighboring countries more difficult.
Lack of Risk Assessment Capacity 
at the Local/Urban Levels
Increasingly, risk assessment tools are being 
developed and applied at the subnational 
and local/urban levels. The development of 
geographic information systems mapping 
technology has permitted granular exposure 
analysis of small, defined geographic areas, 
and downscaling has, in some cases, permitted 
the use of probabilistic models in localized 
areas. In many emerging economies of 
Asia and the Pacific, however, local and 
city governments have minimal access to 
these tools. If DRF is going to be made 
accessible and more widely adopted by local 
government, the means to track, measure, 
and project disaster losses must be improved. 
The dramatic urbanization trend within 
Asia should be sufficient reason in itself to 
direct new investment toward subnational 
risk assessment. The growing economic 
importance of cities and the vulnerability 
of populations and infrastructure to natural 
hazards warrant special attention to  
this need. Climate change further raises the  
stakes for cities because they must contend  
with unique climate impacts arising from 
weather extremes.
Nonetheless, models of integrated 
DRM systems that capture local and 
urban risk assessment needs do exist. 
For example, Mexico’s Fund for Natural 
Disasters (FONDEN) program operates a 
risk assessment platform (R–FONDEN) 
that provides both static and probabilistic 
assessments of various hazards affecting 
states and localities. Using a database of 
infrastructure and public assets, the program 
can make projections about fiscal effects on 
local government and support the design of 
DRF mechanisms.
The private 
sector, must 
undertake 
significant 
investment 
to establish 
common 
methodology, 
definitions, 
and metrics 
for assessing 
exposures and 
losses
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Cities of varying size in Asia and the 
Pacific require access to similar tools, whether 
these are provided via a national system, as 
in Mexico, or are developed locally. Local 
governments have a contingent liability 
burden not unlike that of national govern-
ments, but with the added complication that 
funding support from national government 
sources can be unpredictable in degree and 
timing. Also, people may have higher expecta-
tions that local governments will respond to 
immediate disaster needs, thereby placing 
greater demands on government prepared-
ness. Armed with tools that help quantify the 
financial effect of disasters, governments can 
begin building greater financial resilience into 
their current systems.
Duplication and Inefficiency of 
Ad Hoc Data Collection
Much like small-scale DRM projects, which 
often fail to link up with a national DRF 
framework to demonstrate their sustainability, 
risk assessment efforts are also often project-
driven, one-off efforts, the benefits of which 
are reserved for the entity that undertook 
the data collection, thus becoming stranded 
at the project level. As a result, Asia and the 
Pacific is left with an overlapping, patchwork 
system of data collection efforts that are 
undertaken with a particular outcome in 
mind and lack the means to convey the 
benefits to a wider audience of practitioners. 
Because so many of these efforts are ad 
hoc in nature, they also have no means to 
update and perpetuate themselves. This, 
in turn, leads to duplicate efforts and lost 
opportunities to leverage existing work 
against new risk assessment demands. In the 
commercial market, investments are being 
made in the creation of risk models built as 
standing resources and then marketed and 
adapted as needed. Outside the commercial 
modeling world, however, the current risk 
assessment work undertaken appears to lack 
the connectivity necessary to create a common 
store of knowledge to aggregate and provide a 
foundation for future work.
Lack of Open-Source Data
The fragmentation of data collection goes 
beyond just the lack of common definitions 
and standards. Differences in methodology 
among countries, states, research universities, 
reinsurers, and government agencies 
themselves contributes to the balkanization 
of disaster data management and makes 
access and use of that data ever more 
limited. This leads the region farther from 
an open-source data repository capable 
of providing transparent, high-quality 
information to all users. The effect of such 
a resource would likely be to draw a wider 
range of interested constituencies into the 
work of DRM by lowering entry costs and 
other barriers. Pioneering efforts, such as the 
multi-risk CAPRA GIS–based platform led 
by the IDB, the World Bank, the Center for 
Coordination of Natural Disaster Prevention 
in Central America, and the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
in Central America or the OpenGEM web-
based platform for analyzing seismic risk and 
consequences, have presented open-source 
models to replicate as appropriate and to study 
for the benefits of broad accessibility.
Other Areas Where Further 
Disaster Risk Financing 
Investment Is Needed
Aside from the major areas already discussed, 
new investment is required to build financial 
resilience through innovative application of 
existing DRF instruments, developed and 
supported by new vehicles. As noted, although 
progress has been made, the modest results 
of DRF to date suggest that the international 
community must do more than just double 
down on existing strategies. Alternative 
approaches for developing DRF programs, 
especially those that have the capacity to bring 
the benefits from investment in resilience 
forward into current budgetary and political 
cycles and those capable of reaching the poor, 
are needed to supplement the work done  
to date.
Regional organizations can serve a vital 
function in terms of exercising the leader-
ship necessary to convene, coordinate, and 
facilitate the development of DRF solutions. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has provided these services in the 
context of DRF over the past several years. 
The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Manage-
ment and Emergency Response contains 
a 2010–2015 work program that includes 
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several aspects of DRF. More recently, ASEAN 
has worked to develop a Disaster Risk Financ-
ing and Insurance Program under the auspices 
of the Taskforce on the Future Priorities of 
ASEAN+3 Financial Cooperation. The work 
of ASEAN in this regard is just beginning, 
but it has gathered the support of ADB, the 
Government of Japan, and the World Bank. 
In addition to these organizations, significant 
investment from all ASEAN member states 
will be necessary to develop national and 
regional initiatives that fill capacity gaps and 
build experience within the region.
Laying the groundwork for regional DRF 
solutions such as risk pools can be extremely 
difficult and time-consuming. Consensus 
building requires institutional leadership and 
credibility, and technical capacity is necessary 
to project national budgetary and economic 
effects and to design finance mechanisms 
that deliver results as advertised. Perhaps the 
most difficult consensus to achieve, however, 
is the notion of investing in a long-term 
shared solution to a mutual problem. Risk 
pools can derive benefits from the diversity of 
uncorrelated risks that smaller, more exposed 
countries cannot produce individually. The 
diversity of risk facilitates market access, 
reduces national capital contributions, and 
lowers shared operating costs overall; yet, that 
same diversity produces concerns about self-
interest, sovereignty, and popular acceptance. 
These are real obstacles that must be acknowl-
edged and addressed. For example, where 
risk pools are thought to be viable, MDBs can 
support feasibility studies and start-up costs 
and can even consider short-term premium 
financing, in return for concrete actions taken 
to reduce risk (Box 23). MDBs can also be 
instrumental in forming offshore captive 
entities—as the IDB has done—to assist 
with the formation, capitalization, and initial 
operation of the entity. Although MDBs are 
not in a position to provide reinsurance capac-
ity directly, they can nonetheless help build 
channels through which national and local 
governments can begin to access additional 
capital through various risk transfer mecha-
nisms, including reinsurance and guarantees. 
At all levels of local government, includ-
ing cities, building financial resilience requires 
significant new investment. There is a vast 
need for awareness and capacity develop-
ment in this area. Many DRF tools typically 
Box 23 Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) is a regional disaster risk pool spanning 16 Caribbean Community 
island nations. Begun in 2007, the pool is organized as a mutual insurance company controlled by its participating govern-
ments. The principal objective of the pool is to provide short-term liquidity to governments to better respond to emergency 
needs arising from severe hurricanes and earthquakes. At the request of participating governments, efforts to expand 
insurance coverage to include flood losses are in progress. Policies are issued individually to governments based on their 
individual requirements and risk profiles and then reinsured in global markets. The insurance coverage is based on a para-
metric trigger (i.e., claims are paid based on the severity and location of the event, not the ascertained loss) and therefore 
funds can be rapidly disbursed and flexibly targeted by the government as the situation requires.
Since 2007, CCRIF has paid more than $30 million in claims to participating governments. However, in addition to claims 
paid, significant benefits have also accrued to the participating governments in the context of a more efficient distribution of 
insurance costs, including reduced premium and reinsurance costs achieved by aggregating non-correlated risks. The value 
of risk pooling has also been demonstrated by the more efficient use of capital, as well as accelerating the formation of risk 
reserves, which over time should reduce the cost of reinsurance. 
The success of CCRIF has depended in part on the availability of high-quality risk assessment data necessary to support the 
creation of risk models and the creation of parametric triggers to activate the flow of funds after the occurrence of a qualify-
ing disaster. Early funding support from multilateral development banks allowed this work to move forward and provided 
an important catalyst for consensus building and market acceptance. This demonstrates how investment in risk assessment 
capacity forms an essential building block for the development of disaster risk financing options and, by reducing uncertainty, 
can pay dividends in the form of lower costs of risk transfer. CCRIF has also demonstrated the critical importance of regional 
consensus building and continued open communications when contemplating regional disaster risk financing solutions.
Source: World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2012b).
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Many disaster 
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tools typically 
associated with 
sovereign disaster 
risk management 
are adaptable for 
use by cities and 
local government 
authorities
associated with sovereign DRM are adapt-
able for use by cities and local government 
authorities. These include risk pooling, reserve 
development, credit and insurance liquidity 
facilities, insurance captives, and microinsur-
ance programs for lower income groups. As 
noted, many local governments understand 
perfectly well that a contingent disaster 
liability attaches to them, regardless of the 
extent of national disaster funding. However, 
their ability to quantify and plan for that 
liability has been quite difficult in the absence 
of new technical skills and resources. Local 
governments will normally rely substantially 
on national funding and external support 
from the international community—thereby 
leaving their populations at the mercy of 
national programs and the hope that they will 
perform as intended, or on the generosity 
of others. In either case, local government 
will have partially ceded responsibility for 
managing disaster consequences for which 
they know they will be held accountable. Local 
governments, therefore, have a significant self-
interest in attracting new investment to build 
their capacity in this regard.
Capital markets represent a liquid source 
of DRF that has been much discussed but 
infrequently used within developing country 
markets. Developed primarily as an alternative 
source of risk capital for the insurance industry, 
capital market products such as catastrophe 
bonds have been an integral part of Mexico’s 
FONDEN program since 2006, but they remain 
largely undeveloped for government applica-
tions within Asia and the Pacific (Box 24). 
Obstacles to more widespread use of catastro-
phe bonds include high transaction costs, long 
structuring periods, the need for specific risk 
models, and risk premiums that are nearly the 
cost of traditional disaster risk reinsurance. 
Some of these hurdles can be managed through 
the development of platform mechanisms such 
as the World Bank’s MultiCat program, which 
provides a shared utility for the development 
of catastrophe bonds worldwide and thereby 
reduces costs. Catastrophe bonds can provide 
substantial amounts of protection for events 
that typically have a low probability of occur-
rence (at high layers of loss) but nonetheless 
require significant capital commitments. In 
addition, because they are fully collateralized, 
they are substantially free of counterparty risk, 
unlike traditional insurance products.
MDBs, in partnership with the private 
sector, could make more creative use of the 
Box 24 Mexico’s Fund for Natural Disasters
Mexico’s Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN), originally established in the late 1990s as a budgetary mechanism to provide 
prompt support to federal and state governments affected by natural disasters, has evolved into a multifaceted and sys-
tematic national disaster management framework that could potentially serve as a model for governments in Asia and the 
Pacific. FONDEN’s principal support for disaster impacts is directed at reconstruction of public infrastructure at the federal, 
state, and municipal levels. However, in the past decade, FONDEN has expanded its focus on ex ante disaster risk financing 
and risk reduction efforts. 
In order to leverage its budgetary authority and deal with the potential uncertainty of the call on its resources, FONDEN, 
beginning in 2006, entered into various market-based transfer instruments such as reinsurance and catastrophe bonds with 
the support of private sector firms such as Swiss Re. In that year, it succeeded in arranging $450 million in earthquake protec-
tion through a combination of parametric reinsurance and a catastrophe bond—the first ever government catastrophe 
bond—issued in global capital markets. Following the expiry of this bond, a second catastrophe bond was issued in 2009, 
providing both earthquake and hurricane coverage. In 2011, the program was expanded to include an indemnity insurance 
cover for government assets and low-income housing with a $400 million excess-of-loss reinsurance treaty.
FONDEN demonstrates the feasibility and potential scope of a government-led, market-based disaster risk manage-
ment framework. In particular, the program demonstrates how insurance and capital market products can be structured to 
maximum effect when combined with sound budgetary and reserving practices. The FONDEN experience also demonstrates 
the value of including local district and municipal governments in the development of disaster risk financing programs and 
how the creation of a truly systematic risk management framework and market-based instruments can be put to work at the 
subnational level.
Source: World Bank (2012a).
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risk appetite of capital markets. For example, 
one method of achieving more widespread use 
of catastrophe bonds could be the deployment 
of bond collateral into DRR uses during the 
life of the bond. In the event there is no call 
on the collateral (i.e., no qualifying disaster 
event), an MDB standby loan could be applied 
to the risk reduction investment to free up the 
funds for disbursement to investors at matu-
rity. Alternatively, in the event of a qualifying 
disaster, a portion of the bond proceeds could 
be dedicated to paying off existing loans for 
risk reduction activities and a portion could 
go to disaster response or reconstruction. In 
either case, the benefits of the bond would be 
brought forward to provide real present value 
and to create a virtuous cycle: Risk transfer 
costs would actually be helping to fund risk 
reduction, which in turn should yield lower 
risk transfer costs.
The development of domestic credit 
and export credit insurance capacity (from 
both national and international insurance 
companies) can also be encouraged. A 
well-developed domestic credit and export 
credit insurance market, providing insurance 
to companies and exporters under an all-risk 
policy covering nonpayment, including if the 
obligor cannot pay due to a disaster, is one 
factor in providing an important source of 
liquidity and commercial continuity in the 
face of disasters. Bankers use insurance as 
both an indemnity and a credit enhancement; 
therefore, governments can recognize the 
value of private credit insurance or export 
credit insurance when it is provided by a 
highly rated domestic or international insurer, 
and can allow appropriate capital relief. 
There is a natural affinity between the 
capacity of the private sector to support DRF 
acceptance and use in Asia and the Pacific and 
the core mission of the international commu-
nity. Risk management has been refined and 
practiced within the commercial world over 
a long period, and many of its principles and 
practices have been imported into government 
programs within the developed world. How-
ever, there is a capacity gap among emerging 
economies within Asia that can leave these 
private sector resources just beyond reach. For 
example, the use of sophisticated risk model-
ing developed in the private sector is of limited 
use to governments that have not managed to 
collect basic historical disaster data. The most 
sophisticated DRF instruments are of little 
use to departments of finance that lack the 
training to know when and how they should 
be considered.
MDBs themselves can begin to access 
reinsurance market capacity. To the extent 
that capital constraints limit the ability of 
MDBs to support new investment in DRF 
through new lending and guarantees, the 
use of risk transfer arrangements written 
directly to MDBs (e.g., guarantees, insurance, 
or unfunded risk participation) could be 
used to leverage capital, relieve equity–loan 
ratio constraints, and provide extra lending 
headroom for constrained country loan and 
guarantee ceilings. Depending on the leverage 
allowed (largely dictated by the counterparty 
rating), MDBs could become more active in 
using their lending and guarantee authority 
to support DRF. For example, MDBs could 
more creatively explore the use of risk transfer 
arrangements to enable greater support for 
credit-based liquidity facilities. Depending 
on whether the underlying transaction was 
written on a sovereign or nonsovereign basis, 
risk transfer arrangements could backstop 
political risks, credit risks, or both.
The international community itself could 
make use of reinsurance and capital market 
capacity as well, thereby leveraging its scarce 
resources. For example, rather than engag-
ing in reactive, ad hoc post-disaster funding 
or loan reallocations, MDBs and bilateral 
donors could allocate a portion of their annual 
budgets, in line with their historic levels of 
post-disaster support, and then leverage those 
funds by entering into reinsurance arrange-
ments with the private sector. The reinsurance 
support could be structured on a parametric 
basis to provide the relevant MDB or bilateral 
donor with ready liquidity and maximum 
flexibility to direct funds as needed, includ-
ing to support new investment in DRR. Such 
an arrangement could provide significantly 
higher levels of emergency response and 
reconstruction aid for particularly severe 
disaster events without otherwise constricting 
normal operations or country lending limits. 
Nonetheless, for all the apparent opportu-
nity, close cooperation between the public and 
commercial sectors has been more aspirational 
than real. For its part, the private sector must 
continue to recognize the skills and relation-
ships that the international community can 
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bring to bridge these gaps—to act as catalysts 
to integrate risk management practices in 
ways that meet private sector objectives 
and development goals alike. Similarly, the 
international community must embrace the 
true spirit of public–private partnerships and 
accept that the private market has resources 
and expertise that are essential to building 
this capacity—and that it makes little sense 
for international development partners to 
replicate these resources themselves. Building 
this partnership will require new investment on 
both sides. In the private sector, this will require 
the capacity to engage in training and product 
development with the specific needs and risk 
profiles of countries in mind. It will require the 
leading firms in risk modeling to develop new 
cooperative business models that allow for data 
sharing while protecting revenue streams and 
proprietary intellectual property. For MDBs 
and bilateral donors, the new investment will 
need to start with management’s awareness of 
their own capacity constraints and their need 
to invest in the skills within their own organiza-
tions to operate seamlessly on both sides of the 
public–private divide.
Concluding Thoughts  
on Investing in Disaster 
Risk Financing
Looking forward 20 years hence, if the 
milestones just discussed are reached and 
expanded levels of DRF investment in Asia 
and the Pacific are attained, the question 
remains: What will be the consequences of a 
more vibrant DRF environment in the region? 
What can the region expect to experience if 
such new investment comes to pass, and what 
is the best way to measure the effectiveness 
of these DRF instruments? However, one 
must also ask what the future holds if Asia 
and the Pacific reverts to the status quo. What 
repercussions will arise if DRF initiatives 
lapse and the financial resilience of Asia and 
the Pacific actually weakens in the face of 
increasing exposure, urbanization, and  
climate change?
Certainly, in one sense the answer must 
begin and end within the context of economic 
development. The effects of natural hazards 
on economic growth vary from country to 
country, but the compounded annual cost 
of disasters in terms of poverty rates and 
economic opportunity costs are substantial. 
Disasters negate a substantial share of the 
development benefits delivered within the 
region, and the success or failure of building 
financial resilience must ultimately be traced 
back to measures of poverty, growth, and the 
environment. Over time, disaster resilience 
must translate into development resilience—
that is, the release of development potential, 
unfettered by the weight of natural hazards.
If Asia and the Pacific does take a step 
backward, the results could likely be measured 
in widening gaps. The gap between DRF 
investment in Asia and the Pacific and that of 
other developing regions would continue to 
grow. The gap between insured and incurred 
losses would likely continue to widen. The 
DRM capacity gap between the least-devel-
oped countries in Asia and the Pacific and the 
middle- and upper-income countries would 
likely grow. The gap separating most of Asia 
and the Pacific from global insurance markets 
would likely remain wide, and the gap keeping 
individuals and households from having 
access to even the simplest forms of disaster 
protection will remain a challenge.
If DRF takes root in the region, the broad-
est measure of success will be governments 
taking ownership of DRM as a core function 
of government rather than just an obligation to 
react compassionately to disaster consequences, 
and moving beyond a willingness to engage 
in DRF only when the cost is borne by  others. 
This ownership will be reflected in many 
ways, including earnest engagement with the 
international community and the private sector 
to exploit opportunities and leverage resources. 
It will be reflected in a willingness to make 
tough choices about trade-offs between current 
expenditures and future security.
In the future, a government’s willingness 
to take on proactive risk management will 
likely be aided by the delivery of benefits 
in real time. If the goal of the international 
community is to reach a point where 
emerging economies begin to institutionalize 
risk management practices and culture, that 
likely will be achieved in part by figuring out 
how to bring forward benefits and establish 
program linkages that provide real incentives 
to governments to make these shifts. 
Transitioning to a fundamentally different 
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approach to DRM is unlikely to happen 
without such assistance.
Finally, if the role of MDBs, in particular, 
and the public sector is truly catalytic with 
regard to building financial resilience, then 
they will need to respect advances made by 
the emerging economies and shape their 
residual role accordingly. Even if success is 
many years away, developing a more robust 
disaster financing environment should 
translate into a lower profile for MDBs, 
rather than a new dependence on public 
sector support. The public sector can play an 
enabling role in this context, and thus should 
know when and how to reinvent its role  
over time. 
Part IV
Achieving Resilience
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Urgent action is required to tackle the trend 
of rising disaster losses in Asia and the Pacific. 
Vulnerability is growing in many countries. 
The volume of physical capital stock in the 
region, and, with it, exposure to natural 
hazards, is increasing. The frequency and 
intensity of meteorological, hydrological, 
and climatological events are also rising as 
a consequence of climate change. However, 
there is nothing inevitable about the 
consequent rise in losses and, with it, the 
forfeit of hard-won development gains.
Existing technical know-how is sufficient 
not just to stem but also to reverse this trend. 
We know how to assess risk, how to reduce 
risk, and how to manage the residual risk. 
Moreover, governments and their interna-
tional development partners have stated 
repeatedly their intentions to improve disaster 
risk management (DRM) and reduce losses in 
a multitude of national, regional, and interna-
tional public forums.
Yet, despite this technical know-how and 
good intentions to the contrary, hazard-related 
physical losses in the region have continued 
to rise. Moreover, there has been no overall 
pattern of declining human mortality, par-
ticularly from geophysical hazards. Physical 
losses will escalate even further over the next 
few decades if the huge sums required to 
sustain recent high rates of growth are invested 
without careful regard to disaster risk. Efforts to 
secure substantial new investment are a central 
objective of economic policy across Asia and 
the Pacific, but this will not have its desired 
impact if disaster risk is ignored in expanding 
the region’s infrastructure.
This report has invited readers to 
reflect on this breach between rhetoric and 
action, focusing on a simple yet central and 
There is nothing 
inevitable about 
the consequent 
rise in losses and, 
with it, the forfeit 
of hard-won 
development gains
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 increasingly urgent question: How do we 
ensure that the actions that we know are 
required to strengthen resilience are actually 
taken? It has set out a wide portfolio of policy, 
capacity, and investment instruments and 
mechanisms that can be drawn on to achieve 
change, ultimately contributing to poverty 
reduction and inclusive, sustainable socioeco-
nomic development. 
The report applied a backcasting 
approach, setting visions of a resilient future 
and working back from those visions to iden-
tify potential pathways to their achievement. 
This approach, combined with related analyses 
of existing gaps and obstacles, has revealed 
a wide variety of potentially useful tools and 
mechanisms to strengthen resilience. It has 
emphasized the role of backward and forward 
linkages between different endeavors and the 
importance of coordinated action, with prog-
ress in any particular area likely to feed from 
and contribute to others. Furthermore, it has 
stressed the fact there are no fixed rules on the 
sequencing of different actions, nor particular 
instruments and mechanisms that necessarily 
are better than others. 
Envisioning a Resilient 
Future 
If applied in combination with careful 
planning, coordinated action, and widespread 
impetus for change, there are sufficient 
instruments and mechanisms to achieve a 
future in which the following are true:
•	 Resilience is significantly strengthened, 
as demonstrated by a long-term decline 
in human and physical losses as a conse-
quence of natural hazard events.
•	 Policy makers, legislators, national, 
regional, and local government officials, 
private businesses, communities, indi-
vidual households, and the international 
community each recognize and accept 
their respective roles and responsibili-
ties in strengthening resilience and the 
long-term nature of their commitment. 
Furthermore, they acknowledge that 
related resource needs, in the form of 
money, capabilities, and human resourc-
es, stretch well beyond the capacity and 
obligations of the public sector.
•	 The case and opportunity for investing 
in resilience is considered with each 
development action. Every public 
and private partner in development 
recognizes that its actions potentially 
carry disaster risk but can also 
potentially strengthen resilience and, 
with the support and encouragement 
of appropriate regulatory, institutional, 
and policy frameworks and incentives, 
embraces its responsibility to strengthen 
resilience for both individual and 
common good.
•	 Disaster Risk Financing is an accepted, 
institutionalized, and routinely 
employed part of DRM policy and 
practice. 
Achieving the Vision: 
Critical Next Steps
To achieve this broad vision and the specific 
thematic and sectoral visions presented in 
Part II, a wide range of steps can be taken 
to stimulate, secure, and sustain the desired 
investments in resilience. This will lead to a 
series of different paths leading to the same 
outcome and many actions along the way. 
However, there are eight critical steps that can 
help jump-start the process by overcoming 
a number of the more common gaps and 
challenges faced in many countries across Asia 
and the Pacific. These should be regarded as 
priority tasks that need immediate action.
Policy Change
•	 Governments can review and, where 
appropriate, revise DRM legislative and 
regulatory frameworks to clarify and 
explicitly articulate the precise roles and 
responsibilities of individual households, 
communities, the private sector, 
governments, and the international 
community in strengthening resilience. 
Government and international 
community forms and levels of relief, 
early recovery, and reconstruction 
assistance may need to be adjusted 
to ensure that designated roles and 
responsibilities and incentives are not 
undermined by actual public behavior in 
the event of a disaster.
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Risk Assessment
•	 Governments can ensure that some form 
of disaster risk assessment is undertaken 
for all new investments in their coun-
tries, whether financed directly by a gov-
ernment, the international community, 
or privately. Appropriate risk manage-
ment features can then be reflected in 
the resulting project design and in the 
location of structures, protecting new 
investments against natural hazards and 
ensuring that the investments do not 
create new forms of risk. The interna-
tional community can support govern-
ments in this process.
Financing
•	 National and subnational governments 
can develop and implement comprehen-
sive disaster risk financing (DRF) strate-
gies to reduce risk and to provide ad-
equate and timely post-disaster support 
to strengthen financial resilience. The 
insurance industry and the international 
community can play a vital role in this 
process, including through the provision 
of risk modeling expertise. The insur-
ance industry can also offer risk-sharing 
capabilities while the international 
community can provide start-up capital 
reserves, guarantees, contingent credit, 
and technical advice on risk layering and 
regulatory framework requirements. 
•	 Governments, working in cooperation 
with the international community, can 
encourage the growth and development 
of the insurance and reinsurance sectors 
in their countries to provide a range of 
DRF instruments.
•	 Governments, working in cooperation 
with the international community, can 
establish public programs of financial 
support for community and local invest-
ment in risk assessment, risk reduction, 
and residual risk management. A signifi-
cant portion of the required investments 
in resilience are needed at this level, but 
existing funding for local and commu-
nity initiatives is typically particularly 
limited. Programs of financial support 
can be designed to leverage additional 
financing from local government, local 
business, and community funds—
through cost-share arrangements, for 
instance—and to reward progress in 
strengthening resilience with additional 
resources. Technical and financial sup-
port from the international community 
may be required to support this process.
Private Sector Engagement
•	 Governments, working in cooperation 
with the international community, can 
develop programs of work to strengthen 
private sector understanding and ap-
preciation of the commercial oppor-
tunities in strengthening resilience, to 
facilitate regional sharing of ideas, and 
to incentivize related undertakings—for 
instance, by supporting first-entrant 
product development and market re-
search costs. 
Knowledge Management
•	 Governments and regional associations, 
working in cooperation with the inter-
national community and private sector 
partners, can establish an open-source, 
regional online information platform to 
facilitate the development, exchange, and 
dissemination of hazard and disaster risk 
data, including climate change modeling. 
Community consultation to prioritize actions for disaster risk management. Bangladesh
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Training on risk assessment methodolo-
gies can also be provided. Related tools 
can be developed and placed on the same 
platform, offering support for nonexperts 
in interpreting and applying the data to 
public and private development planning 
and investment decisions. 
•	 Governments and regional associations, 
working in cooperation with the 
international community, can establish 
a regional knowledge development and 
capacity-building program to strengthen 
understanding in government and the 
wider society of the potential returns 
on investment in risk assessment, risk 
reduction, and residual risk management. 
The program can collate existing cost–
benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses 
into a central online repository, including 
analyses undertaken by the private sector 
and nongovernment organizations as well 
as governments and the international 
community; commission further analysis 
to address any key gaps in the existing 
knowledge base, relating to types of 
hazard, sectors of analysis, and scales of 
intervention; provide related technical 
training on the application of relevant 
analytical tools in this area; and highlight 
potential mechanisms to enhance 
rewards for investments today that 
deliver benefits tomorrow. Dissemination 
activities can be included to inform 
individual citizens about the net benefits 
of potential DRM actions that they could 
take and to enhance their capacity to 
assess public DRM policies and actions, 
thereby strengthening political reward for 
investment in resilience.
Achieving the Vision:  
Coordinated Action
Policy makers, legislators, governments, the 
private sector, communities, households, and 
the international community all have a role to 
play in ensuring that these critical next steps 
lead to further actions that will ultimately 
result in the achievement of a resilient future. 
Each group has an important role. No group 
or even single entity is too small to play a part 
in strengthening resilience. The importance 
of national governments creating an enabling 
environment that permits and encourages 
subnational governments, the private sector 
and local communities to experiment and 
develop homegrown resilient choices cannot 
be underestimated.
The sum of parts will be far greater, 
however, if there is strong collaboration and 
coordination along an agreed-upon common 
path toward clear common goals, exploit-
ing interconnectedness and linkages, and 
if individual resilience actions are carefully 
integrated into wider development concerns. 
This collaboration needs to occur at all tiers of 
governance—international, national, regional, 
subregional, and community. It will not occur 
on its own. Instead, governments and the 
international community need to guide and 
encourage collaboration both in designing and 
implementing public measures and actions 
and in stimulating parallel private sector and 
household initiatives. 
Achieving the Vision:  
Prioritizing Resources
A key part of the solution hinges on 
resources—money, know-how, and human 
resources. Resource needs are enormous, and 
resource envelopes limited, implying that hard 
choices must be made. Working together, policy 
makers, legislators, governments, the private 
sector, civil society, communities, individual 
households, and the international community 
must determine which actions to prioritize. 
They need to consider the cost-effectiveness of 
different options, their relative scale of potential 
effects, and, particularly in the case of public 
investments, their potential contribution to 
key development objectives, including poverty 
reduction, as well as enhanced resilience. 
Choices must be made in the context of desired 
outcomes; prevailing circumstances, including 
key gaps and obstacles; resource availability; 
and specific opportunities to effect change. 
Achieving the Vision:  
Reflecting Prevailing 
Political Economy Realities
Analysis of prevailing power relations 
and political incentives is essential in 
understanding the political constraints 
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within which resilience strategies will be 
implemented and in identifying bundles 
of actions that have a greater likelihood 
of enduring success. Altering the power 
relations and political incentives themselves 
is an enormously difficult and lengthy task. 
However, strengthened knowledge and 
understanding of disaster risk and the net 
benefits of disaster risk reduction options, 
including wider equity and macroeconomic 
benefits, can play an important role in helping 
to shift the balance of incentives in favor 
of strengthened resilience. Knowledge and 
understanding enables citizens and interest 
groups to monitor and judge the actions 
of others in both creating disaster risk and 
strengthening resilience.
Specific time-bound political opportunities 
for change should also be seized. These may 
arise, for instance, in the aftermath of a major 
disaster when there is strong public demand 
to avoid a repeat event or when a resilience 
champion comes to the fore. However, it 
should be recognized these opportunities are 
often short-lived and their impacts on the 
balance of political incentives in favor and 
against strengthened resilience typically only 
temporary. As such, the actions they trigger 
should be carefully selected to maximize the 
possibility of long-term benefit despite likely 
backward shifts in political motivation for 
strengthened resilience. 
Monitoring Progress  
and Achievements
Progress toward a resilient future can be 
carefully tracked to ensure that identified 
steps are taken and that potential unforeseen 
obstacles along the way are overcome, thereby 
helping to ensure that the intended end 
outcome is achieved. Detailed frameworks 
can be developed to monitor and evaluate 
progress, potentially covering a wide array 
of legislative, regulatory, policy, planning, 
institutional, financial, and capacity-building 
instruments and mechanisms. There are three 
critical outcome indicators:
•	 There is a long-term decline in the direct 
human and physical losses and indirect 
impacts occurring as a consequence of 
natural hazard events.
•	 This decline is apparent in regional, 
national, and subnational data.
•	 The decline holds for both low-impact/
high-frequency and high-impact/low-
frequency events.
In the more immediate term, broad 
progress can be measured according to the 
following indicators:
•	 Disaster risk data at appropriate levels of 
resolution are readily available, reliable, 
up to date, and regularly used to inform 
government, private sector, community, 
household, and international 
development partner investment 
decisions and actions.
•	 The government has a comprehensive 
DRM strategy in place, which is fully 
integrated into wider national and 
local socioeconomic and physical 
development planning frameworks 
and processes; sector strategies; 
legal, regulatory, and institutional 
arrangements; operational processes; 
and budgetary systems and 
appropriations.
•	 There is a reduction in national 
dependence on international disaster 
assistance, in local government 
dependence on federal support, 
and in private sector and household 
dependence on public support in the 
event of a disaster. 

References and 
Glossary 

References
Adams, R. H., H. de Haas, R. Jones, and U. O. Osili, eds. 2012. Migrant remittances and 
development: Research perspectives. SSRC Web Anthology Second Edition. Brooklyn, 
NY: Social Science Research Council.
ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2009. Natural catastrophe risk insurance mechanisms for Asia 
and the Pacific: Main report. Manila.
———. 2011. Guidelines for climate proofing investment in the transport sector: Road infrastructure 
projects. Manila.
———. n.d. Statistical database system. https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp.
ADB (Asian Development Bank) and ADBI (Asian Development Bank Institute). 2009. 
Infrastructure for a seamless Asia. Manila and Tokyo.
Aon Benfield. 2011. Chile: One year on. London: Aon Benfield Inc. Available at http://www.
preventionweb.net/files/20701_201102chileoneyearonreport1.pdf
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). 2011. APEC High Level Policy Dialogue on Disaster 
Resiliency. Available at http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Ministerial-Statements/
High-Level-Policy-Dialogue/2011_disaster.aspx.
Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. 2010. Incheon Declaration on Disaster 
Risk Reduction in Asia and the Pacific 2010. Fourth Asian Ministerial Conference on 
Disaster Risk Reduction, Incheon, Republic of Korea, 25–28 October.
Asian Tiger Capital Partners. 2010. A strategy to engage the private sector in climate change 
adaptation in Bangladesh. Report prepared for the International Finance Corporation. 
Panthapath, Bangladesh.
Bahadur, A. V., M. Ibrahim, and T. Tanner. 2010. The resilience renaissance: Unpacking of 
resilience for tackling climate change and disasters. Strengthening Climate Resilience 
Discussion Paper 1. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
Bendimerad, F. 2003. Building a disaster management program for a megacity. Paper presented 
at the Third Annual Meeting of the Disaster Prevention Research Institute of the Kyoto 
University and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, 
Austria, on Integrated Disaster Risk Management: Coping with Regional Vulnerability, 
Kyoto International Conference Hall Kyoto, Japan, 3–5 July.
Benson, C. 2009. Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development: challenges and experience 
in the Philippines. Geneva: ProVention Consortium.
———. 2010. Economic and social analysis of natural disasters in the Asia–Pacific region. Bangkok: 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
———. 2011a. Dzud disaster financing and response in Mongolia. Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2011b. Financing disaster risk reduction: A strategic framework to stimulate greater 
public and private investment. Draft. Geneva: United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction.
Benson, C., M. Arnold, and I. Christoplos. 2009. Disaster risk financing consultative brief. Geneva: 
ProVention Consortium.
Benson, C., M. Arnold, A. de la Fuente, and R. Mearns. 2012. Financial innovations for social and 
climate resilience: Establishing an evidence base—Framework paper. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
162 References
Benson, C., R. P. Gyanwaly, and H. P. Regmi. 2009. Economic and financial decision making 
in disaster risk reduction: Nepal case study. Geneva: United Nations Development 
Programme.
Benson, C., and O. Mahul. Forthcoming. Risk assessment and management of disasters from a 
fiscal perspective: Framework paper. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Benson, C., and J. Twigg. 2007. Tools for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction: Guidance notes for 
development organisations. Geneva: ProVention Consortium.
Bettencourt. S., R. Croad, P. Freeman, J. Hay, R. Jones, P. King, P. Lal, A. Mearns, G. Miller, I. 
Pswarayi-Riddihough, A. Simpson, N. Teuatabo, U. Trotz, and M. K. van Aalst. 2006. 
Not if but when: Adapting to natural hazards in the Pacific Islands region—A policy note. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Bhattacharyay, B. N. 2010. Estimating demand for infrastructure in energy, transport, 
telecommunications, water and sanitation in Asia and the Pacific: 2010–2020. ADBI 
Working Paper No. 248. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute.
———. 2011. Financing infrastructure for connectivity: Policy implications for Asia. Research 
Policy Brief 33. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute.
Carmin, J., N. Nadkami, and C. Rhie. 2012. Progress and challenges in urban climate adaptation 
planning: Results of a global survey. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Central Bureau of Statistics. 2011. Third Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS-III). Kathmandu, 
Nepal: Central Bureau of Statistics.
Central Institute for Economic Management. 2012. Social protection system ineffective for farmers. 
Available at http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/society/24714/social-protection-system-
ineffective-for-farmers.html.
Chambers, R., and G. Conway. 1992. Sustainable rural livelihoods: Practical concepts for the 21st 
century. IDS Discussion Paper 296. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
Climate Risk Disclosure Initiative Steering Committee. 2006. Global Framework for Climate Risk 
Disclosure: A statement of investor expectations for comprehensive corporate disclosure.
Available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/global_framework.pdf.
Comerio, M. C. 2000. The economic benefits of a disaster resistant university: Earthquake loss 
estimation for UC Berkeley. Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley, Institute 
of Urban and Regional Development.
Cowan, H., and I. Simpson. 2012. Planning for disasters and responding to unforeseen complexity: 
The First Large Test For The New Zealand Earthquake Commission. In Catastrophic 
Complexity 2011–Conference Papers, 12th Biennial Aon Benfield Hazards Conference, 
29 September–1 October 2011. Aon Benfield.
CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters). EM-DAT: The International 
Disaster Database. http://www.emdat.be.
Cummins, J. D., and O. Mahul. 2009. Catastrophe risk financing in developing countries: Principles 
for public intervention—Overview. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Cuny, F. C. 1983. Disasters and development. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
DFID (Department for International Development of the United Kingdom). 2011. Defining 
disaster resilience: A DFID approach paper. London.
Dreborg, K. H. 1996. Essence of backcasting. Futures 28(9):813–838.
 References 163
DuPont, W., and I. Noy. 2012. What happened to Kobe? A reassessment of the impact of the 
1995 earthquake in Japan. University of Hawaii Working Paper No. 12-4. Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii in Manoa, Department of Economics.
Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative. 2010. Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in megacities: 
A pilot application in Metro Manila and Kathmandu—Risk-sensitive land use plan, 
Kathmandu Metropolitan City, Nepal. Available at http://www.emi-megacities.org/
upload/projectdocs/dkkv/RSLUP_KMC.pdf
Geurs, K., and B. van Wee. 2004. Backcasting as a tool for sustainable transport policy making: 
The environmentally sustainable transport study in the Netherlands. European Journal 
of Transport and Infrastructure Research 4(1): 47–69.
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. 2010. It is not too late: Preparing for Asia’s 
next big earthquake with emphasis on the Philippines, Indonesia and [People’s Republic 
of] China. Washington, DC: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery and 
the World Bank.
Government of India. 2009. Revision in EFC format to address disaster management concerns. 
Office memorandum No. 37(4)/PF.II/2003. New Delhi: Government of India.
———. 2010. Guidelines for formulation, appraisal and approval of government plan funded 
projects/schemes to be made effective w.e.f. 1st April 2010. Office memorandum No. 
1(3)/PF.II/2001. New Delhi. Available at http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_
expenditure/plan_finance2/guideline_formulation_app_approv_01042010.pdf.
———. 2012. Circulation of revised formats of EFC/PIB memorandum. Office memorandum 
No. 1(1)2011-PF.II. New Delhi.
Government of Indonesia and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2009. 
Lessons learned: Disaster management legal reform—The Indonesian experience. 
Available at http://www.undp.or.id/pubs/docs/Lessons%20Learned%20Disaster%20
Management%20Legal%20Reform.pdf
Government of New Zealand. 2011. Monthly Economic Indicators: January 2011. Wellington: 
Treasury.
Government of the People’s Republic of China. 2012. [People’s Republic of] China’s comprehensive 
disaster prevention and reduction plan (2011–2015). Beijing: Office of the National 
Commission for Disaster Reduction. 
Government of Thailand. 2012. Monthly Economic Report (March and Q1 2012). Bangkok: 
Ministry of Finance. Available at http://www2.mof.go.th/economic_report_detail.
php?id=74
Group of Twenty (G20). 2012. 2012 Progress Report of the Development Working Group– 
Los Cabos, Mexico, June 19, 2012. Available at http://www.g20.org/images/stories/
docs/g20/conclu/2012_Progress_Report_Of_The_Development_Working_Group.pdf 
(accessed on 24 June 2012).
Guy Carpenter and Company Ltd. 2011. Managing catastrophe model uncertainty: Issues 
and challenges. Available at http://guycarp.com/portal/extranet/insights/reports.
html?vid=114.
Hallegatte, S. 2011. How economic growth and rational decisions can make disaster losses 
grow faster than wealth. Policy Research Working Paper No. 5617. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
Hallegatte, S., and M. Ghil. 2007. Endogenous business cycles and the economic response to 
exogenous shocks. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 20. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968378.
164 References
Hazell, P., and U. Hess. 2010. Drought insurance for agricultural development and food security 
in dryland areas. Food Security 2(4):395–405.
Hochrainer-Stigler, S., H. Kunreuther, J. Linnerooth-Bayer, R. Mechler, E. Michel-Kerjan, 
R. Muir-Wood, N. Ranger, P. Vaziri, and M. Young. 2011. The costs and benefits of 
reducing risk from natural hazards to residential structures in developing countries. 
Working Paper No. 2011-01. Philadelphia: The Wharton School.
Holland, P. 2008. An economic analysis of flood warning in Navua, Fiji. Available at http://www.
sopac.org/data/virlib/ER/ER0122.pdf.
IDNDR (International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction). 1994. Yokohama Strategy and 
Plan of Action for a Safer World. Geneva: United Nations.
IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). 2002. World disasters 
report: Focus on reducing risk. Geneva.
———. 2009. Assessing quality and cost benefit: A Philippines case study. Geneva.
———. 2011. Public awareness and public education for disaster risk reduction: A guide. Available 
at http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/reducing_risks/302200-Public-
awareness-DDR-guide-EN.pdf. 
Intellecap. 2010. Opportunities for private sector engagement in urban climate change resilience 
building. Bangkok and Hyderabad: Rockefeller Foundation and Intellecap.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2007. Climate change 2007: Synthesis 
report. In Fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
edited by R. K. Pachauri and A. Reisinger. Geneva. Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_
report.htm
———. 2012. Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change 
adaptation: A special report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change. Geneva.
ISO (International Organization for Standardization). 2009. ISO 31000:2009. Risk management—
Principles and guidelines for implementation. Geneva.
International Recovery Platform. 2010. Guidance note on recovery: Governance. Kobe: 
International Recovery Platform Secretariat. Available at http://www.recoveryplatform.
org/assets/Guidance_Notes/INTERNATIONAL_GOVERNANCE_150910.pdf
Keefer, P. 2009. Disastrous consequences: the political economy of disaster risk reduction. Paper 
commissioned by the Joint World Bank–United Nations Project on the Economics of 
Disaster Risk Reduction. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Ketkar, S. L., and D. Ratha. 2007. Development finance via diaspora bonds: Track record and 
potential. Paper presented at the Migration and Development Conference at the World 
Bank, Washington, DC, 23 May.
———. 2011. Diaspora bonds: Tapping the diaspora during difficult times. In Diaspora for 
Development in Africa, edited by S. Plaza and D. Ratha. Washington, DC: International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, pp. 127–143. Available at http://
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/ 
05/05/000333037_20110505005550/Rendered/PDF/616380PUB0Dias1351B0Extop0I
D0182580.pdf
Kohli, H. S., A. Sharma, and A. Sood. 2010. Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian century. New Delhi: 
Sage Publications.
 References 165
Kunreuther, H., and E. Michel-Kerjan. 2010. Market and government failure in insuring and 
mitigating natural catastrophes: How long-term contracts can help. In Private markets 
and public insurance programs, edited by J. Brown. Washington, DC: American 
Enterprise Institute Press.
Mechler, R. 2005. Cost–benefit analysis of natural disaster risk management in developing countries: 
Manual. Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).
Melecky, M., and C. Raddatz. 2011. How do governments respond after catastrophes? Natural-
disaster shocks and the fiscal stance. Policy Research Working Paper 5564. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
Mileti, D. 1999. Disasters by design: A reassessment of natural hazards in the United States. 
Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press. 
Mohapatra, S., G. Joseph, and D. Ratha. 2009. Remittances and natural disasters: Ex-post 
response and contribution to ex-ante preparedness. Policy Research Working Paper 
4972. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Munich Re. 2010. Protecting cooperatives and their low-income members in the Philippines 
against extreme weather events through microinsurance. Press release, 11 October. 
Munich: Munich Reinsurance Company.
Nathe, S., and P. Dimond. 2005. Becoming a disaster-resistant university. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California at Berkeley, Office of Business Resumption and Office of the Vice Provost 
for Academic Planning and Facilities.
National Academy of Science. 2012. Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative. Committee on 
Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters and Committee on Science, 
Engineering, and Public Policy. Prepublication version. Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press.
OAS (Organization of American States). 1990. Disasters, planning, and development: Managing 
natural hazards to reduce loss. Washington, DC.
———. 1991. Primer on natural hazard management in integrated regional development planning. 
Washington, DC.
Powers, J., B. Magnoni, and E. Zimmerman. 2011. Formalizing the informal insurance 
inherent in migration: Exploring the potential links between migration, remittances 
and microinsurance. Microinsurance Innovation Facility Briefing Note 4. Geneva: 
International Labour Organization.
Robinson, J. B. 1990. Futures under glass: A recipe for people who hate to predict. Futures 
(October), pp. 820–842.
SMEC and IID (Institute for International Development). 2006. Local government land use 
planning and risk mitigation: National research paper. Project No. 3004-124. Carnegie, 
Australia.
Subbiah, A. R., L. Bildan, and R. Narasimhan. 2009. Regional integrated multi-hazard early 
warning system: Background paper on assessment of the economics of early warning 
systems for disaster risk reduction. Paper submitted to the World Bank Group Global 
Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery for Contract 7148513. Bangkok: Asian 
Disaster Preparedness Center.
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. 2011. Disaster risk reduction in international 
cooperation: Switzerland’s contribution to the protection of lives and livelihoods. Berne, 
Switzerland.
166 References
Swiss Re. 2011. Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2011: A year of devastating and 
costly events. Sigma 1/2011. Zurich: Swiss Reinsurance Company.
———. 2012. Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2011: Historic losses surface from 
record earthquakes and floods. Sigma 2/2012. Zurich: Swiss Reinsurance Company.
Swiss Re Economic Research and Consulting. 2012. Swiss Re Sigma Disaster Database.
UN (United Nations). 2009. Creating linkages for a safer tomorrow: Proceedings of the 
Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, Second Session, Geneva, Switzerland, 
16–19 June 2009. New York. Available at http://www.preventionweb.net/files/
section/193_GPProceedingsFINAL.pdf.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2005. A global review: UNDP support to 
institutional and legislative systems for disaster risk management. Executive summary. 
Geneva.
UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction). 2000. A guide to the 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). Geneva.
———. 2008. Private Sector Activities in Disaster Risk Reduction: Good Practices and Lessons 
Learned. Bonn: UNISDR Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning, December.
———. 2009. 2009 UNISDR terminology on disaster risk reduction. Geneva. Available at http://
www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf
———. 2011. 2011 global assessment report on disaster risk reduction: Revealing risk, redefining 
development. Geneva. Available at http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/
gar/2011/en/home/download.html
———. 2012a. How to make cities more resilient: A handbook for local government leaders. A 
contribution to the global campaign 2010–2015 Making Cities Resilient – My City is 
Getting Ready! Geneva.
———. 2012b. A toolkit for local governments—The 10 essentials for making cities resilient. Geneva. 
Available at http://www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/toolkit/essentials
———. n.d. Adaptation to climate change by reducing disaster risks: Country practices 
and lessons. Briefing note 02. Geneva: United Nations International Strategy 
for Disaster Reduction. Available at http://www.preventionweb.net/files/11775 
_UNISDRBriefingAdaptationtoClimateCh.pdf
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2012. Financial Tracking 
Service. Available at http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencies&
section=ND&Year=2010
University of California, Berkeley. 2000. Strategic plan for loss reduction and risk management. 
Working paper 2000-03. Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley, Institute of 
Urban and Regional Development.
UN ESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific). 2011. 
Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2011. Bangkok.
Vishokarma, J. S. 2012. Potential disasters in the education sector and their risk management 
in Nepal. Paper presented at the Seminar on Public Sector Excellence—Disaster Risk 
Management, sponsored by ADB and the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Singapore, 16–19 April.
Vishokarma, J. S., R. H. Dahal, S. P. Acharaya, R. Guragain, and A. M. Dixit. 2012. Implementing 
school retrofitting program in Nepal: Experiences and lessons learned. Paper presented 
at the 15th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Lisbon, 24–28 September.
 References 167
von Einsiedel, N., F. Bendimerad, A. Rodil, and M. Deocariza. 2010. The Challenge of Urban 
Redevelopment in Disaster-Affected Communities. Environment and Urbanization Asia 
1(1):27–44. 
Ward, R. E. T., C. Herweijer, N. Patmore, and R. Muir-Wood. 2008. The role of insurers in 
promoting adaptation to the impacts of climate change. The Geneva Papers 33:133–139.
Warner, K., N. Ranger, S. Surminski, M. Arnold, J. Linnnerooth-Bayer, E. Michel-Kerjan, 
P. Kovacs, and C. Herweijer. 2009. Adaptation to climate change: Linking disaster risk 
reduction and insurance. Geneva: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction.
White, B. A., and M. M. Rorick. 2010. Cost-benefit analysis for community-based disaster risk 
reduction in Kailali, Nepal. Kathmandu: Mercy Corps Nepal.
Williams, G. 2011. Study on Disaster Risk Reduction, Decentralization and Political Economy: 
The Political Economy of Disaster Risk Reduction. Background report for the Global 
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva: United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction.
Woodruff, A. 2008. Samoa technical report: Economic analysis of flood risk reduction measures for 
the Lower Vaisigano Catchment Area. Available at http://map.sopac.org/data/virlib/ER/
ER0069g.pdf
World Bank. 2006. Ethiopia: Managing water resources to maximize sustainable growth— 
A World Bank water resources assistance strategy for Ethiopia. Report No. 36000-ET. 
Washington, DC.
———. 2007. Philippines: Agriculture public expenditure review. Technical Working Paper 40493. 
Washington, DC.
———. 2011. Pacific catastrophe risk assessment and financing initiative: Country risk profiles. 
Washington, DC.
———. 2012a. FONDEN: Mexico’s natural disaster fund—A review. Washington, DC: International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank.
———. 2012b. The Sendai report: Managing disaster risks for a resilient future. Washington, DC.
World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. 2012a. Advancing disaster 
risk financing and insurance in ASEAN member states: Framework and options for 
implementation. Volume 1: Main report. Washington, DC.
———. 2012b. Advancing disaster risk financing and insurance in ASEAN member states: 
Framework and options for implementation. Volume 2: Main report. Washington, DC.
World Bank and United Nations. 2010. Natural hazards, unnatural disasters: The economics of 
effective prevention. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/World Bank.
Glossary
Adverse selection. A condition arising from information asymmetry in which the insured knows 
more about the risk insured than the insurer—resulting in participation by high-risk individuals 
and nonparticipation by low-risk individuals.
Alternative risk transfer. Any nontraditional form of insurance risk transfer (Cummins and 
Mahul 2009). 
Annual expected loss. Expected loss per year when averaged over a very long period (for 
example, 1,000 years). Computationally, annual expected loss is the summation of products of 
event losses and event occurrence probabilities for all stochastic (random) events in a loss model 
(Cummins and Mahul 2009). 
Backcasting. An approach that seeks to determine how to attain desirable ends or visions of the 
future. It focuses on these visions, rather than on present conditions and current trends, seeking 
to work backward from visions of the future to the determination of their feasibility and the policy 
measures required to achieve them. It is typically applied to complex and important long-term 
issues (Robinson 1990; Dreborg 1996). 
Capacity. The combination of all the strengths, attributes, and resources available to an individual, 
community, society, or organization, which can be used to achieve established goals (IPCC 2012). 
Catastrophe bond. High-yield insurance-linked security providing for payment of interest and/or 
principal to be suspended or canceled in the event of a specified disaster, such as an earthquake 
(Cummins and Mahul 2009).
Climate change adaptation. In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural 
systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may 
facilitate adjustment to expected climate (IPCC 2012).
Contingent emergency liquidity. Prearranged disaster funding, either credit- or insurance-based, 
that can be accessed promptly in the event of a qualifying disaster event and directed as needed by 
the borrower or insured.
Disaster. Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a society due to hazardous 
physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread adverse human, 
material, economic, or environmental effects that require immediate emergency response to satisfy 
critical human needs and that may require external support for recovery (IPCC 2012). 
Disaster risk. The likelihood over a specified time period of severe alterations in the normal 
functioning of a community or a society due to hazardous physical events interacting with 
vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread adverse human, material, economic, or 
environmental effects that require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs 
and that may require external support for recovery (IPCC 2012). 
Disaster risk financing. Application of financial instruments as part of a systematic approach to 
managing disasters in order to anticipate, plan for, reduce, transfer, and respond to natural hazard 
events. It is intended to capture various financial mechanisms and policy options that enable 
greater financial resilience to natural hazards.
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Disaster risk management. Processes for designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies, 
policies, and measures to improve the understanding of disaster risk, foster disaster risk reduction 
and transfer, and promote continuous improvement in disaster preparedness, response, and 
recovery practices, with the explicit purpose of increasing human security, well-being, quality of 
life, and sustainable development (IPCC 2012).
Disaster risk reduction. Denotes both a policy goal or objective and the strategic and 
instrumental measures employed for anticipating future disaster risk; reducing existing exposure, 
hazard, or vulnerability; and improving resilience (IPCC 2012).
Disaster risk transfer. A contractual process whereby the burden of financial loss (arising as 
a consequence of a natural hazard) is shifted to another party via the use of insurance or other 
financing instruments in return for a payment or premium. 
Diversification. The variety of assets within a portfolio in terms of its geographic or sectoral 
spread, or in terms of its credit quality. In general, risk is reduced as portfolio diversification 
increases (Cummins and Mahul 2009).
Expected return period. The mean period between similar hazard events in a defined 
geographical area. 
Exposure. The presence of people; livelihoods; environmental services and resources; 
infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural assets in places that could be adversely affected 
(IPCC 2012). 
The amount (sum insured) exposed to the insured peril(s) at any one time (Cummins and  
Mahul 2009).
Fiscal risk. The likelihood that there will be a shortfall in projected government revenue or 
additional unforeseen government expenditure requirements, beyond those included in the 
annual budget. This risk may stem from a range of factors, including natural hazard events.
Hazard. The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event that may cause 
loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, 
livelihoods, service provision, and environmental resources (IPCC 2012).
Hazardscape. The exposure and vulnerability of a particular place, its people, and its assets to 
the full range of hazards that it faces, including natural, environmental, health, and technological 
hazards. It links the dimensions of earthbound atmospheric, hydrologic, and geologic processes 
and human interventions with the spatial dimension of land use, the built environment,  
and ecosystems.
Insurance. A financial mechanism that aims to reduce the uncertainty of loss by pooling a large 
number of uncertainties so that the burden of loss is distributed. Generally, each policyholder 
pays a contribution to a fund, in the form of a premium, commensurate with the risk he or she 
introduces. The insurer uses these funds to pay the losses (indemnities) suffered by any of the 
insured (Cummins and Mahul 2009). 
Insurance capacity. The maximum amount of insurance or reinsurance that the insurer or 
reinsurer or insurance market will accept (Cummins and Mahul 2009).
Land use planning. The process undertaken by public authorities to identify, evaluate, and decide 
on different options for the use of land, including consideration of long-term economic, social,  
and environmental objectives and the implications for different communities and interest groups, 
and the subsequent formulation and promulgation of plans that describe the permitted or 
acceptable uses (UNISDR 2009).
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Livelihood. The capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources), and activities 
required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from 
stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, 
while not undermining the natural resource base (DFID 2011; adapted from Chambers and 
Conway 1992). 
Moral hazard. The problems generated when the insured’s behavior can influence the extent of 
damage that qualifies for insurance payouts (Cummins and Mahul 2009).
Parametric insurance. An insurance contract in which payment is based on the occurrence of a 
specified event, as opposed to the measure of loss suffered by the insured (ADB 2009).
Premium. The monetary sum payable by the insured to the insurers for the period (or term) of 
insurance granted by the policy (Cummins and Mahul 2009).
Probable maximum loss. The largest loss believed to be possible for a certain type of event in a 
defined return period, such as once in 100 years (Cummins and Mahul 2009).
Reinsurance. Insurance that insurance companies purchase in order to smooth results over time, 
limit their exposure to individual risks, increase solvency, and spread risk more broadly among a 
greater number of market participants.
Residual risk. The risk that remains in unmanaged form, even when effective disaster risk 
reduction measures are in place, and for which emergency response and recovery capacities must 
be maintained (UNISDR 2009).
Resilience. The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or 
recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through 
ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and 
functions (IPCC 2012).
Retrofit. Reinforcement or upgrading of existing structures to become more resistant and resilient 
to the damaging effects of hazards (UNISDR 2009). 
Risk assessment. A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by analyzing 
potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that together could 
potentially harm exposed people, property, services, livelihoods, or the environment on which 
they depend (UNISDR 2009). 
Risk layering. The process of separating risk into tiers that allow for more efficient financing and 
management of risks (Cummins and Mahul 2009). 
Risk modeling. The use of computer simulations to calculate the risk of natural disasters and 
resulting monetary loss based on asset values at risk, vulnerabilities, and a range of likely natural 
hazard occurrences. 
Risk pool. An aggregation of individual, roughly homogenous risks that yields a mean average 
consistent with actual outcomes, thus allowing an accurate prediction of future losses and the 
setting of accurate premium rates (Cummins and Mahul 2009). 
Risk transfer. The process of shifting the burden of financial loss or responsibility for risk 
financing to another party, through insurance, reinsurance, legislation, or other means (Cummins 
and Mahul 2009).
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Sustainable development. Development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (IPCC 2012). 
Transboundary hazard. The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event 
that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, 
infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, and environmental resources, and which impacts 
more than one country.
Vulnerability. The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected (IPCC 2012).

Ensuring a Disaster-Resistant Future
Investing in R
esilience: E
nsuring a D
isaster-R
esistant Future
Investing in 
Resilience
Investing in Resilience 
Ensuring a Disaster-Resistant Future
Investing in Resilience: Ensuring a Disaster-Resistant Future focuses on the steps required 
to ensure that investment in disaster resilience happens and that it occurs as an integral, 
systematic part of development. At-risk communities in Asia and the Pacific can apply a wide 
range of policy, capacity, and investment instruments and mechanisms to ensure that disaster 
risk is properly assessed, disaster risk is reduced, and residual risk is well managed. Yet, real 
progress in strengthening resilience has been slow to date and natural hazards continue to 
cause significant loss of life, damage, and disruption in the region, undermining inclusive, 
sustainable development.
Investing in Resilience offers an approach and ideas for reflection on how to achieve 
disaster resilience. It does not prescribe specific courses of action but rather establishes 
a vision of a resilient future. It stresses the interconnectedness and complementarity of 
possible actions to achieve disaster resilience across a wide range of development policies, 
plans, legislation, sectors, and themes. The vision shows how resilience can be accomplished 
through the coordinated action of governments and their development partners in the private 
sector, civil society, and the international community. The vision encourages “investors” to 
identify and prioritize bundles of actions that collectively can realize that vision of resilience, 
breaking away from the current tendency to pursue disparate and fragmented disaster 
risk management measures that frequently trip and fall at unforeseen hurdles. Investing 
in Resilience aims to move the disaster risk reduction debate beyond rhetoric and to help 
channel commitments into investment, incentives, funding, and practical action.
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